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Notes on Translations, PaH and Sinhala words
This thesis contains numerous Sinhala, Tamil, Pali, and Sanskrit words. Except for
popularly Anglicized terms such as karma, Buddha, Colombo, and Tamil, we have adopted
the convention used by scholars in the field of Buddhist studies. This thesis uses the
convention adopted by the Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism 2004 edition for transliterating
Buddhist/Theravadin terms and concepts.
There are differences in the way a Pali word appears in its original form and how it
is used in Sinhala. For example, the word Bhikkhu in Pali is Bhikshu in Sinhala. We have
used the original Sinhala form, as the context demands it and most references are in Sinhala
texts. In regards to the names of Sangha, we have used the transliterations done by scholars
such as Kitsiri Malalgoda (1976) and Ann Blackburn (2010). Names of popular/political
figures are abbreviated as they are used in popular discourse in Sri Lanka, such as SWRD
for S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, lR for 1. R. Jayewardene and NM for N. M. Perera.
Throughout this thesis, the term Sangha is used both in singular and plural and we use
Sinhala and Sinhalas to refer to the ethnic Sinhalas as against the traditional Anglicization
of the same as Sinhalese.
Tamil words and pronunciation are used as they are in the Sri Lankan Tamil
tradition, which may be different to that of Tamil Nadu. Where there was no original
English translation, we have ourselves translated some Sinhala and Tamil texts.
[iv]
Abstract
The ethnic conflict between the Tamil minority and the state of Sri Lanka turned into one of
the bloodiest and protracted civil wars in the modem history of South Asia. In its final stage
from 1995 to 2009, the war went through a textbook cycle from ceasefire to peace talks, to
the resumption of war, and to final military victory for the state. During this period, many
observers including governments and international organizations promoted federalism as a
possible solution to the conflict. However, the federal proposal for Lanka was not only
defeated but also provoked violent resistance led by the highly influential Buddhist monks-
the Sangha. Federalism not only failed as an instrument of peace; the very proposal led to
more violence and the intensification of the conflict.
This thesis is an inquiry into the question of how federalism became the reason for
violent resistance promoted by the Sangha, who are expected to adhere to ahimsa, non-
aggression and the non-violent, renouncer path of life.
The research adopted a case study method in order to reconstruct the life history and
mindsets of three Sangha activists, who changed the manner in which federalism was
received as an idea in Lanka. By analyzing the history of the resistance politics of the
Sinhala Sangha, this research found that Sangha resistance is not merely a colonial by-
product or post-colonial innovation but rather a direct expression of the Sinhala 'cosmion',
i.e. of a world of meaning in which Sinhala society appears as an analogue of the Buddhist
cosmic order. Within this cosmion, the Sangha playa crucial role as the mediators between
the cosmic order and its earthly manifestation. Peacebuilding projects and federal proposals
advanced by Western actors and their local supporters failed to appreciate this historical
Sinhala self-understanding, because their Western frameworks considered federalism as an
'export-ready' political template while the religious actors in Lanka featured as mere
'spoilers' in the inevitable process of modernization.
In conclusion, we argue that future peacebuilding in Lanka should consider two
approaches. On the one hand, recognize and appreciate the cultural role played by key
forces in Lankan society and, on the other, work with the self-understanding of these forces
in order to help them transcend the singular uniqueness of the position, which they think
they occupy in the world of Buddhism and beyond.
[v]
O. A Paradise - Poisoned?
Burden of the Past - Blunder of the Present
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0.1 Introduction
0.1.1 Research puzzle, methodology, and overview
Sometimes called the "Pearl of the Indian Ocean," Sri Lanka has during the last 40 years
often drawn attention to herself for reasons other than her tropical beauty.' Violence has Page I 2
been a constant feature in the history of the country since 1958, when Buddhist monk
Thudawe Somarama assassinated Prime Minister Bandaranaike. The 1971 Sinhala youth
rebellion, led by the Maoist Janatii Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), and the state's violent
response killed at least 75,000 people. The ethnic pogrom of 1983 killed at least 4,000
Tamil civilians and displaced over 150,000 Tamils in the south of Lanka. The second JVP
uprising, in 1988-89, is estimated to have led to the death of over 60,000 (largely Sinhala)
youth including some 5000 bhikkhus or Buddhist monks. From the 1980s to 2009, the war
between the separatist rebels, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the state
military claimed over 150,000 lives (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer 2000; Radhakrishnan
20 I0; Senarathne 1997; Spencer 1990; Kapferer 1988).
On 22 March 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva adopted
a resolution (A/HRC/19/L.2/Revl) regarding Lanka. In its resolution, "the Council called
on the Government to implement the recommendations made in its previous report and to
present as expeditiously as possible a comprehensive action plan detailing the steps it has
taken and will take towards that end, and also to address alleged violations of international
law." The 'previous report'f mentioned in the resolution claimed that there was credible
evidence that both belligerent parties had committed crimes against humanity, especially
during the last stages of the war, which ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE.
The British Channel Four has shown disturbing video evidence3 of 'killing fields' and
eyewitnesses too have come forward to suggest that some 40,000 civilians died during the
final days of the war (Weiss 2011).
How did Lanka - which prides herself on being the home of Theravada
Buddhism," a philosophy known for its emphasis on non-violence - engage in this
I The island is referred to by various names throughout its turbulent history - Tabrobane, Seylan, and Ceylon
are just a few names given to it by western travelers. Ceylon was renamed as Sri Lanka by the constitution
1972. This study will refer to the country as Lanka.
2 http://www.ohchr.org!enlNewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID= 1200 I&LangID=E, Accessed
10 April 2012
3 3 http://www.ohchr.org!enlNewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID= 1200 1&LangID=E, Accessed
10 April2012
4 Theravdda (translated as "teaching of the elders") is the only surviving school of Buddhism within the
Hinayana ("small vehicle") tradition. It is the dominant form of Buddhism in South-East Asia, and is
protracted war and deploy sinister terror and counter-insurgency military campaigns with
scant regard for civilian lives? How did a country permeated by Theravada Buddhist
teachings become a "killing field"? This broad question has generated a considerable
volume of literature. Lanka's post-independence political journey has been studied from a
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range of perspectives and by different scholarly disciplines ranging from anthropology to
postcolonial and subaltern studies (Goodhand, Korf and Spencer 2010; Grant 2009;
Gunathilake 1984; Imtiyaz and Stavis 2008; Spencer 1990; Uyangoda 2011, 2007).5 The
literature tends to converge on three key factors that contributed to the violence in Lanka:
(i) the ethno-national identity politics that have dominated the political arena in Lanka
from the early zo" century onwards, (ii) the dominance of Sinhala Buddhism in post-
independence Ceylon, and (iii) the failure to accommodate the political demands of the
Tamil minority.
This study will focus on a crucial segment of these complex developments: the
powerful role of the Sangha Buddhist monks in the contemporary politics of war and
peace in Lanka.6 It is not a coincidence that the period from 1995 to 2010, which saw the
political mobilisation of the Sangha, also saw the violent rejection of various power-
sharing proposals. It was the proposed power sharing with the Tamils through some kind
of federal arrangements that made the Sangha engage in violent political agitation. The
same period witnessed an evolution from conflict, to peace negotiations, to ceasefire
agreements, to international mediation, to constitutional proposals, and finally to the
resumption of the war leading to a violent military climax.
As we explore the role of the Sangha in Lankan politics and society, we are
especially interested in how and why they were hostile to peace proposals that involved
therefore sometimes referred to as Southern Buddhism. This significance of Theravada in the area is due to
the missionary activities of Emperor Asoka, who sent his Bhikkhu son Mahinda to Lanka around 245 BC.
Some scholars see Thetavada as one of four subdivisions of the Vibhajyaviidins (Distinctionists), each
flourishing in a different area, the other three being the Mahisiisakas in the Deccan, the Dharma-guptakas in
Central Asia, and the Kiisyapiyas in North India. The Vibhajyavadins were a continuation of the earliest
school, the Sthaviravddins of the First Council: they were so named because they distinguished themselves
from the heretical Pudgalavadins or Personalities, who asserted a kind of atmavada doctrine (Gombrich
2006).
5 For a wider bibliography on the conflict of Lanka see
http://www.ices.1k1sl_database/ethnic_conflictlbibliography.shtm1, accessed on 10 Aug 2011, and also
http://www.safur.orgiindex.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=350.
6 The term Sangha (or also Samgha) originally referred to the total community of four types of faithful
followers of the Buddhist community: (i) the ordained male-Bhikkhu, (ii) the ordained female-Bhikkhuni,
(iii) laymen Upasaka and (iv) lay women Upasika, However, as time passed, in Sinhala society, the ordained
Bhikkhus were referred to as the Sangha possibly due to the lead role they play in the Buddhist church. In
this study, the term Sangha is used in both the singular, to denote a monk and plural, to denote large gropu of
monks.
elements of power sharing and federalism.i Federalism is often recommended as an
institutional/constitutional modality for solving intra-state conflicts based on identity
features such as ethnicity, language, race, region or religion. Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Iraq and even the United Kingdom are contemporary states that have adopted
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varying degrees and forms of federal principles in order to resolve existing and potential
internal conflicts, create, and sustain stability. Parallel to this, already established federal
states such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States of America are
intensifying their federal politics in an attempt to allow for greater democratic
participation. In political science debates, federalism is generally accepted as a procedural
arrangement that allows government to function effectively even where societies are
divided or fragmented. Some societies, however, have resisted the federal solution. Lanka
is one such a state.
Federalism has been debated in Lanka for more than ninety years. As we will show
later in this introductory chapter, there are many good reasons why federalism appears to
be a natural solution to Lanka's problems. Neighbouring states such as India and Malaysia
adopted federal constitutions and have subsequently enjoyed political and economic
development. The regional and international communities generally supported a federal
"solution", and large sections of the Tamil and Muslim minorities were in favour as well.
However, can federalism really work in Lanka as believed by these agents? If so, why was
it rejected so violently? Nancy Bermeo has asked key questions at a more abstract level:
"How can states avoid ethnic violence and best accommodate multiple ethnicities? [... ] Is
adopting federalism the best way to cope with territorially based diversity? Simply, can we
import federalism as an institution?" (2002:96) In Lanka, these questions were answered
firmly in the negative. Lanka rejected any form of federal constitution and instead adopted
a military strategy, with huge human and material costs, to settle the protracted ethnic civil
war and re-centralize the state. Among those who rejected federalism, the Sangha formed
the most radical group, despite their position as the people who "embody" Theravada
Buddhism with its emphasis on or non-violence.
In this thesis, we explore how the political elite of the Sinhala majority, and
especially the powerful Sangha, responded to federalism. We will see that for the Sangha
and similarly radical groups, federalism was not a proposal to be rejected politically.
7 In this thesis, I use the term 'federalism' to denote constitutionally agreed governance which includes
elements of self-rule and collective shared rule (Anderson 2007; Burgess and Pinder 2007; Elazar 1987;
Seymour and Gagnon 2012 Watt 2008).
Rather, the very proposal itself - merely talking about power-sharing - fuelled the conflict
it was meant to pacify. Elite attitudes towards federalism will thus provide us with a lens
through which we can see in some detail the mind-set that determined Lanka's political
course during the period under investigation.
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Within the context of our investigation, our focus will be on the Sangha, as we
identify them as the key actors in Lankan politics and society. In order to be able to
understand the Sangha political influence, we will need to reconstruct how their political
attitudes are shaped and how, in turn, they are able to shape political attitudes in the
country. Moreover, as we look at the formation of their political attitudes, we must pay
special attention to the manner in which they reconcile their views - especially their
militant support of the war effort - with the normative Buddhist ethics that govern their
lives. These investigations will then bring into sharper focus more general questions such
as: Are modern political concepts such as federalism incompatible with the Sangha and
hence the Sinhala worldview? Why, indeed, is the discourse of political justice and liberal
peace repulsive to the majority of the Sinhalas?
In light of these questions, an interdisciplinary approach is essential as we explore
the political significance of Sinhala Buddhism and the Sangha, who as the unelected
agents of their religion managed to exert a key influence on state policies. In contrast to
the conventional approaches usually taken by scholars of Buddhism and its institutions, we
avoid focusing on Buddhist philosophy and the metaphysical dimension of the Theravada
school and its key texts, with the exception of some necessary references to selected
Theravadin concepts and Pali texts such as passages of the epic Mahiivamsa. Still, this is
not a study of the religious life of the Sangha or their siisana - the oldest surviving
institution based on Buddha's life and teaching. A considerable amount of literature on the
modern Sinhala Sangha fraternity is already available (Bartholomeusz 1988; Gombrich
1986; Malalgoda 1976; Seneviratne 1999). We add to the existing literature by focusing
specifically on the intersection of religion and politics. We aim to explore the Sangha self-
understanding in a political context. How do the Sangha understand what it means to be a
Sinhala Buddhist? Moreover, on that basis, how did they justify their response to the
minority demands for greater political equality during the protracted ethnic war?
During the three years since the military defeat of the LTTE, scholars have
proposed a range of explanations for the Lankan conflict. Among the more frequent
explanations are (i) the aggressive ethnoreligious nationalism of the Sinhalas;" (ii) the
ethnicity-based separatist terror politics of the Tamil Tigers; (iii) power contestation
among the Sinhala elites; and (iv) the incompatibility of an over-internationalized peace
process and the local/regional socio-political reaction. While all these theories contribute
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to our understanding of the war in Lanka and the failure of the peace efforts, this research
will focus specifically on the role of the Sinhala Sangha in mobilizing the Sinhalas to
pursue a military campaign rather than search for a power-sharing arrangement with the
Tamil minority. Focusing on the Sangha, and specifically their hardline attitude towards
power-sharing arrangements such as federalism, will help us appreciate the political nature
of Sinhala Buddhism. The political dimension of Sinhala Buddhism becomes especially
apparent during the period under investigation (1995 to 2010) because the international
peace process and the principles of modem liberal democracy and federalism on which it
drew tended to marginalize the Sangha, thus provoking a reaction. The broader and more
general question which is at stake here is whether the "principled distance" (Bhargava
2009,2007) between the secular state and religion" can indeed be maintained in traditional
societies" such as Lanka, where Buddhism and the Sangha are the principal political,
societal and cultural powers that inspire the majority of the population. Any process
aiming to facilitate a transition towards a liberal, democratic peace in Lanka must
appreciate the cultural dominance of Theravada Buddhism and hence of the Sangha.
0.1.2 The wider research context
The Lankan case helps us to explore the limits of the modem practice of promoting liberal
democratic peace in deeply divided states as an attempt to overcome the political and
cultural problems associated with division. Western states or groups, who are often eager
to implement some kind of federalist arrangement between the warring factions,
encouraging them to become equal members in a collective political, economic and social
bargaining process, generally mediate these peace efforts. Apart from the open advocacy
8 I use the term 'ethnoreligious' to indicate a group mobilization that combines a religious faith/practice with
a given ethnic identity such as 'Jewish' or 'Sikh' (Marty 1997; Thomas 2006; Winter 1996).
9 I use the concept of 'religion' in its broadest sense. For example, "religion" does not necessarily involve
belief that there is a God. As is well known, Buddhism does not advocate a concept of God. We understand
"religion" as a set of beliefs and practices dealing with spiritual and sacred ideas (Beckford 1999).
10 The term 'traditional society' is used to denote non-industrial societies and societies in transition from a
rural agrarian to a market-based capital economy. We do not wish to imply, of course, that 'traditional'
societies are marked by backwardness; rather, we wish to indicate that these societies approach
contemporary challenges in a particular manner in that their imagined or real past does not seem to
correspond with the present or a projected future (Giddens 1994; Rostow 1959).
of federalism, which as is often argued has deep Judeo-Christian roots, the very notion of
peace that underlies these attempts is also defined by Western concepts of conflict
resolution, reconciliation, minority rights and justice.
The kind of well-established "solutions" suggested and encouraged by external
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forces, even if they appear to be of universal appeal, do not always receive a favorable
response. In Lanka, Tamil separatists as well as Sinhala nationalists rejected the idea of
federalism because they had their own understanding of peace and justice based on
centuries-old perceptions of "self' and "other". Moreover, they not only rejected proposals
which many outside observers and commentators would have considered obvious
solutions; they even interpreted such well-meaning proposals as provocations, so that the
mere mention of federalism and power sharing fuelled the conflict rather than contributed
to its resolution. Western observers and politicians did not understand the dynamics of this
situation.
We do not wish to dismiss the efforts of the global peace industry and the INGO-
led conflict resolution campaigns simply because they were informed by Western models.
Our analysis must go deeper. We must reconstruct how exactly the most obvious proposal
turned out to be the most counter-productive. This is the area where we can learn much
from the Lankan contlict. The Norway-led peace negotiation, the Scandinavian ceasefire
monitoring, the US, EU and Japan-led reconstruction and development agenda, and
India's good will diplomacy - all failed to appreciate the importance of making the
Sangha an integral part of the various multi-track processes that were part of these efforts.
They either willfully or ignorantly tried to replace the hegemony of the Sangha with a
new, "modern" hegemony of Western ideas and practices. Even a cursory overview of the
situation of the Sangha would have made it clear that this was an important group on the
defensive. Given their classical self-understanding, their conceptualizing of Lanka as the
guardian of true Buddhism in the world, and given their outlook on the general (especially
the Western) secular world, it is clear that the Sangha viewed the war waged by the Tamil
Tigers as a siege. To them, the war was not only a real and concrete danger, but it was also
symbolic of the wider cosmic dangers that Buddhism faced in the modern world. The
failure of successive governments to tame the Tigers politically or militarily directly
threatened the self-understanding of the Sangha, who then proceeded to transmit their
anxiety to the lay society. The war was undoubtedly the most serious internal challenge to
the Sangha interpretation of Sinhala Buddhism and the state built upon it. In times of
national crisis, Sinhala Buddhists will seek the leadership of Sangha. This study is
interested in the political dimension of this leadership, and we will therefore focus on the
Sangha politics and their influence during the period from 1995 to 2010.
The dominant understanding of the Sangha in the context of the Lankan crisis is
that they were "spoilers" of the peace process (Brekke 2009; Goodhand and Korf 2010;
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Lewis 2010; Hoglun 2005). This characterization of the Sangha as "spoilers" implies that
they were a somewhat annoying disturbance rather than a central pillar of the process.
They represented backward and outdated forces, which fought, it was assumed, a hopeless
fight against modernity. This view, however, proved to be a costly mistake, not because it
led to wrong theories but also because it informed external interventions, which ultimately
made matters worse. Sinhala Sangha are not just "spoilers". As we shall explain in
subsequent chapters, they define the spiritual and socio-political culture of the Sinhala
nation. Consequently, attempts to introduce federalism without the support of the Sangha,
or even against their will, were counterproductive.
The example of Lanka allows us to explore the current limits of the Western
project to extend its modernity to other parts of the world. While academics in
international relations observe a "return of religion" in the politics of the 21 st century, the
situation in Lanka demonstrates that religion never ceased to be a key influence on politics
and society. It appears that academic observers, distracted by the ideological conflict of
the Cold War, simply overlook how politics is made in large parts of the world. However,
this "blind spot" is not just an academic problem; the peace efforts of the international
community reveal an analogous blindness. The idea that one could encourage/force Lanka
to adopt a federal system without including the Sangha in the negotiations displays a
considerable degree of ignorance of how the society and politics of Lanka work.
Predominant Western concepts still assume that ultimately religion is a backward force, to
be relegated to the realm of private beliefs, where it may "spoil" and, at worst, slow down
the inevitable advance of a Western, liberal-democratic rationality. Yet, it is precisely this
attitude, which provoked a strong militant resistance, and not just among the Sangha. This
study will explore the nature of this resistance.
0.1.3 Method and Structure
This thesis will combine a number of separate but related approaches in order to reflect the
richness and complexity of our subject. Much of our research is informed by a perspective,
which we call "historical-reconstructivist" (Habermas 1979), because the important role of
the Sangha in Lanka, especially their close relationship with the Lankan government, will
need to be historically reconstructed in order to appreciate how key patterns were created
in the early post-Buddha period. Thus, we do not take for granted existing patterns of
political relations as "natural" or "normal" but instead explore how they emerged
historically and how they evolved through time. In an approach, that draws inspiration
from Michel Foucault's genealogical method (Foucault 1977); we emphasize the
conditions of the emergence of patterns of relationships and the lasting effects of such
patterns and their evolution through time.
Again drawing on Foucault's terminology, we are especially interested in how the
Sangha, based on their historically evolved self-understanding and position within society,
"problematized" (Foucault 1984) various developments and challenges within Lanka and
from outside. As we shall see, the manner in which the Sangha problematized certain
challenges to their self-understanding shaped the space of possible responses that the
Lankan polity was able to give to those challenges. In this historical process, certain
dynamics emerge which lead us to talk about 'waves' of Sangha resistance. At various
stages in the development of the Lanka polity, the Sangha articulated their resistance to
proposals, which from their point of view threatened to undermine Lanka's unique
position as the primary representative and protector of Theravada Buddhism in the world.
Through these waves of resistance, the Sangha situated themselves within the Lankan
polity, culminating in the remarkable creation of a Sangha political party, the Jiithika Hela
Urumaya (JHU), and in the support, they offered to the war effort.
We thus find both an underlying continuity in Sangha mobilization and radical
changes in the manner in which the Sangha articulated and manifested their resistance.
What remains constant throughout this history is the background of Sinhala Buddhism,
and hence the Sangha have to refer to their selected Buddhist scriptures, texts and
practices as the unshakable foundation of everything they do. As we noted previously, and
as we have occasion to note throughout this study, the Sinhala Buddhist background forces
the Sangha to rationalize and justify the ethical choices they make, especially when it
comes to the use of violence. Changes in the Sinhala Sangha mindset can thus be traced by
looking at the manner in which they rationalize their actions in relation to their Buddhist
beliefs, historical texts and practices. We therefore will look at the lives of three key
Sangha in order to explore how they navigated their renouncer beliefs and became
political activists. The three Sangha leaders included in this part of the study are Venerable
Walpola Rahula, Venerable Gangodawila Soma, and Venerable Athuraliye Rathana.
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Looking at how the historical dynamic referred to above unfolded in their lives, and how
they in tum continued and shaped this dynamic, will allow us to conclude our historical
reconstruction by looking in depth at the mindset of the recent and current generation of
Sangha activists. Our accounts of the three Sangha obviously cannot aim to provide
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anything like full biographies, but at least we can try to establish how these activist-leaders
made their ethical choices and how they managed to mobilize large sections of the Sinhala
population to support their cause. The lives of the three Sangha thus become lenses
through which we can trace the overall historical dynamics as under a microscope.
As explained previously, we use the Sangha response to federalism as a further
focus in order to understand why exactly power-sharing proposals were considered so
dangerous and unacceptable. We have already alluded to the wider significance of this
question within the context of a world politics that continues to be dominated by Western
concepts. For this purpose, we will reconstruct the history of the debate on federalism in
Lanka, emphasizing key Sangha interventions. This part of our study will thus focus on
the concrete fate of a theme - federalism - in Lanka rather than on the life of Sangha
leaders. Both parts aim to give us a more detailed insight into the overall dynamics of the
Lankan polity.
This research benefitted from fieldwork we were able to conduct in Lanka.
Interviews were conducted with Venerable Athuraliye Rathana, one of the leading Sangha;
Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne, Prime Minister of Lanka and Minister of Buddhist
Affairs; Venerable Dr. Ittademaliye Indasara Thero, the Vice-Chancellor of the Buddhist
University; Venerable Professor Mahinda Sangharakkitha, Chief Sangha at the historical
Kelaniya Raja Maha Temple. Other interviews were conducted with officials in the
Ministry of Buddhasasana, academics and activists concerned with Sangha politics.
Throughout our research, we were able to draw on literature available in English, Sinhala
and Tamil. The research was also informed by our own experience as a peace activist with
key functions as a facilitator during the peace dialogues between the state of Lanka and the
now defeated Tamil Tiger rebels.
In accordance with the aim of our research and the approach chosen, the thesis has
the following structure: This introduction introduces some of the key themes of our
analysis. In particular, we will briefly look at the puzzle that motivates our research. Given
that many observers felt that there were in fact many good reasons to think that federalism
was a possible and promising solution to the violence and crisis in Lanka, it is even more
striking that the very proposal not only was not productive but also proved to be counter-
productive. The first chapter provides a historical introduction to the Sangha community,
their history, sources of inspiration, their self-understanding and their role in the Lankan
society and polity. Special attention will be paid to the importance of the Mahavamsa epic.
Chapter two looks more specifically at the history of the political involvement of the
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Sangha by investigating the various waves of resistance they offered at key transition
moments in the history of the Lankan polity and by looking at the lasting effects of this
resistance. Chapter three offers the above-mentioned discussion of three key Sangha
leaders in an attempt to understand in greater detail how they navigated the ethical choices
they had to make in order to combine their roles as world renouncers and political
activists. In chapter four, we will review the debate on federalism in Lanka and how it
intersected with the history of the polity of the country. In this context, we will also
compare the 'spirit' of federalism with the political dimension of the Theravada
cosmology.
In the final section of the fourth chapter, we will look back at the thesis as a whole,
provide a summary and draw our conclusions. What lessons can be learned from our
analysis for both the Lankan context and the wider international context? This final
chapter will also give us an opportunity to discuss what the future of the country may hold,
in light of recent events - especially the defeat of the LTTE. Will the LTTE defeat confirm
or end the historical dynamics our study has identified?
Only two years after the conclusion of the war, the Norwegian government
published a report highlighting the main consequences of the war. According to the report,
six major trends can be observed:
• Sinhala nationalism is now firmly back at the center of power.
• A new political dynasty (Rajapakse) has emerged, challenging the
dominance of the English-speaking political families that traditionally held
power or were close to the center of power in Colombo.
• A shift from an essentially mainstream two-party dynamics to a more
streamlined, unipolar system has occurred.
• While in the past power-sharing proposals had placed the state under
considerable pressure to adopt a course of reform, no such pressure existed
following the defeat of the LTTE.
• The end of the LTTE state-building project also meant the emergence of a
new politico-military regime in the north east of the country.
• The LTTE defeat also implied the redefinition of the state-minority
impairing the bargaining power of minorities and opposition groups.i"
In our conclusion, we will be able to reflect on these trends and evaluate how they might
affect the role and position of the Sangha and how in tum the future of the polity might be
relationship with the hegemony of the Rajapaksa-Ied SLFP, severely
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affected by the future development of the Sangha self-understanding.
0.2 The conflict in Lanka: the burden of the past
The complex, violent, political conflict in Lanka is the result of many factors including
religion, nationalism, historical memories, post-colonial elite rivalry, ethnicity and
economic oppression. More recently, the denial of minority rights, armed separatism,
flawed mediation efforts, the rejection of federalism, and counter-insurgency warfare have
also played a major role in the continued unrest. At a deeper level, however, the conflict is
understood to be rooted in a historical process of incomplete state formation and post-
colonial ethno-national politics (Uyangoda 2011; Wallenstein 2007), stemming from the
failure of the island's majoritarian democracy to become multi-ethnic and inclusive of
those who are not Sinhala Buddhists.
Popular Sinhala nationalist rhetoric and the Sinhala historical memory, in the form
of oral and written tradition, hold that Lanka primarily belongs to the Sinhalas (Roberts
2001), but scholars argue that Lanka has been multi-ethnic and multi-cultural from ancient
times (Gunawardena 1984, Indrapala 2005). The power and influence. of history when
analyzing and interpreting a protracted ethno-national conflict is well established
(Bandarage 2008; Brun and Jazeel 2009; Datta 2005; Horowitz 1985; Liu and Hilton
2005; McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Philipson 2001; Sahadevan 2002; Spencer 1997;
Thompson and Karayanni 2004; Vaishney 2002). The past - whether retold through myth,
constructed narrative, or an official record of events - has the power to reshape the
dynamics of the 'present'. Smith argues that views of the past fuel socio-political attitudes
and civic culture like no other factor:
II Published by the Norwegian development agency NORAD, see http://www.norad.no/enltools-and-
publications/publications/evaluations/publication?key=386346. Accessed on Nov. 10, 20 II
... our commanding practical interest in how we share action with other actors is
distinctively engaged by presumed information about past occurrences. We recognize that
past occurrences have determined the conditions of action sharing, constraining our
practice with regard to which actors we share practical reality with and which
compounding actions we mayor must join in progress.
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The ethno-national claims of many conflicting communities are frequently based on
singular, often homogeneous and monolithic claims rooted in history (whether real or
imagined), which contradict their modern pluralistic realities. Chabal and Daloz (2008)
draw attention to the limits of modern political science to understand and present
alternative discourses between mono-ethno-centrism and a globalized universalism.
Regardless of whether it manifests itself in its primordial or modernistic version,
nationalism takes many other non-dialectical positions (Smith 2001 :43-60, 2000:27-50)
and continues to create, shape and sustain "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983).
One of the most ingrained beliefs held by the Sinhalas in the construction of their
national history is that Buddha himself envisioned the island as the future sanctuary of his
teaching. According to this belief, the teacher entrusted the future ownership of Lanka to
the Sinhalas as 'guardians' of his teaching. This point of conviction planted in the social
cognition of the majoritarian Sinhala Buddhist society generates the desire for a tighter
grip on the socio-political structure, projecting a mono-Buddhist identity and constructing
a Pan-Sinhala ethnicity in every sphere of the society. This Sinhala-Buddhist identity
construction is further fuelled by the fact that Lanka is considered as the home of ancient
Buddhism by the rest of the Theravada Buddhist world, and that it is the only place on
earth where the Sinhala language and culture are found. The Sinhalas are a population of
merely 15 million (2010) on an island of only 65,000 square kilometres, while 70 million
Tamils live a mere 30 kilometres away in Tamil Nadu, India, and a further 30 million live
in other parts of the world. The senses of fragility and precariousness caused by these
limitations of space and population have been deepened by repeated invasions from South
India and by over four centuries of European colonization beginning in the 16th century.
This situation together with its historical background is what Schaller and Abeysinghe
term as the "structural context" that creates a political psychology of "double
asymmetries" in power relations (2006:616).
An imbalanced geo-dernography often contributes to the construction of structural
asymmetries. These asymmetries in turn produce reactionary and paradigmatic power
relations in reference to other contestants in a given socio-political realm. Though the
nearly 6 million Jews are the 76 per cent majority in Israel, they are in fact a diminutive
minority compared to the surrounding Arab population or indeed the worldwide Muslim
population (Beckerman 2002; Peleg 2004). The resulting sense of insecurity tends to be
reflected in militarisation. This socio-political psychology operates within a cross-
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pollinating "interactive double minority" frame of reference, which further generates deep
fear and distrust. This distrust and corroborating combative political events help each
involved group to demonize the other (Eidelson and Eidelson 2003; Rouhana and Bar-Tal
1998, 1995; Rouhana and Fiske 1995; Schaller and Abeysinghe 2006).
Historical memories re-lived in the writings of a religious chronicle, archaeological
evidence of repeated invasions, subjugation, loss of life style, and strongly demarcated
geo-physical realities could have contributed to the construction of an ontological
insecurity that is implanted in the collective political psyche of the Sinhalas. Such
insecurity was vividly displayed in the collective struggle for independence from the 450
years of European rule during the early years of the zo" century. In many ways the
struggle for independence did not proceed as a struggle for freedom, secular civil liberty,
or pluralistic democracy like in India under the Gandhi led Indian Congress (Sen 1993;
Upadhyaya 1992); rather, it was to recover, repair, and restore an ancient version of the
Sinhala-Buddhist civilization (Krishna 1999; Malalgoda 1976; Tambiah 1986). Sinhalas
believe they are the original and only true owners of the island and mobilize their politics
based on this self-understanding.
0.2.1 The Tamils: a different history
The Lankan native Tamils make up approximately 12% of the island's total population.
They are largely Hindus and traditionally live in the northeast province of the island. A
further 6% of the Lankan population, living in the central hills of the island, are Tamils of
Indian origin, the descendants of Tamils who came from India for plantation work during
the British rule. The native Tamils challenge the Sinhala version of history and have their
own ownership claims to the island. They claim that ancient mythical King Ravana of the
Ramayana epic was a Tamil Hindu (Pillai 2003, 1928; Zvelebil 1988). Tamils were the
dark skinned inhabitants of the island encountered by Prince Vijaya - the father of
Sinhalas according to the Mahavarnsa - as he accidentally landed on the northwest of the
island. Mahavamsa further narrates that Vijaya married Kuveni, who according to
Balasingham (2003) was Tamil, and established his kingdom. Satchi Ponnambalam (1983)
claims the Sinhala language, (based on the Pali of Theravada text), became widespread in
the island with the advent of Buddhism.
The act of 'choosing' a past and relating it to the present has never been an easy
task for the Tamils in Lanka. Viewing, interpreting and using history became part of the
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political process. Their preferred version of history significantly differs from those
advocated by the Sinhalas, which not only deny the Tamils (co)inhabitancy in the ancient
island, but also brand them as aliens, intruders or invaders. Tamils recognize the presence
of the Sinhalas on the island from a very ancient time, but would add to the theory that the
Sinhalas are part of a great Dravidian family, who have developed their own identity due
to the influence of Buddhism and who are not a special Aryan group (Rajanayagam 1999).
One consequence of these conflicting claims is that several incompatible
assumptions are taken very seriously. These assumptions dismiss common features that
the two views share (Gunawardana 1997). Based on these ethno-nationalist interpretations,
both sides have treated the other as an opponent ready to wage war. Sadly, some modem
academics take the same line of argument (Dharmadasa 1989). In one extreme version of
this narrative, the Venerable Walpola Rahula, one of the most influential Sangha,
maintained that the victory of Dutthagamini over the Tamil King Elara in 200 BC was the
beginning of Sinhala nationalism: "it was a new race with healthy young blood" (Rahula:
1959:79). Anthropologists such as Obeyesekere dispute this:
There were historically two major opposed ethnic identities, Tamils and Sinhalese [ ... ].
The opposition stabilized the Sinhala-Buddhist identity [... ]. The Sinhalese could be
mobilized by their rulers to fight the invaders [... ] the myth became often a rallying point
for Sinhala nationalism.
(Obeyesekere 1979:36)
Because of these extreme and polarized positions, race, nationality and political
territoriality are often distorted and confused. Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, two great
ancient cities of Sinhala civilization, contain evidence of Tamil presence (Devendra 1959),
while in Jaffna, the modem centre of the Tamil homeland, there is evidence of a Buddhist
culture in places like Nagadipa and Kandaroodai (Shalk 2006). Sandagomi (2002)
suggests that at least 25 per cent of the modem Sinhala language comprises words that are
Tamil in origin. This testifies to the fact that these groups lived side by side for centuries.
However, post-independent popular nationalist literature often dismisses these common
grounds and discredits the rare attempts by historians like Gunawardane (1997 et al) to
create clarity on these questions (Goonawardane 2002, 1998). From the mid-1980s to the
current date, Sinhala nationalist intellectual debate has been dominated by the Jiithika
Chinthanaya (national consciousness) movement, with Gunadasa Amarasekara and Nalin
de Silva as its key agitators. According to Nalin de Silva, "[t]here is a common culture in
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this country and we must seek our solutions to our problems within the framework of that
common culture. The inherent common culture in this country is [... ] best described in
Buddhism" (1990:34). Similarly, Gunadasa Amarasekara claims:
Our National Ideology is the Sinhala-Buddhist ideology that has evolved through a period
of about two thousand years. The main assumption behind Jathika Chinthanaya is that,
although there are many ethnic groups in this country such as the Sinhalese, the Tamils,
and the Muslims, all of them belong to basically the same culture; as such, they must be
referred to as one nation. We believe that the people of this country, while belonging to
different ethnicities, are bound by the same culture and are heirs to the same Jathika
Chinthanaya. What is racist about that?
(1993:23)
As a direct result of this "past-forwarding", the Sinhalas in the independent state of Lanka
began to look into their mytho-historical past while actively denying the multinational
reality of their present and future.
Drawing attention to the multinational history of the country is not to deny the fact
that there were people with distinct differences, who fought for political power. However,
these were more likely intra-dynastic conflicts with power centres moving between
Tamils, Sinhalas or a mixture of both communities. The possibility that they were
primarily inter-ethnic conflicts as portrayed in the post-independence nation state
discourse IS remote (Rodgers 1994). Interpretations of history often supersede
contemporary social and political debates in Lanka and tend to hide the political
motivations fuelling them. This process, in addition to many other adverse results, created
clashes between nostalgia for the past and a disdain for the present, giving rise to
confrontation based on ethnic identity and ideology. Both dominant ethnic identities
became preoccupied with the search for legitimacy in their own history, and this search
was pursued at the expense of the other's legitimacy.
The Sinhalas, because they were in control of the country's parliament for many
years, had the advantage of being able to make serious structural and institutional
amendments in order to undermine the Tamil history of Lanka and to reduce the Tamil
socio-political space. Decades of such "majoritarian" impositions - including the
disenfranchising of the Indian Tamils, the debate over the national flag and anthem, the
overnight declaration of Sinhala as the official language, the state sponsored Sinhala
settlements in predominant Tamil constituencies, and the neglect of the Tamil regions in
national development programmes - led to the steady growth of frustration, alienation and
political divorce.
At the same time, the Tamils were determined to restore their historical position
and strength. Perhaps it was for this reason that the LTTE, the most articulate and militant
Tamil national mobilization, adopted the name l..I6\Sl8)6Tr "Pulighal" (Tigers) and a
proposed national flag featuring a raging tiger. A Bengali type tiger was the state symbol
of the great Cola dynasty from 310 BCE to 1250 CE (Sastri 1984, 2002). History is often
politicised through the ethnic interpretations of archaeology, which provoke nationalism
and the quest for a new identity that affects even the more globalized diaspora (Demmers
2002; Peterson 2006). The case of Eelam Tamil nationalism neatly fits into this analysis,
even while its global growth is largely a reactionary political force in the context of a
homeland democracy where Tamil concerns are deliberately ignored and suppressed.
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0.2.2 The colonial impact
The first Europeans arrived in Lanka around 1505 (Bailey 1962; De Silva 2005; Peebles
2006) and the process of colonial subjugation was at its peak in 1815, when the British
conquered Kandy, the last kingdom of Ceylon. Now completely under British control, the
island was declared a single "unitary" political entity (Knighton 2005), a move that had
far-reaching consequences for future Lankan politics.
The British colonialists introduced a commercial economy, built up much-needed
infrastructure for this purpose and introduced, among many other ideas, the ideology of
nineteenth century liberal individualism. For them, these developments were part of the
process of introducing 'civilization'. When confronted with the heterogeneity of identities
and cultural practices on the island, they classified them as stemming from distinctly
different 'races'. Along with the main Sinhala and Tamil races, the British carefully
divided Ceylon into Up Country and Low Country Sinhalas, Indian and Ceylonese Tamils,
Muslims and Moors, Veddhas, Malays, Dutch and Portuguese Burghers, and even sub-
groups such as the Rodiyas, a nomadic gypsy group now largely assimilated into other
identities (Raghavan 1957; Rogers 2004). This drive for ethnic classification had direct
political ramifications when, in 1833, the British developed a system of political
representation based on racial identities (Nissan and Strirrat 1990). In 1833, when the
common administration for the island was set up, three unofficial members were selected
to represent Low Country Sinhalas, Burghers and Tamils. Later, in 1889, two more
members were included in order to represent Kandyans and Moors, thus making the
politics of the island dependent on racial representation (Nissan and Strirrat 1990). This
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race-based representation was in force for almost a century until the 1931 Donoughmore
Commission.l ' which recommended a territory-based constitution (Barron 1997). By then
Lanka had developed into a living paradox: on the one hand, all its citizens were equal
before British rule, while on the other, they were separated by their racial and ethnic
distinctions.
By the tum of the twentieth century, the southern Sinhala elites had become
ambitious and influential through their trading partnership with the ruling British
(Jayawardene 2003). Using their wealth and power, they mobilized a new national
identity, largely defined by the Sinhala language and their Buddhist practices. Revivalists
like Anagarika 13 Dharmapala (1864-1933) spearheaded an emotional religious and ethnic
awakening in the south coastal regions (Amunugama 1985; Deegalle 1997; Moor 1989;
Seneviratne 1999; Tambiah 1992 ;). This was in many ways a radical departure from the
intellectual Buddhist discourse that was envisioned by Sangha such as Hikkaduve Sri
Sumangala (Blackburn 20 I0). Anagarika was keen to restructure the society along ethno-
nationalist lines while Sumangala was trying to systematize and restore religious learning.
Externally, the revival of liberalism and objective oriental scholarship challenged the
British rule (Bell and Bell 1991). As Gellner (1994, 1987, and 1994) and Anderson (1996)
have argued, new realizations of ethnicity and nationalism emerged within the discourse of
social reform movements because of the influence of western education, economic factors,
improved media, as well as changes in class structure and political representation.
12 The Donoughmore Commission was appointed in 1927 by the colonial government to recommend self-
rule for Ceylon. The commission replaced the ethnic based representation with a universal franchise
including all women above 21 years of age. This made Ceylon the first non-European country to grant
voting powers to women at a time when the UK voting age for women was 28 (Russell 1982). In Lanka as in
India, the British created an educated class to provide administrative and professional services in the colony.
By the late nineteenth century, most members of this emerging class were associated directly or indirectly
with the government. Increased Lankan participation in government affairs demanded the creation of a legal
profession; the need for state health services required a corps of medical professionals; and the spread of
education provided an impetus to develop the teaching profession. In addition, the expansion of commercial
plantations created a legion of new trades and occupations, landowners, planters, transport agents,
contractors, and businesspersons. Certain Sinhala caste groups, such as the fishermen (Karave) and
cinnamon peelers (Salagama), benefited from the emerging new economic order to the detriment of the
traditional ruling cultivators (Goyigama).
13 Anagarlka means one who dors not inhabit a house. Before and during the time of Buddha the term
indicated those who had left home for a more ascetic life. This term was adapted by Dharmapala, to intiate
a new lay order. See aBD page 12
The printing of the Mahavamsa, the most influential epic of Vamsa literature in
Lanka, in 1837 and British sponsored archaeological discoveries in the ancient capital
cities of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa provided solid textual support to the growing
'newspaper nationalism' (Tennekoon 1999). However, each community, to serve their
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new political desires, interpreted these discoveries differently. For the Sinhalas, these
provided historical evidence of the ethnic superiority of the Sinhalas (Kemper 1991,
Nissan 1985, Stirrat 2006). For the Tamils, these same discoveries provided a new source
of pride in the glorious past of their Sangam era (Zvelebil 1994).14The emotional reaction
to the discoveries of a 'glorious past' was initially directed against the British, questioning
their right to rule over such an advanced civilization. Lankan elites came to the firm
conclusion that the invading foreigner, (06 a{;'t~J) 'para sudda', or the alien whites had to
leave in order to allow a free nation to regain its pride. After a prolonged period of reforms
undertaken through the Colebrook Commission of 1832, the Donoughmore Commission
of 1928 and the Soulbury Commission of 1946, British rule ended in 1948 (Mendis 2005).
Soon Lanka's post-independence English-speaking Sinhala elites manoeuvred
electoral politics by advocating the language, religion and culture of the Sinhala majority.
Though partly a top-down, elite-driven process, Sinhala nationalist sentiments could not
simply be 'turned on' or 'off by the political class. Rather, these sentiments permeated
society more broadly and were tied up with expectations of the state as the protector and
benefactor of the Sinhala peasantry, a discourse infused with Sinhala Buddhist ideals of
righteousness and moral regeneration. Nationalist ideology "provided a moral lens through
which electoral politics and the actions of the state could be evaluated and imbued with
legitimacy" (Venugopal 2011 :84).
0.2.3 Independent but divided
In February 1948-, the British handed over administrative powers to a Sinhala-led
government. Before long, the Tamils, who had for a considerable time argued for political
power sharing, began to be seen as the main challengers to a monolithic Sinhala-Buddhist
political and cultural project. Tamils were portrayed as invaders, and were labelled 06
14 Though the idea that early Tamil literature was fostered in ancient academies on a submerged landmass
has been widely discredited, literary historians do still refer to Tamil literature from 200 BCE to 300 CE as
Sangam literature. Sangam literature is the oldest known Dravidian literature, written in Tamil. In contrast to
contemporary literary works in Sanskrit and Pali, Sangam literature is surprisingly secular, dealing with day-
to-day themes such as love, war, governance, trade, eloping, bereavement, and mourning in a unique South
Indian context.
e'C:;®~J 'para demalas', the alien Tamils or the 'dangerous other' in the nationalist political
psychology and vocabulary (Kapfere 1988). One of the practical points that further
justified the Sinhala agitation was that a disproportionate number of the Tamils held top
professional and civil jobs as a consequence of the British missionary education in Tamil
areas. The political and civil equality and democratization articulated and demanded by
Tamil leaders further fuelled the Sinhala antagonism, until both ethnic groups treated the
other as an enemy of their ambitions. In independent Lanka, this cross ethnic demonizing
process (Mitchell 1991) became a political separator for Tamils and Sinhalas, who had
already been divided based on their language and culture.
Two tragically regressive political acts in the modem history of Lanka were to
prove disastrous for Sinhala- Tamil political relations. First, in 1936, a Pan-Sinhala Board
of Ministers was formed. The exclusion of non-Sinhala members from the Board of
Ministers through the manipulation of the Executive Committee system made cooperation
among the Sinhala and Tamil elites even more difficult. This particular incident is a
reminder that Donoughmore-type constitutional reforms do not by themselves provide for
equitable representation and power-sharing (Wilson 1974: 13). Then, in 1949, nearly one
million Indian Tamils were disenfranchised in one of the very first decisions of the
independent government of Lanka (Muthiah 2003). This disfranchisement was the result
of a series of legislations in 1948-49: the Citizenship Act No.18 of 1948, the Indian and
Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act No. 3 of 1949 and the Ceylon Parliamentary
Elections (Amendment) Act No. 48 of 1949. The three Acts in effect withdrew the voting
rights of almost the entire Indian Tamil estate worker population. More than 72,230 of
them had voted at the elections of 1947 (Wilson 1974: Table 4.1). These acts of systemic
manipulations of the political system to undermine and exclude the Tamils deeply hurt the
Tamil elites as well as the rest of their community.
The governance of the newly free Lanka by the ruling United National Party
(UNP), one of the oldest, largely Sinhala political organisations, was very similar to that of
the colonial era. English was still the dominant language and many sectors, especially the
Sinhala press, expressed the frustrations of those who had imagined a reinvigoration of the
glorious past after independence (Tennakoon 1999). As a result, language became a
crucial driving factor behind national identity. As Anderson has argued, 'print capitalism'
paved the way for a greater circulation of material in the vernacular language and helped
to solidify an 'imagined' nation. However, by 1956 their ethnic leaders, who were mere
'Kalu Suddas '-dark white men, disappointed the average Sinhala villager. The 2500th
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anniversary of the death of Buddha and the landing of Prince Vijaya were commemorated
in 1956. After 450 years of colonization, this was an ideal political and cultural
opportunity for the more radical Buddhist nationalist and their monks to demand a Sinhala
nationalist state order.
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S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.i'' (SWRD) frustrated after failing to gam the UNP
leadership, broke rank with the party, claiming that it had failed to build a Sinhala state.
SWRD was a skilled orator who agitated for an immediate introduction of a total
"Sinhalaness" into the public and political sphere. An Oxford graduate and student union
president, he used his influence to position himself as the alternative Sinhala national
leader. In his march to power, SWRD adopted a nationalist transformation in attire as well
as in ideology. Despite having argued for a federal solution for the island in 1926, he now
appealed to the rural Sinhala Buddhist consciousness for support in creating a single
national identity to construct a Sinhala majority hegemony (Clarence 2002; Manor 1989).
His already considerable influence amongst the powerful Sangha increased tremendously
with this move and they vigorously supported his cause. As a combined result of these
forces, the ruling UNP was replaced with the nationalist Mahiijana Eksath Peramuna
(MEP or People's United Front), which was an extension of the Sinhala Maha Sabha (The
Great Council of Sinhalas), which SWRD had created to propagate his nationalist
ideologies. The MEP easily won the 1956 April election on a nationalist platform, and in
contrast to the UNP government, no minority members were included in the cabinet,
making the ruling government a Sinhala-only regime.
Sinhala elites had been using the language issue to promote their individual and
cultural ambitions. It is noteworthy that J.R. Jayawardene as early as 1944 moved a
resolution in the State Council to make Sinhalese the official language of Ceylon. He
argued,
I had the intention of proposing that only Sinhalese should be the official language of the
Island; but it seems to me that the Tamil community and also the Muslim community, who
speak Tamil, wish that Tamil should also be included on equal terms with Sinhalese. The
great fear I had was that Sinhalese being a language spoken by only 3,000,000 people in
the whole world would suffer, or may be entirely lost in time to come, if Tamil is also
placed on an equal footing with it in this country ...(State Council Debates, May 24, 1944).
(Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam 1999:81)
15 Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike was the only son of Sir Solomon Bandaranaike
Mahamudliya (chief government interpreter) who had become rich and powerful due to his services to the
British rule. Son Bandaranaike gave up his high Anglican faith and embraced Buddhism to find political
popularity. In this thesis, we will refer to him as SWRD.
Within weeks, the new government of 1956, as promised during the election, introduced
the 'language bill', making Sinhala the only official language of the country and
mandating that all state communication, including communication involving the courts, be
conducted in Sinhala. Tamils now had either to learn Sinhala in a short period or lose their Page I 22
jobs in the state sector. Tamil leaders treated the bill as oppressive and protested against
the restrictive legislation with Gandhi-style non-violence - "satyagraha" - outside
parliament (DeVotta 2002; Kearney 1978). Even during the legislative deliberations of the
bill, anti-Tamil riots broke out in Gal-Oya, a historically Tamil area that had been
colonized by the Sinhalas under a new settlement and irrigation project (Manor 1989;
Uphoff 1992). With the language bill, the new government used political power and its
administrative/linguistic hegemony to the advantage of the Sinhalas. Eventually the
country would witness an active state project of 'Sinhalanizing' its general administration
and socio-political space (Samraweera 1981).
In 1958, violence broke out again across the country when the northern Tamil
activists refused to follow the new government regulation to use the Sinhala 'cd'6' (Sri,
meaning 'blessed') character instead of the English alphabets on all vehicle number plates.
The Sinhala retaliation to this challenge to the Colombo administration resulted in some
400 assassinations, and left at least 12,000 homeless. Almost all the victims were Tamils
(Vittachchi 1962, 1959). Ethnic riots, sometimes encouraged or even sponsored by the
state, occurred in 1956, 1958, 1970, 1972, 1977, and in 1978. Tamils who lived outside
the Northeast, in Sinhala majority areas, were the main victims (Kauffmann 1996;
Senaratne 1997; Tambiah 1986; Wickramasinghe 2006). The MEP victory reconfigured
power relations in post-colonial Lanka (Uyangoda 201Ob) as the newly formed coalition
government rewarded their wide support base in Sinhala rural society by granting a new
rural elite access to state power. Even as the social support base for the political elites
broadened, ethnic representation in national politics narrowed and the state became openly
Sinhalanized (Uyangoda 2010). Discriminatory policies in the fields of language,
university admission, state employment, and land ownership were institutionalized and
further compounded by symbolically important measures related to Buddhism and the
national flag (Chelvanayakam 2005; De Silva 2005; Jeganathan and Ismail 1995; Moore
1985; Richardson 2005; Spencer 2008; Tiruchelvam 2000; Uyangoda 2011, 2007).
The process of Signalization continued under Sirirnavo Bandaranaike, SWRD's
widow, who was in power under the banner of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party from 1960 to
1965 and from 1970 to 1977. On 22 May 1972, under a new constitution, the state Ceylon
became a republic, and the name of the island was changed to @ CollS)J (Sri Lanka). This
Buddhist term was loaded with symbolism: some twenty years previously, Tamils had
protested against the extreme Buddhicizing of the public space. The new constitution
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provided a "foremost place" for Buddhism and made the head of state the custodian of the
Buddhasasana, i.e. of the entire Buddhist church including all aspects of its religion, its
teaching and its practices. What this meant in practice was that any prospective head of
state had to be a Buddhist. It further diminished the prospect of any meaningful political
bargaining or power sharing by declaring Lanka to be a 'unitary' state, a pre-emptive
measure designed to block any Tamil claim to regional rule. This was an unprecedented
move.i" As many modern researchers on the constitutional transformation have shown,
this was not based on Lanka's indigenous political history but on a construct left over from
the British colonial policy (De Silva 2005; Edrisinghe 2006; Marasinghe 2003; Mendis
1932). Until the unification by the British, Lanka, throughout history, had been a state of
collective kingdoms: the largest such kingdoms were originally called Rohana, Pihiti,
Maya, and much later, there were the kingdoms of Jaffna, Kandy, Kotte and smaller
kingdoms. Post-independent Sinhala ruling elites eagerly imported and installed the
unitary model in order to concentrate all present and future powers in their hands, giving
them a political carte blanche. What was until then an institutional discrimination became
constitutional in 1972. The new constitution removed the safeguard that the Soulbury
constitution had provided minorities. 17
The process above was carried out without any consultation with the civic body at
large or with the affected population (De Silva 1996; Wilson 2000). Further developments
in the Sinhala political and social marginalization and suppression of the Tamil population
included the 1970 ban of Tamil media and the 1971 'standardization' of higher education,
which required Tamil students to have higher, marks than the general population to enter
universities (De Silva 1974; Wickramasinghe 2012). The climax of this process was the
1978 constitution, which centralized power in the office of an executive presidency. The
political landscape was further irreparably damaged in June 1981 when the state police
was involved in the burning of the Jaffna library, considered the centre of Tamil
scholarship. This confirmed for the Tamils that the time for coexistence had passed. The
16 See 1972 Constitution of Lanka, Chapter 1 Article 2 and Chapter 2 Articles 6. at:
http://www.tamiination.orglsriiankaiaws/72constitution.htm. Accessed on 6 March 2009.
17 The 1948 Souibury constitution's article 29. 1-3 guaranteed equality for all religions and ethnicities. See
http://www.nationaiarchives.gov.ukldocumentsoniine/ceyionconstitution. Accessed on 5 March 2009.
systematic ethnic marginalization of the Tamils and their politics deeply divided the
national polity along ethnic identity lines while creating a permanent democratic deficit.
Lanka was slowly but inexorably transforming into an ethnic state, negating her historical
multi-nation existence.
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In response to the concentration of power in the Sinhalas and the continuation of a
system of social and political repression, Tamil nationalist politics began to take shape
with the emergence of a demand for self-rule in the form of a separate state. In 1976, the
Tamil polity reformed as the ~LfilW~ ffiffi&lUJ rulffi~6lJ)6\) @6iJrrn61rn'fl, the Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF), with a more radical and ethnic nationalist ideology. On 14 May
1976, at its first national convention in Vaddukoddai in the Northern Province, the party
unanimously adopted a resolution demanding a separate state for the Tamils.ls TULF,
with its firm ethno-nationalist demand, enjoyed landslide victories in the Northeast at the
1977 general election and became the first Tamil party to function as the official
opposition.!" With mass support for an independent Tamil State, as had happened in East
Pakistan and Malaysia, radical Tamil youth had begun to dismiss traditional parliamentary
politics and followed the ideology of an armed revolution against the Sinhala state.
Various groups formed with Marxist-Leninist as well as ethno-nationalist ideologies and
began to attack state symbols in the Northeast (Fair 2005; Shastri 1999; Swamy 2004). In
July 1983, one such attack by the LTTE, killed 13 Sinhala soldiers in Jaffna, the biggest
loss the army had suffered until that point. As part of the Sinhala retaliation, Tamils once
again became the target of unparalleled state-orchestrated violence in the south and the
hills. This pogrom, now known as 'Black July', was a permanent turning point for
democracy in Lanka, killing some 4000 Tamils and displacing 150,000. The violence
produced two long-term consequences. Tamils disinherited from the state of Lanka began
to support the cause of a separate state and to use violence as a means of political
negotiation, and the state of Lanka began to view Tamils and their separatist politics as a
permanent and deadly threat to the Sinhala-Buddhist nation. For the ultra-nationalists in
the Sinhala south, the 1983 riots were a natural reaction of a nation threatened by a
historical enemy.
18 See http://www.sangam.org/FB HIST DOCS/vaddukod.htm for the full text of the resolution, Accessed
on 3 March 2009.
19 See the results of 1977 general election at
http://www.slelections.gov.lklpdflGeneral%20Election%20 1977.PDF , Department of Election Lanka,
Accessed on 15 March 2009.
By failing to recognize the need to create space for the national 'other' within the
structure, the Sinhala elites, in their eagerness to create a mono-ethnoreligious state,
placed Lanka's post-independent politics on an illiberal trajectory, readily led by the
cultural patriarch of the Sangha. The Sangha, in their eagerness to construct a mono-
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Sinhala social order, supported the nationalist power politics that dismantled the
democratic principles and instead planted the seeds of one of the most protracted civil
wars in South Asia. The ethnoreligious ideology of Sangha further re-fuelled the Tamil
separatist nationalism and became the political midwife to the LTTE, arguably the world's
most formidable separatist movement.
0.2.4 LTTEseparatism and the war
The LTTE began as a small group of Tamil militants led by self-trained Veluppilai
Prabhakaran. Due to its sheer discipline and with material support from Tamil Nadu, by
the mid-1980s the LTTE had become a strong military force (Narayanaswamy 1950).
With its highly sophisticated international operations, unmatched military skills and
inspirational ethno-nationalism, the LTTE defied the traditional understanding of the role
of non-state actors (Goodhand 2010; Stokke 2006; Woodhead 2011). By the year 2000,
the movement had not only caught worldwide attention with its dramatic military
operations and suicide missions but also managed to create and maintain a de-facto state
of roughly 15,000 square kilometres in the greater parts of the north of the island -
approximately 25% of the island and 90% of the northeast. The growth, operation and
final defeat of the LTTE are now well-documented (Aryasinha 200; Hopgood 2005;
Nayaran Swamy 2010,2005, 2003; Stokke 2006; Schalk 1994; Trawicka 1997; Van de
Voorde 2005).
If the LTTE was, as is sometimes claimed, the world's most effective guerrilla
group, then by facing such a group and its terror politics for more than two decades and by
finally defeating its military might comprehensively, the Lanka state, its army and the
Sinhala Buddhists behind them have demonstrated the intransigent will of the Sinhalas to
not share their sovereignty with the Tamil minority. Sinhalas have proven to the world that
they will rather fight a bloody and prolonged war with the Tamils, sacrifice thousands of
their young men and women, face economic and social stagnation and earn the antipathy
of the international community, than agree to recognize the right of the Tamils for a
shared-rule arrangement. Their chief desire is to create a majoritarian hegemony over the
island and to continue to protect that. The Sinhala Buddhists of the island, through their
successive governments over the last three decades, have fought one of the bloodiest civil
wars in recent world history. The will and endurance of the Sinhala Buddhists, 45 per cent
of whose population live with a daily income of less than two US dollars.i" to mobilize
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their nationalist conviction is astonishing and challenges some widespread ideas about
both Buddhism and ethno-nationalism.
Behind this, will power and determination of the Sinhalas are the Maha Sangha
who mobilizes the national psyche. Many indigenous and international observers argue
that the Maha Sangha's claim that Lanka is a land only for the Theravada Sinhala
Buddhists, and the violent reactions of the Tamils to this claims, are key components of
this protracted ethno-national conflict. At this stage, the question is whether this
ideologically charged impact of Buddhism on the state is an isolated development in the
contemporary world. This work will argue that it is not.
During the period of this research (1995-2010), many observers considered the
conflict a prime candidate for a federal solution as a compromise between a separate
Tamil state and the existing centralized unitary Sinhala majoritarian system. The proposal
of constitutional changes along federalist lines found support among moderate Sinhalas,
and the international community. The LTTE too indicated a willingness to consider such a
proposal. However, key Sangha activists and their nationalist followers adamantly rejected
the federalist proposal, because the concept of federalism was directly opposed to the
Sangha understanding of Lanka's 'cosmic mission'. Thus, federalism was unacceptable as
a solution to the conflict and further fuelled the Sangha agitation. In order to be able to
understand how federalism could have this perverse and unintended effect, it is important
to reconstruct the federal discourse in Lanka.
0.3 Federalism in Lanka
On July 2, 2009, a mere six weeks after the dramatic and comprehensive military victory
that ended the 30-year civil war with the Tamil Tigers, President Mahinda Rajapakse
declared:
20 See World Bank and Asia Development Bank country reports on Lanka.
http://data.worldbank.org/country/sri-Ianka and http://www.adb.org/countries/sri-Iankalmain, Accessed on
10 Aug 2011.
There is no way for federalism in this country. I am willing to search for a political
solution and the TNA (Tamil National Alliance) must agree to this. They also must know
that they can't get what they want.
('Federalism not possible' Rajapakse The Island: 7)21
With this statement, the victorious president concluded a ninety-year debate on federalism Page I 27
and reassured the Sinhala masses that the island would always remain a centralized unitary
state with the Sinhala majority at the political epicentre. He reiterated the fact that the
possibility of federalism or federal power sharing in Lanka had ended.
President Mahinda Rajapakse enjoyed his highest-ever popularity ratings after
winning the war against the separatist Tamil Tigers. In the statement above, the president
was articulating not only his personal belief, but also the collective mind of the majority of
Sinhalas, especially of the culturally powerful Sangha, who have historically and
successfully opposed any power-sharing arrangements with the minorities. In recent years,
the Sangha have violently opposed any proposed federal constitutional arrangements
aiming to satisfy Lanka's Tamil demands and have concretized the idea of Lanka as a
unitary state. The federal option failed in spite of multi-level and multi-actor efforts to
promote federalism as the most viable solution to a long-running military conflict.
Both Tamil and Sinhala elites were central in the construction of the ethnically
based political ideologies, which they supported with reference to archaeological
discoveries, the interpretation of historical texts and the colonial legacy of race-based
representation. These opposing mind-sets were instrumental in codifying the existing
religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional particularities of each identity, diminishing the
possibility of a common civic bond. Post-independence, undemocratic, and majoritarian
actions by the Sinhalas further widened these deep divisions (Stokke 1998).
While the ethno-nationalist ideologies in Lanka were contesting for hegemony in
their respective spheres, in post-World War II conditions, other multi-ethnic states in the.
region such as India and Malaysia were able to implement federalism as a solution to the
challenge of multi-ethnic representation and participation. However, the political
trajectory in Lanka was different.
In 1919, the Tamil and Sinhala elites began pre-independence negotiations on the
nature of an independent Ceylon when Ponnambalam Ramanathan founded the Ceylon
National Congress to demand the reform of British rule. Ramanathan, representing the
21 President Rajapakse's interview with the Indian newspaper, The Hindu, as reported on the front page of
The Island of 7 July 2009, http://pdfs.island.lkl2009/07/07/pl.pdf, Accessed on 20 April 2011.
Tamils, agreed with James Peiris and E. J. Samarawickrama, negotiating on behalf of the
Sinhalas, to share power in the legislature, with a seat for the Western Province where the
Tamil political elites resided. The next inter-ethnic arrangement was the Mahendra Pact,
signed in June 1925 in Jaffna, which proposed future power sharing, in which the Tamils
would maintain one-third of the seats with Sinhala representatives holding two-thirds.
Debates on federalism have been central to any constitutional possibilities in the
troubled modem history of Lanka. Ironically, in 1926, two decades before Lanka gained
independence from the British rule, some Sinhala elites promoted federalism. SWRD
argued in a series of political commentaries that "federalism provides the best democratic
solution for Ceylon's internal and external challenges ... Some form of federalism would
be the only solution to our problem" (Raghavan & Bauer 2006: 107). Bandaranaike argued
for 'liberty', which he defined as the transfer of political powers to individuals. He further
believed a federation with India would be the best security arrangement for post-
independence Ceylon (Manikkalingam and Ratnayake 1995). At that time, James Rutnam,
who represented the Tamil polity paradoxically opposed federalism in a response to
Bandaranaike (de Silva 1996:46-48).
The second prominent discussion on federalism came from the Kandiyan Sinhalas,
who appealed to the Donoughmore Commission to design a federal system along the lines
of the U.S. model in order to preserve their cultural identity, distinct from the Sinhalas of
the Low Country. The Kandyan National Assembly declared in a memorandum that:
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Ours is not a communal claim or a claim for the aggrandizement of a few: it is a claim of a
nation to live its own life and realize its own destiny ... A federal system ... will enable the
respective nationals of the several states to prevent further inroads into their territories and
to build up their own nationality.
(Wickremeratne 1928:55)
These attempts were aborted because of pressure from the powerful, largely southern,
Sinhala elites. The Donoughmore Commission of 1927 - like the Soulbury Commission+
under which Ceylon became independent - did not pursue the federal option. One of the
questions that remain unanswered is why the colonial British government (which actively
22A commission sent by the British government to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in 1944 to examine a
constitutional draft prepared by the Ceylonese ministers of government and to make recommendations for a
new constitution. The Soulbury Commission called for the retention of universal adult suffrage and
territorial rather than communal representation, as specified by the constitution of 1931, which was based on
the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commission (1927). However, in order to ensure that minority
groups would secure more seats, electorates were delimited in a new way.
promoted federalism in Australia and Canada, and proposed quasi-federalism for India
under the India Act of 1935) did not consider the federal option for Ceylon, particularly as
both the Tamils and Up Country Sinhalas had demanded such an arrangement. While there
were some ethno-national biases in the above pacts, this elite exercise was largely guided
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by the nation-state concept. However, these early power-sharing agreements, like the
subsequent Banda-Chelva Pact23 of 1957 and the Dudley-Chelva Pact24 of 1965, failed to
become realities due to the partisan power struggles between the Sinhalas led by the
Southern Sangha (Kearney 1964).
SLFP and UNP, the two major Sinhala political parties, from time to time made
election promises that they would address and solve the Tamil issue. When in power their
efforts were rather reluctant and lacked the necessary political will and flexibility. 1956,
1965 and 1987 saw three attempts to constitutionalize Tamil demands for greater
autonomy." However, in the face of violent opposition led by the Sangha, these projects
were abandoned or allowed to become defunct. In response to this political insincerity,
Tamil demand for greater autonomy from the late 1970s onwards were expressed in terms
of concrete calls for federalism and later for total separatism.
The federal debate in Lanka has oscillated between the strong majoritarian unitary
ideology of the Sinhalas and the equally strong desires for self-determination of the
Tamils. Some have argued that these parties neither understood nor genuinely agreed to
the true ideal of federalism even when their representatives declared in Oslo as late as
2002 that
[... ] the parties have agreed to explore a political solution founded on the principle of
internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples,
based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.
(Oslo Communique 5 Dec 2002)26
23 On 25 July 1957, a power-sharing pact was signed between the Prime Minister Bandaranaike and the
Tamil Federal Party Leader S. J. V. Chelvanayakam. This agreement came to be called the Banda-Chelva
pact. See: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilankaldocumentl
actsandordinancelbandaranayake.htm, Accessed on 12 Sep 20 IO. .
24 Another power-sharing agreement was signed on 24 March 1965 between Prime Minister Dudley
Senanayake and Chelvanayagam, known as the Dudley-Chelva pact. See:
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilankaldocumentlactsandordinance/senanayake.htm accessed on
12 Sep. 2010. In 1987, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the style ofa regional superpower forced
the Lankan state to sign the Indo-Lanka accord, which made constitutional changes in order to create nine
~rovinces. However the Lankan state did not implement the said accord with political honesty.
_5 The 1956 Banda-Chelva Agreement, the 1965 Dudley-Chelva agreement, and the 1987 13th amendment
to the constitution to create Provincial Councils.
26At the end of the 3rd set of direct talks between the GOSL and the Tamil Tigers on 22nd Oct 2002 both
parties signed what is known as the Oslo Declaration/Communique see
During the various stages of the debates - interspersed by pacts, violence and peace talks-
the power-sharing discourse had a distinct discursive trajectory. What started with specific
issues such as fair representation and Tamil language rights became a much broader
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demand for greater political devolution and autonomy. The later debate tended to be about
wider issues such as Tamil nationhood, (internal/external) self-determination and even the
idea of a confederation. Typically the state response offered 'too little, too late' and failed
to guarantee the physical safety of the Tamils living in majority Sinhala areas. Even with
all these drawbacks, the idea of a federalized Lanka still seemed to be relevant to the
resolution of its political impasse for many reasons. The debate on federalism has
continued within the constitutional and structural reforms of the state over the past decades
and the question of why federalism was considered a favourable solution, yet violently
rejected by the Sangha-led Sinhala nationalists, is the focus of the following section.
0.3.1 Indigenous factors supporting a federal solution
I. Lankan politics practised federalism in the past
Historically, Lanka has consisted of many coexisting kingdoms representing diverse
ethnic, linguistic, cultural and territorial cleavages. Historian K M De Silva maintains that
King Devanam Piyatissa, ruler of Lanka at the time of the arrival of Buddhism, after his
association with Emperor Asoka assumed the title Devanam Piyatissa 'Maharaja'.
However, his influence over the mountainous and southern part of the island was minimal.
According to Silva, "[ ... ] other rulers on the island did not readily acknowledge his
sovereignty over the whole land" (2005: 15). According to the Mahavamsa, the Sinhala
warrior king Dutthagamini 'united' the island only after defeating as many as 32 kings in
the course of his 15 years of war against the Tamil king Elata, who had ruled the central
capital Anuradhapura for over 40 years. The success of Dutthagamini could have been the
first significant triumph of centripetalism over centrifugalism in the island's political
power distribution. The list of 171 kings of Lanka from 480 BC to 1518 AD shows the
existence of simultaneous kingdoms in the island (Mendis 1932), and the unified Lanka of
Dutthagamini's legacy was soon fragmented by invasions and internal rivalries which re-
created multiple kingdoms.
http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolutionltamileelamlnorway102I 2050slodeclaration.htm for the full text,
Accessed on 10 Aug 20 II.
When the first European colonists arrived on the island Lanka, there were five separate
kingdoms: Kandy, Kotte, Sithawaka, Raigama and Yalpaanam (Jayasuriya 1999,
Obeyesekere 1977). These five were further divided into sub-kingdoms and separate
regions. Although scholars argue that the pre-colonial period is under-studied, there is
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enough evidence to confirm that the island had never been a unitary state until it was
declared to be an administrative unit by the British in 1815 (Strathern 2004). On the
contrary, there were multiple kingdoms within which a decentralized polity operated
(Strathern 2002). It is therefore unsurprising that the notion of a unitary state and the very
enforcing of such a notion was a colonial and post-colonial political project (Imtiyaz
2008).
II Minoritiesdemandfederalism27
Lankan minorities, including the Up Country Sinhalas, the Tamils and (to a lesser degree)
Muslims, have demanded federalist concessions from Sinhala rulers since 1929
(Edrisingha 2005; Farzana 2011; Oberst 1988; Thiruchelvam 2000).
In 1949, one year after independence, a nationalist Tamil political section formed
the ~6\)rhJ(imlJ) ~u5lW ~1J8' lJ)L5I - Ilafigai Thamil Arasa Katchi (ITAK) (Lanka Tamil
State Party), which was also known as the Federal Party (FP). Its leader S. J. V.
Chelvanayakam argued for a federated province for the Tamils in the Northeast, which the
Tamil population endorsed at repeated elections. Due to the support for this idea, the FP
enjoyed success in the parliamentary elections of 1956, 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975. On
the strength of these victories, the FP entered power-sharing pacts with the ruling
governments as in the Banda-Chelva Pact of 1957 and the Dudley-Chelva Pact of 1965.
However, as noted above, these agreements failed to become a reality. By 1975, the Tamil
27 In our thesis, we follow the broad understanding of federalism advocated by Elazar: "The debate of
defining federalism is varied and contested. Federalism, as we understand the concept - in its political form
- is related to the problem of the concentration, diffusion and, most particularly, the sharing of power in
political and social systems. Federal principles grow out of the idea that free men can freely enter into lasting
yet limited political arrangements to achieve common ends and protect certain rights while preserving their
respective integrities. As the ambiguity of the term "federal" reveals, federalism is concerned simultaneously
with the diffusion of political power in the name of freedom and its concentration on behalf of energetic
government. Institutionally, federalism is a form of political organization, which unites separate polities
within an overarching political system so that all maintain their fundamental political integrity. It does so by
distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence
and authority of all while enabling all to share in the system's decision-making and executing processes. In
its most practical manifestations, the workings of federalism are reflected in the processes of
intergovernmental relations and negotiated coordination among the general and constituent governments and
the interests they represent." Daniel J. Elazar, "The Themes ofa Journal of Federalism", Pub/ius, 1971,
Yol.1, No.1, p.3
polity was frustrated because the Sinhalas did not show any willingness to respond to their
requests. Chelvanayakam summarized the disappointment as follows:
[... ] it is regrettable fact that successive Sinhalese Governments have used the power that
flows from independence to deny us our fundamental rights and reduce us to the position Page I 32
of a subject people [... ]. I wish to announce to my people and to the country that I
consider that the Tamil Eelam nation should exercise the sovereignty already vested in the
Tamil people and become free.
(Wilson 1988:88)
In response to a series of such disappointments, the FP was transformed and became the
separatist ~LfilW~ tBffi&lUJ 6ill@~6lI)6\) (.!J)(;M61JT6lJlfi'l:the Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF). The new party moved towards a separatist agenda and declared their separatist
demands in the Vaddukoddai Resolution (Wilson 1988; Phadnis 1969).
The Vaddukoddai declaration for an independent state of Tamil Eelam culminated
in the nationalist separatist demands on which the LTTE launched their military campaign.
Although some question the sincerity of their claims, even the LTTE, throughout the war,
publicly maintained their willingness to enter into a federal arrangement with Lanka if the
latter was willing to grant them federal rights as e.g. in the Canada-Quebec arrangement.
The LTTE's proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the areas under
their control was a blue print for such an extended federation. This was an attempt to build
on the successive but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to institute a federal system on the
island.
III The existing constitution already includes federal elements
After the 1987 Indo-Lanka peace accord, the thirteenth amendment to the Lanka
constitution institutionalized a Provincial Council (PC) system and embedded a 'two tier'
governing structure (Premdas and Samarasinghe 1988; Hancocka 1999; Hennayake 1989).
In practice, however, these Councils proved to be a structural and financial burden and
their operation became counter-productive. Nevertheless, even in 2012, these
constitutional mechanisms were still in place. The PC mechanism, which was modelled
after the Indian model of power sharing between centre and province, was too limited,
however, to be considered a genuine federal system (Edrisinghge 2004). The executive
president at the centre was able to dissolve any province without giving reasons. While in
theory, the provinces were meant to have their own police forces, land rights, taxation and
educational policies, the full implementation of these provisions never happened.
Furthermore, most of the fiscal and budgetary controls were with the centre. The three
areas of governance that were divided as the Provincial List, the Reserved List and the
Concurrent List never articulated in detail the separation of powers. 28 However, even with
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the above-mentioned limitations, if the Accord had been fully implemented, they just
might have paved the way for the future development of federalism in Lanka. However,
the Sinhala elites, pressured by the Sangha, did not favour the full implementation of the
accord. The Sangha even during the signing of the Accord led a violent opposition, which
included an attempt on the life of visiting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
PCs, they argued, would further strengthen separatist demands and would benefit
the LTTE's military helping them to fight Lanka. Such arguments proved to be lame
excuses for the Sinhala elites and Sangha, because after the comprehensive defeat of the
LTTE in May 2009, in a post-war state some 24 years after signing the accord, Lanka
could have genuinely implemented the devolution and let the regional political bodies
function semi-autonomously. However, such post-victory political magnanimity was not
an option for Rajapakse or his powerful Sangha turned politicians (Hoglunda and Orjuelab
2011: 19; Wickramasinghe 2009: 1045).
0.3.2 Exogenous factors supporting a federal solution
Federalism is considered as the best option
Some form of federalism is frequently suggested as the best option for creating a stable,
democratic, constitutional arrangement in divided societies especially where the divisions
are based on ethnicity (Burgess 2006, 2007; Gagnon and Tully 2001; Simeon 2009).
Democratization scholars Linz and Stepan argue that ethnically constructed federal units
within democratic ~tates provide channels for ethnic groups to engage with the state
system (1996). Other scholars have argued from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives that federalism is the best solution available for the resolution of protracted
intra-ethnic conflicts (e.g. Barnes 200 I; He, Galligan and Inoguchi 2009; Hicks 2011;
Horowitz 1993; Kincaid 2011; Lijphart 2004 and 1992; McGarry and O'Leary 1993;
2006; Roeder, Rothschild [eds.] 2005; Simeon 2009; Tillin 2007). This view is
commonplace across a wide range of disciplines from conflict analysis to the study of
28 See the full text of the Accord and the lists at
http://tamilnation.co/srilankalaws/87thirteenthamendment.htm, Accessed on 30 March 2009.
multiculturalism (Burgess and Pinder 2007; Christiny and Hugz 2003; Church and
Dardanelli 2005; De Frantz 2008; Gagnon 2009; Hanspeter and Trechsel 2008; Karmis
and Maclure 2001; Kriesi 2009; Kymlicka 2001; Kymlicka 2009,2001, 1996; Kymlicka
and Norman 2000 Mattes and Savun 2009; McRoberts 2001; Nolte 2002; Gagnon and
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Tully 2001; Raghavan and Bauer 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl Brancati 2009;
Thies 2009)
Federalism is a constructive response to demands for separation made vis-a-vis
unitary states. "Federalism offers a compromise between a unitary state and secession; it
plays a prominent role in agreements on terminating civil wars between ethnically-defined
parties to the conflict. [... ] It offers the possibility of a compromise between a unitary state
and demands for separatism" (Gromesa 2010:354). Federalism helps consolidate
democracy III situations where various nationalisms compete for hegemony and/or
recognition III the political arena (Maiza 1999), and it can provide an alternative to
unilateral separatism as in the case of Quebec (Anderson 2007). Federal states are also
better equipped to manage fragmented, contested, and diverse identities as in the case of
Ethiopia (Abbaya 2010), India (Adeney and Saez 2005) and many other states such as
South Africa, Nigeria and Switzerland (Moreno and Colino 2010). Furthermore, it can
build and strengthen institutional capacity for advancing the process of democratization in
homogenous states as demonstrated by the case of Austria (Howea 2010). Federalism is
not without criticism. Some have argued that federalism weakens state structure and
causes fragility as in Belgium (Wintera and Baudewyns 2009). However, Alan Gagnon,
echoing Heisler argued:
I don't think federalism solves conflicts. I don't think it can avoid conflict. I think it ought
to provide a context in which conflict can be approached, arbitrated and managed.
Multinational federalism is a more refined model of federalism and it has added potential
for state managers to come to terms with political issues confronting diverse societies.
(2007:28)
Michael Burgess, a scholar of comparative federalism, draws attention to the fact that at
least in the classic federations, federalism and democracy have been mutually reinforcing:
When we are reminded that previous scholarship in this area (federalism and democracy)
has largely been occupied with modern classic federations, such as the USA, Switzerland,
Canada and Australia, it becomes much clearer why contemporary scholars of federal
studies should come to the general conclusion, as they do, that federalism and democracy
- notwithstanding tensions between them - are ultimately mutually reinforcing.
(20 I 0: xiii)
Canada, Spain, and Malaysia are further examples of how diverse cultural and political Page I 35
identities can co-exist within a federalist system.
II Indian Influence
India, the regional superpower, had long advocated Tamil rights in Lanka (Hennayake
1989; Keethaponkalan 2011; Premdas and Samarasinghe 1988). India's regional policy
and direct involvement and her costly and failed attempt to install federalism in Lanka are
well-documented in the literature (Edrisinghe 2005; Dixit 1997).
India played a major role in promoting and facilitating the idea of an armed Tamil
rebellion from 1984-1989, and in advocating and enforcing a would-be form of federalism
through the Indo-Lanka accord in 1989. Finally, they helped Lanka militarily to defeat the
Tamil Tigers (Keethapongalan 2011). Throughout this chequered history, India, while
arguing for the devolution of more political powers to the Tamils, had firmly discouraged
the notion of a separate state in the northeast of Lanka; instead India promoted some form
of federalism that would grant the Tamils a degree of autonomous self-rule.
The 1987 Accord amended the Lankan Constitution (13th amendment) and created
a Provincial Council system with significant powers, and merged the Northern and Eastern
Provinces, thus creating a contiguous area that roughly corresponded to the geographical
idea of Tamil Eelam. The Accord mandated the deployment of an Indian Peacekeeping
Force (IPKF) to monitor (and enforce) its implementation. India positioned herself to
negotiate on behalf of the Tamils and used her political weight to extract a compromise
from the Lankan government, but soon found there was limited willingness from both
sides. The LTTE, not a signatory to the agreement, refused to disarm. The IPKF's attempt
to force them into compliance sparked a bloody war with massive casualties on both sides.
Among Sinhala nationalist constituencies, the perception of Indian infringement on
Lankan sovereignty and fears that the unitary state was under threat spawned violent
opposition. This culminated in the second JVP uprising in the south, in which
marginalized Sinhala youth driven by a heady mixture of Maoism and nationalism staged
an insurgency in 1987. The uprising was brutally crushed by the government in 1989
(Chandraperuma 1991; Moore 1993; Samaranayake 1999).
Meanwhile, opposition to India's intervention in the northeast continued. In a
peculiar twist of history, there was a convergence in the interests of the Lankan
government and the LTTE as both sought to force the withdrawal of the IPKF. In 1989
President Premadasa's government and the LTTE held two rounds of talks in Colombo in
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which both parties agreed that the IPKF should withdraw within a year. After the Indians
withdrew in 1990, the pro-Indian Tamil groups, which India had used as allies or proxies,
were crushed by a reinvigorated LTTE (Balasingham, 2004; De Silva 2005; Destradi
2010; DeVotta 2010; Dixit 2003; Krishna 2001; Loganathan 2006; Tilakaratne 2006).
Even today, after the military victory of Lanka, India is actively promoting the idea of
(some level of) federalism in Lanka (Bandarage 2012).
III The international community supported a federal solution
The military victory in May 2009 came after one of the most internationalized, multi-
actor, systematic, and thoroughly theorized peace processes in recent times (Spencer and
Goodhand 2011). The Norwegians were invited as negotiation facilitators by President
Chandrika Kumaratunge Bandaranaike (Bullion 200). The ceasefire agreement was signed
with a Scandinavian monitoring mission on the ground. Six rounds of direct talks between
the Tamil Tigers and the Government of Lanka were held from 2002 to 2005. A team of
experts from the EU, Japan and India were also acting as observers and advisors to the
process (Hoglunda and Svenssona 2009). For many enthusiastic actors, Lanka was
promising to become a success story in conflict resolution. The peace process, from inter-
party communication to humanitarian development, was dominated by international actors
(Goodhand et al 2005), a fact which some commentators in retrospect have criticized as a
case of "over-internationalization" (Uyangoda 2010). All of the above actors supported,
favoured and facilitated federalism in Lanka. However, as we know, not only was
federalism rejected but the ideology of the unitary state model was also reconfirmed.
Understanding this surprising process of rejection and the role of Sangha within it is the
key aim of this research. Perhaps due in part to their positive experience as federal states,
many members of the international community, including Australia, Canada, Germany,
Switzerland and USA, were actively involved in the Lankan process and openly
supported a federal solution.
0.4 Federalismrejected
In light of the many reasons why federalism appeared as a natural solution to the problems
in Lanka, how do we explain its rejection in Lanka by the Sinhala majority? After ninety
years of debate and deliberation, the federal option is still highly unpopular and widely
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rejected by the Sinhala political elites, most vehemently among the Sangha.
Will Kymlicka observed that over the past few decades there have been positive responses
to federalism's policy of accommodating minority rights in North America and Western
Europe on the one hand, and an opposite trend in Central Europe, Asia and Africa on the
other (2007). While multinational/multicultural states such as Belgium, Canada, Spain,
Switzerland, and even the United Kingdom have actively searched for constitutional and
institutional designs to incorporate politics of the peripheries, other states - particularly in
Asia - have often violently refused to consider any such minority aspirations for political
and cultural autonomy. Here a noteworthy aspect is that almost all the Theravadin states in
Asia - Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Lanka and Thailand - have experienced bloody civil
unrest due to their firm refusal to accommodate minority rights.
There are the key reasons given to justify an inflexible and undemocratic state
response. They include the legacy of the past, the very political manner in which the past
leaves traces in memory, colonial divisions and injustice, elite competition within the
majority group, powerful religious/cultural actors, fear of other regional/external
influence, and the argument that economic development rather than political power-
sharing will fulfil minority aspirations. The federal discourse of the minority was
considered an attempt to break the territorial integrity of the island, an internal and
international conspiracy against the ethnic Sinhalas and their Theravada Buddhist
civilization. This interpretation justified the campaign for a comprehensive military
solution. Defending the unitary status of Lanka with every means available to the state
became a "just holy.war" of Sinhala-Buddhism (Bartholomeusz 2002) led by the Sangha
community. However, the Sangha community has failed, to date, to make a collective and
authoritative case against federalism in Lanka. Judging from their actions and
pronouncements, the federalist agenda has evoked a number of phobias in the minds of the
Sinhala Sangha and their nationalist followers. Federalism, as understood by the Sangha,
is an attempt to (i) make non-Sinhala Buddhists equal political owners of the island, which
is unacceptable as Sinhalas are the only 'nation' while others are mere communities. It is
also an attempt to (ii) subdivide the island and undermine its present homogeneous
Sinhala-Buddhist identity to incorporate other religious/ethnic identities, which will in tum
undermine the Dhammadipa/" the island of (Buddhist) dhamma. This belief is driven by
the fear that Tamil demands for federalism are a pretext for establishing a Tamil state - a
fear nurtured by historical precedents. Such a future Tamil-Hindu state carved out of the
island would inevitably seek the destruction of Sinhala-Buddhist Lanka.
These deep-seated fears are reasons why the Sangha, as the agents of the Sinhala-
Buddhist ideology empowered by an unbroken lineage and tradition, have violently
opposed federalism. The reason for their stance cannot be understood without appreciating
the role and influence of the Sangha, how they conceptualize Sinhala-Buddhism, interpret
Lankan/global history and predict the future of Sinhala society and its polity.
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0.4.1 The Sangha and Sinhala Buddhism30
Traditionally the majority of Buddhist studies have fallen into three main categories: the
study of Buddhist doctrine, the anthropology of Buddhist societies and the study of the
history of South Asia. However, there is also now an emerging focus on understanding the
impact of Buddhism on state formation and democratic politics (Blackburn 2010; Borchert
2007; Braun 2009; Harris 2007; Keyes 2011). This interest in the political implication of
Buddhism grew out of a desire to understand why in almost every Theravada Buddhist
state one can find high levels of protracted political unrest and violence. Burma (Schober
2011; South 2008), Cambodia (Kent and Chandler 2009; Ojendal and Lilja 2009), Laos
(Abeysekara 2011 :489; Evans 1998), Lanka, Thailand (Jerryson 2009:33; McCargo 2008,
2009: 1, 2009: 11; Tamada 2009) are all Theravada Buddhist states experiencing some form
of protracted conflict relating to the definition of their statehood.
The scholarly literature suggests three main reasons why the political involvement
of the Sangha contributed to the conflict in Lanka. First, scholars have argued that the
Sinhala Sangha involvement is atypical. In other words, the Sangha have "betrayed" the
true nature of Buddhism (Amunugama 1985, 1991 a, 1991b; Seneviratne 1999; Tambiah
29 Dlpavamsa, Mahavamsa and the Culavamsa record that Buddha himself declared Lanka as Dhammadlpa -
the island where his Buddhist doctrine will be preserved and propagated. See Clifford, R. T., 'The
Dhammadipa tradition in Sri Lanka: three traditions within the chronicles', in Smith 8., L., (ed.) Religion
and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka. Anima Books, Chambersburg, PA, 1978
30 I use the term Sinhala Buddhism to identify the way Theravada Buddhism is practiced amongst the
Sinhalas. How the doctrine, the role of the Sangha and the practice of Buddhism in Lanka differs from other
countries has been discussed by many scholars including, Bradwell Smith, Gananatha Obeysekara, H. L.
Seneviratne, Richard Gombrich, Sarath Amunugama, Stanley Tambiah, Steven Berkwitz, Steven Kemper,
and Yen Deegalle Mahinda
1987). Second, others have drawn attention to the specific features of Sinha1a Buddhism,
which make it state- and ethno-centric (Kemper 1991; Smith 1978). Finally, scholars have
pointed out that the democratic forces and the democratic political mechanisms failed to
recognize and negotiate with Sinhala Buddhism (Abeysekara 2008, 2004; Malalgoda
1976).
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The central point of understanding Sinhala politics is to appreciate the complex
relationship between the Sangha and the legitimacy of the state. The Asokan model shaped
the sasana in Lanka. This 'traditional,3! Sinhala heritage has been enshrined in a sacred
history through the Vamsa volumes and other literature. In this tradition, the relationship
between the Sangha and the state/ruler is one of immediate, unbroken, reciprocal
legitimization (Bechert 1974, 1970; Smith 1974).
One cannot overestimate the impact of the colonial experience on the Sangha's
self-understanding. Lanka had been a Buddhist kingdom for many centuries. Most of the
non-Sinhala kings in the country either became Buddhists or accepted the responsibility to
protect and promote Buddhism. As the rulers of a Buddhist kingdom, the rulers in Lanka
were also expected to protect the Sangha and their institutions. In 1815, for the first time
in its history, the whole island came under the rule of a non-Buddhist foreign colonial
power. The experience of colonial domination dramatically changed the Sangha and their
sasana, shaping the Sangha attitudes towards early democracy in Lanka and towards non-
Buddhist 'others' around them, especially those with political power.
Theravada canonical teaching does not directly conflicts with democracy (or
federalism). Buddhism offers the opportunity of nirvana 32 - of reaching the final goal and
'no-return' status of life in the cyclical journey of birth and rebirth - to everyone.
Buddhism does not - in theory or literally - believe in any hierarchical class or caste
system.r' It also affirms the impact of karma." on everyone depending on his/her
(in)actions. Taking. these facts alone, the universality of democracy/federalism and
31 Heinz Bechert distinguished three phases in the development of Buddhism: I) canonical (from the time of
Buddha to the time the teachings circulated as texts), 2) traditional (from the time of the texts to the Buddhist
exposure to western colonialism), 3) modern (from the time of colonization to the present). (Bechert 1974)
32 The end goal of every Buddhist. Nirvana is the end of cyclical birth through samsara based on karma. See
Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism (ODB 2004:194).
33 In Lanka, it is believed, there are over 100 caste categories among the different ethnic communities (De
Silva 1982). Lanka's Sangha are divided into three major chapters based on caste 1) Amarapura (largely
southerners of the Karave caste), 2) Ramanna (largely from the Salagama and lower country Goyigama
caste), and 3) Siyam (for the Kandy/low country Goigama caste). The Siyam in turn are divided into two
major temples as Malwathu and Asgiriya of Kandy (Jiggins 2010; Sudalaimuth 2008; SamueI2007).
34 Karma (or kamma) is the ethical action that results in merit (kusala) or demerit (akusala). Based on such
(a)kusala, one is born in the next birth. No one has the power to alter such merits. (ODB: 137)
Buddhism should complement each other in a constructive manner. However, when it
comes to the organization of the Sangha and their sasana, aimed at becoming enlightened
or and then attaining nirvana, we find a strict hierarchical order based on age, gender,
knowledge and the kusala (positive karmas). Thus, Theravada as it is institutionalized
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among the Sinhalas can also provide points of friction between democracy and federalism
(Clifford at el. 2003).
How exactly these conflicting dynamics between the canons and the practice
influenced Sinhala society is largely a matter of context. Based on Theravada
interpretations, the relationship between the Sangha and the Sinhala polity has always
favoured a centralized state-centric authority. The Sangha often found it difficult to accept
and adopt democracy as presented to them during the last 200 years of their encounter
with colonialists. As we shall examine in later chapters, the Sangha attitudes towards
democratic values entail many paradoxes.
The politics of the Sangha defends the sovereignty of the land, its ethnie and
Theravada faith, which in tum are best maintained and expressed by the unitary state. This
thinking has produced a kind of 'Sinhalatva' - an ideology or a consciousness (~2Sfti)25)c..:l)
like Savarkar's 'Hindutva' (Savarkar 1969; Sarkar 1996) - that considers the Sinhalas as
the only group with a political claim to the land. Through such ethnic hegemonizing and
political centralization, Sinhala nationalism institutionalized a form of non-democratic if
not indeed totalitarian politics.
This research will explore how the Sinhala Sangha have produced this religiosity
using the Mahavamsa and related Sinhala texts, and then used this religiosity to shape the
politics of modem Lanka. The key contribution of the Mahavamsa was to transform Pali
Buddhist ethics into Sinhala Buddhism (Keown 1992; Harvey 2000; Reynold 1979). In
this ideologizing process, the Sangha have managed to declare the act of defending the
island as a Sinhala Buddhist unitary state a religious duty, which justifies and could
require the use of violence. Within this context, questioning or challenging the politics of
Sinhala Buddhism amounted to a rejection of its core values and made the challenger an
enemy of Sinhala ethnicity, their Buddhism and lor the unitary nature of the island.
Because federalism argues for equal citizenship, equal political rights and the recognition
of sub-state regional autonomy in Lanka, the federal discourse in Lanka became the
ideology of an enemy. We cannot label the Sinhala Sangha as religious fundamentalists,
for they do not refer to or adhere to an original religious text to justify their worldly action.
Nevertheless, we may safely call them 'political fundamentalists' because they idealize a
certain version of society codified in the pages of the Mahavamsa,
0.4.2 Theravada ethics and political violence
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The study of Buddhist ethics and their complex relationship to modem societies,
especially to the issue of war and violence, has generated a considerable volume of
literature (Hallisey and Hansen 1996; Hallisey 1991; Jones 1979; Keown 2001; Love
1965; Prebish 1996; Reat 1980; Zimmerman 2006).35 The relationship to political violence
as in Lanka complicated the matter even further. There are no readily agreed-upon
methods of interpretation or analysis. Furthermore, the Theravada canon distinguishes two
different kinds of ethics depending on whether they have otherworldly connotations
(lokottara) or not (laukika, of this world). The way ethical principles apply to the Sangha,
whose primary objective in life is to endeavor nirvana, and to the lay Buddhist are
different. For example, a Sangha has 227 piitimokkha'" rules to follow, which include
celibacy, not using money etc. - but these rules do not apply to the lay Buddhist.
The primary objective of the teaching of Buddha is to understand the suffering -
duhkha - of this world and to train one's mind and life in order to overcome such suffering
by overcoming the cycle of birth and re-birth that one is involved in as a result of one's
own (in)action. Duhkha is one of the four noble truths Buddha preached in his first
sermon. In English, there is no single word to capture the essence of the Buddhist meaning
of duhkha. The rough translation as suffering is somewhat misleading. Duhkha is the
remorse that comes from the understanding of the impermanence of life and everything
around it. There are three kinds of duhkha: duhkha-duhkha, which is the universal
suffering in the world caused by illness, death, poverty, etc., viparinama-duhkha, which is
the suffering caused by change over which we have no control, and samskara-duhkha,
which is the formation and deformation of consciousness and aniitman (no selt). In this
process of overcoming duhkha, there are clear decisions to be made. Some practices and
thoughts are to be avoided while others are to be embraced. Taking part in this process -
35 On the methodological, conceptual and interpretational complexity of Theravada Buddhist ethics see the
special issue of the Journal of Religious Ethics, Spring 79, Vo1.7, No.1, especially the editorial at pp.l-l o.
Damien Keown states that "Buddhist ethics is aretaic: it rests upon the cultivation of personal virtue"
(Keown 2001 :2). The view that Mahayana involves a kind of virtue ethics has been more extensively
developed, especially given the claim that the Bodhisattva's compassion can override rules (Cooper and
James 2005; James 2004).
36 Patimokkha (or Pratimoksa) are the code of conduct of Sangha discipline given in the Vinaya Pitaka. See
(Prebish 1974).
being on the 'path' - decides whether individuals, the people and society are 'for' or
'against' Buddhism.
Aided by the historical position they have occupied in Lankan society, the Sangha
hegemonize the interpretive matrix according to which people, ideas and things stand for
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or against Buddhism. Selecting and popularizing ethics relating to war and peace is a
largely contextualized process, and it is for this reason that the history of the Sangha in
Lanka (and elsewhere) has produced such a variety of results and outcomes. Scholars now
agree that the view of Buddhism as a globalltranslocal phenomenon based on some
original canon cannot explain the function of contemporary Buddhism. Instead, modem
Buddhism survives because of the process of 'inculturalization' within the local setting as
the key act of interpreting Buddhist values, attitudes, traditions and texts. Analyzing this
'localizing' process, Erik Braun argues that
Past scholars studying Buddhism, especially in Southeast Asia, often went so far as to
celebrate the conception of a single translocal form of Buddhism as a worthier counterpart
to seemingly more ephemeral and corrupted local expressions. But in recent years scholars
have moved well past a simplistic division between a supposed trans local and authentic
core of Buddhism opposed to local 'corruptions', in favor of a view that sees meanings
and values for forms of Buddhism - even translocal Buddhism' s-emerging at local levels.
Yet further refinement of this division is ongoing, especially concerning conceptions of
Buddhism in the modern era.
(2009:936)
Karund, maitri and ahimsii are key virtues of Theravadins, Maitri is to be understood as
kindness, benevolence or goodwill, the first of the divine abidings. Karuna is absolute
compassion, the second divine abiding. Ahimsa is the moral principle of non-violence
towards fellow human beings, animals and plants. In Theravada, the teaching of Buddha
embodies universal kindness towards all living beings. Yet throughout history and in the
present day there are examples of violence and war in states where Theravada is the
majority state religion. Almost all Theravadin states have experienced abysmal levels of
violence against their own citizens in the recent decades. This obviously demands some
explanations. What are the possible justifications of violence in the Pali Canon, tales of
Asoka-the universal wheel-turning monarch (cakkavatti), post-canonical narratives such as
the Mahavamsa, as well as contemporary postcolonial Lankan Theravada beliefs and
practice? Theravadin canonical writings do not offer specific, detailed discussions on war
or peace (Premasiri 2003; Bartholomeusz, 2002). Most modem Buddhist theology on the
ethic of war and peace derives from Buddha's discourses on life and society or his
encounters with kings and rulers (ON II 72-76; Panditha 2011:124; Rhys 1977; Walshe
1995). In Lanka, we find at least three different schools of thought regarding the
Theravadin ethic of violence:
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• Violence is a necessary element in the historical unfolding of the Theravadin
narrative (Bartholomeusz 2002; Kepferer 2004, 2001, 1988, 1985, 1979; Kiblinger
2003; Obeysekere 2003,2002, 1995; Tambiah 1993, 1992, 1986).
• There is no evidence of support for violence within the Theravadian tradition
(Deegalle 2007,2006,2003,2004; Panditha 2001; Premasiri 2003).
• Presenting violence as an ethical duty in the context of the Theravada tradition is
always a result of the power play by the Sangha and the state since the time of
Emperor Asoka (Amunugama 1985, 1991; Gunawardene 1971, 1979; Spencer et
al. 1990a, 1990b).
The dominant voice in this debate on the ethics of peace and war in Lanka belongs to the
Sangha, who appeal to two contradictory positions. On the one hand, the Sangha are the
symbol of the teaching of Buddha and his doctrine. They subscribe to an extensive
philosophy based on compassion and renouning of this world. However, they also are the
spiritual and cultural guardians of Theravada and hence of Lanka. This dichotomy of
'renouning yet involved' rests on a fine and fragile balance in Sinhala history. The
Sangha, who are the symbol of a renounced life dedicated to the search for the path to
nirvana, due to their intrinsic involvement are an inseparable part of the politics and
governance of their society. They have also shaped the Sinhala worldview and thus the
subsequent actions taken as a result of this worldview. Over the course of history, it is
obvious that the Sinhala Sangha have both produced a violent political ideology as
embedded in the Mahavamsa and continued to represent Buddhism as a non-violent
philosophy of renunciation.
The violent element of the Sinhala Buddhist ideology was strengthened during the
colonial era. In order to generate and popularize it, the ethno-nationalism presented in the
historical narrative of the Mahavamsa supplied a scriptural justification. The Mahavamsa
even records violence between different monastic orders. In fact, in Lanka the canonical
ethic on war and peace are often adjusted to the local and contemporary conditions; in
other words, the canon can become secondary to localized political ideology. What
matters is not what Buddha preached, but rather what his followers like Venerable
Mahanama of Mahavihara - the legendary author of the Mahavamsa - heard, understood,
and interpreted at least some 1000 years Buddha's death. Such 'sub-ethics' (Hallisey and
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Hansen 1996; Harpham 1992) drive socio-political moral life in Lanka. Narratives like the
Mahavamsa continue to prefigure, configure and refigure the politics of the Sangha and
their society.
Buddhism has undoubtedly contributed to the prosperity of a great agranan
civilization since the era of Emperor Asoka of India. Furthermore, Buddhism fostered a
cultural and economic renaissance whose influence extended from Afghanistan to China,
in the process transforming the social, political and spiritual philosophy of the populations
it touched. However, within that process there was also evidence of regressive trends
which contradicted the very teachings that Buddhism publicly stood for. One clear feature
of Theravada Buddhism is the direct, influential and intrinsic relationship it maintained
with the ruling elites wherever it arrived, supporting them by protecting the state's
centralized rule under a Buddhist ruler. In
Theravada Buddhist states such as Lanka, instead of a secularization process, we find a
deep 'religionizing' during the formation of the state as a cohesive political identity
developed. In the case of Lanka, ethnic and religious identity struggled for legitimacy and
political power well before independence in 1948. Bond (1988), De Silva (1998),
Malalgoda (1976), Tambiah (1992, 1986) and Seneviratna (1997) have documented this
process in detail. Such a contest did not demand reforms of religious traditions. On the
contrary, they opposed the ruling authorities and their secular models that attempted to
distance religion from governance. The 1817, the Ova Wellasa rebellion against the
British colonists, which will be discussed later, was a militant challenge led by religious
actors demanding the legitimacy of Buddhist governance in Lanka. In Lanka, the notion of
independence did not come from secular forces but through an attempt to re-establish and
re-assert the legitimacy of Buddhism and its chief-interpreters, the Sangha, eventually
restoring them at the center of power. As Walpola Rahula summarized in 1946, the
Sangha demanded political freedom from all forces to reestablish their historical heritage
and power. In Lanka, federalism had to negotiate with Buddhism - not the other way
around. That is the fundamental reason why the fashionable thesis of the 'return of
religion' is unable to explain the war, the peace process or even the recent military victory,
because religion never left the politics of Lanka.
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Chapter 1
The Social and Political role of the Sangha in Lanka Page I 46
'The social life of a Sangha is like a flight of a bird in the sky. You can see the bird but you will
never be able to trace it.'
Venerable Khammai Dharnmasarnl"
37 Venerable Dr Khammai Dhammasami, ChiefIncumbent Oxford Buddhist Vihara, Oxford. Interview 10
July 2010.
1.1 Introduction
What is the ideal life of a Sangha? This question challenges the entire recorded history of
the Buddhasasana, No other question has, throughout history, generated such deep,
divisive interpretations in the Buddhist kingdom, giving birth to many of its Vadas Page I 47
(doctrinal schools) and Yiinas (traditions of practice). Just a few weeks after the
Mahaparinibbiina't of Buddha, the Sangha, at their first council," disagreed on a number
of theological and religio-social aspects of their daily life (Hallisey 1991; Prebish 2000,
1974). For the Bahusrutas (the learned), the dhamma (the mastering of the teaching of
Buddha and his philosophy) was important, while for the Seeladharas (the
disciplinarians), salvation came through the stricter observation of the Vinaya" - the
ascetic disciplines (Chatalian 1983; Findly 1992). These disagreements have not
diminished after twenty-five centuries of discourse, and they promise to remain an issue of
contestation in the Buddhist world.
The renouncer tradition of spirituality, whereby one seeks spiritual salvation
through a radical departure from home and society, is not an exclusively Buddhist heritage
(Silber 1981; Whitehouse 2004). Asocial or even antisocial traditions of spirituality
existed prior to the establishment of Buddhism as a key spiritual force in northeast India.
There were several traditions of wandering mendicants such as the Jaina4! (Buehler 2007;
FlUgel 2006, 2005; Osier 2007; Schubring 2000) and AjTvakas42 (Basham 2000, 1951),
who left civilian life and lived on alms in search of spiritual enlightenment. It was from
these traditions (collectively called the sramanasf" That the Buddha first gained spiritual
directions. The Buddha's revolutionary contribution at the time was to present the
Madhyama Pratipatti, the "middle path" between the Brahmans, who were preoccupied
with their countless rituals, and the torturous asetic practices of the ascetic sramanas
(Bronkhorst 1989).
38 In the Buddhist texts, the death of Buddha, his departure from lite and journey to the nothingness of
nirvana ending the cycle of birth and re-birth, is referred to as Mahdparinibbana.
39 The first meeting of nearly 500 Arahats was held at Rajagaha just a few weeks after the death of Buddha.
Here, the senior monk Maha Kassapa is said to have acted as the overall leader. (00B:66)
40 Vinaya is the set of ascetic disciplines described in the Vinaya Pitaka - one of the three key texts of
Buddhism. A Theravadin ordained Sangha has to follow 227 of such rules.
41 Jainism is an Indian religious order very similar to Buddhism and was propagated by Mahavira, a
contemporary of Buddha. Jainism, unlike Buddhism, believes in a Jiva, an eternal soul, and follows a stricter
form of Ahimsa (non-violence, extending to plants and unseen insects).
42 A breakaway sect of Jain ism founded by Makkhali Gosala (00B:6)
43 Indic religions can be divided into two basic types: Sramanas (the unorthodox renouncer type) and
Brahmanism (the orthodox, established and ritualistic type).
Buddha argued for the importance of two key factors: moving away from the repetition of
the customary rituals of Brahmanism, and rejecting sramanisrri's punitive focus on the
body. He emphasized the importance of the mind as the key center of meditation yet he
remained within the renouncer tradition. It appears, as far as the Pali canons permit us to
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determine, that Buddha strategically avoided any abstract (and thus contested) attempts to
re-define the forces of karma, instead taking karma as a given part of the status quo. His
followers were encouraged to eliminate trsnii, or human desires and cravings, which are
the basis of all duhkha (the sufferings in human life). As De Jong (1972) shows, Buddha
very clearly distinguished between parallel traditions in asceticism, Yoga, and sramanism,
Although the prescriptions he gave to the Sangha were less punitive in comparison with
the other sramanic traditions, the Vinaya rules he gave had their own restrictions,
especially when compared to the modem Sangha community. The earliest Sangha were to
follow these nisraya - vrksha mula: sleeping at a root of a tree; pindapiita: begging for
meals; piimsiikiila: wearing rags found in cemeteries; putimutra-bhaisajya: drinking cow
urine as the only medicine - and to practice the 227 rules of the Piitimokkha (Vin. I: 28,
58). These practices constituted the inner and outward signs of the commitment of the
Sangha (Gombrich 1992, 1988; Wijeratne 1983; Thomas 1933).
Buddha's advocacy of a peripatetic yet coenobitic alternative for the Sangha was
initially a radical compromise challenging the social and political context and attracting a
new generation of followers. However, the significant difference of the Buddha's
teaching, compared to the traditions that preceded it, was the "middle-path" teaching. He
encouraged homelessness, wandering without desire, and living a simple life, but never
advocated the total rejection of, and withdrawal from, human society. Aspiring Sangha
were to have two motivations: they had to live a life of "detachment" to find spiritual
salvation, while remaining on the fringes of society, from where they could teach others
how to find enlightenment. The Sangha were to remain meditative during the four-month
rainy season (vassiina), travel and preach the dhamma during the remaining eight months.
The modem Theravada interpretation of these two guidelines creates a tension of
"renouncing but re-engaging". The Sangha occupy the in-between space of renouncing
and re-engaging; they are the mediators of the tension between these two poles of
existence. This is what is meant by Venerable Khammai Dhammasami's dictum, chosen
as a motto for this chapter, that it is possible to see a Sangha but impossible to ever "trace"
his life.
It remains difficult to analyze the early Sangha socio-political behaviour and its impact on
their contemporary polity because, after twenty-five centuries, the only means of doing so
is to study the original texts and their narratives. Most of these narratives concern the inner
dynamics of the individual and the collective dynamics of the Sangha community, and as a
result, most research will involve re-reading and interpreting early Buddhist texts.
Richard Gombrich's account of early Sangha society deliberately attempted to
bypass the sociology of religion, thereby challenging its two popular and hegemonic
prisms: the Marxist narrative of material history and the Weberian school of economic
order. To Gombrich, the rise of religions, especially the simultaneous growth of a number
of Indian religious philosophies, took place independently of surplus production processes.
He maintains that an argument based on a linear, progressive production process and the
rise of a surplus economy was unable to explain the birth and growth of many religious
discourses of the srarnana traditions such as Jainism, Ajlvakas, or Buddhism. His
understanding of renouncer religions also went against the dependency theory of the
priestly class, which he considered to be "not very informative" (1988: 13).
Available historical evidence, including evidence concerning the growth of
Western civilization, also calls into question the value of the economic "surplus" account
of the birth and growth of religions. The birth and subsequent growth of the Christian faith
did not occur under favorable economic conditions. In fact, the radical changes in the
religious landscape inspired by the teachings of Jesus Christ took place against a backdrop
of economic, social, political, and even military oppression. Marcus Borg's work (1998)
highlights alternative methods by which the Jesus movement attracted its early followers
against all odds. As Hopkins (1998) shows, during the first three hundred years of its
existence the Jesus movement was a persecuted peripheral discourse, yet its adherents
were unwilling to surrender their beliefs even in conditions of extreme socio-political
oppression.
One may argue that the Jesus movement was entirely different in theology and
practice from what we witness today in a post-Protestant Western context. Are economic
theories better at explaining the rise of Protestantism? Is Protestantism the result of
capitalism or vice versa? These questions lead us to Max Weber's analysis. Weber
pioneered the sociological analysis of Indian religions including Buddhism. After
publishing his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904) and The Religion
of China: Confucianism and Taoism (1915), Weber ventured to analyze the structure of
Indian society and its relation to the two key religions in India: Hinduism and Buddhism.
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His Religions of India (1958, 2004) remains a standard methodological matrix popularly
used in Western academic circles for reading and understanding the religious sociology of
the Indian sub-continent as a whole and Buddhism (and Hinduism) in particular. However,
there is less appreciation for Weber's third thesis than for his previous work. It found more
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opposition than any of his other works, mainly from the Indologists. Classical Indologists
argue that without first-hand knowledge of Sanskrit or Pali, the most influential ancient
languages, one cannot re-interpret the ancient society of India (Bayly 1983; O'Hanlon
1985). Sociologists on the other hand criticize Weber's argument because it approaches
the complexity of Indian society by employing a predominantly Western economic
conceptual framework (Appadurai 1986). As a result, the Weberian account is unable to
explain the social dynamics that led to the emergence of not one but three distinct
renouncer religions, namely Buddhism, lainism, and AjIvakas. Weber's framework is also
limited in that it cannot explain why Buddhism emerged as the dominant religion in places
where it arrived (rather than the place where it originated), while lainism remained on the
periphery and AjIvakas disappeared. The contribution we can make to these specialist
debates is naturally limited, but it is worth highlighting that historians and Buddhalogists
alike have struggled to establish a precise explanation for the formation of a pioneer
Sangha society that remained a marginal sect until it found favour with Emperor Asoka
two centuries later. In our view, the rationale and the objectives of the Sangha Samaja are
best understood by revisiting the functional dynamics of their society as revealed in the
Vinaya Pitaka, Although it is difficult to reconstruct the details of the society of Buddha at
the moment of its emergence, we will nevertheless try to compose a general picture that
will work as our background for understanding the origin, development and the
subsequent politicization of the Sangha community. While the Indian Sangha Samaja was
the basis for the establishment of the Sinhala Sangha, this chapter will also aim to explain
how the Sinhala Sangha emerged with an outlook that was very different from, if not
opposed to, the outlook of the original Sangha.
1.2 Buddha, the Sangha and politics
It may be possible to argue that the Buddhist renouncer religion, whether by design or
through the political maneuvers of the agents of power, became a structural tool of mass
domestication. In a broader Marxist understanding, this means that the social discourse
created by Buddha and the Sangha community indirectly supported and fortified the
existing base of the socio-political order. However, if we are to test the validity of this
hypothesis, the counter argument should also be considered. Could the radical renouncer
religion advanced by Buddha in fact be a form of resistance to, and contestation of, the
power structure of the polity, as has been argued by Silber (1981). Can non-engagement
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be a form of passive protest? Did Buddha aim to challenge the ruling powers through a
kind of structured civil disobedience and by calling for an alternative social order and
power distribution? Is this the kind of passive aggression that Gandhi adopted, centuries
later, against the British colonial rule in India? With Gandhi, we have a classic example
from recent history to illustrate the power that simplicity and renunciation still hold within
Indian culture even some twenty-five centuries later. Further, it could be that Buddha, by
emphasizing the other world as the only permanent state, may have subtly undermined the
political powers of his time. Through his teaching, he seems to have challenged the two
key contemporary political powers passively, yet with formidable force. He denounced the
mytho-polytheistic, hierarchical and ritualistic Brahmin authorities, and he challenged the
rulers through a radical form of civil disengagement.
Was he in fact mounting a Nietzschean challenge by denying the existence of any
superior God or self (anattii), and instead promoting a rational sense of the inner man
(Krummel 2005; Wallis 2008)? Some commentators suggest that Nietzsche was heavily
influenced by early Buddhist thinking, even borrowing from it for his methods of
philosophical deconstruction (Bilimoria 2008). This line of argument seems plausible
because, in comparison to the contemporary sramana renouncers of his time, Buddha
refused to surrender life to a total fatalistic nihilism. Instead, he argued for an inward
analysis of life and of the attachments that come from cravings and desires (try~J(7).
Buddha never entirely gave up on human life, even when it offered no meaning, as he
believed it was the crucial stage of the "continuous flow" (S(If!lSara) that would determine
the direction ofthe journey of life. He preached the possibility of overcoming not just the
duhkha (suffering) of th is life but also the entire Trans migratory cycle of birth-death-and-
rebirth caused by karma. His middle path discourse, while recognizing the emptiness of
civic life, nevertheless admitted that the path to spiritual liberation was (with rare
exceptions) gradual and sequential. Until the point of spiritual liberation, the goal of life is
to live within the guidance of the renouncer principles: the four noble truths.':!.:jIt is in this
44 Also known as the Arya Catur Satya: the four foundational concepts preached by Buddha in his very first
sermon. Duhkha: life/existence is full of suffering; Samudaya: suffering arises from craving desires,
Niriidha (in nirvana all suffering ends) and Arya Ashtanga Marga: the eightfold path is the way to Nirvana.
context that the Buddha outlined a delicate, and controversial, lifestyle for his followers.
This lifestyle was encapsulated in a series of principles to guide his lay followers and in a
distinct way of life for the Sangha, his immediate disciples. Buddha permitted any layman
to enter the Sangha-hood and any Sangha to return to the lay life at any time: a modus
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vivendi that has continued to operate throughout the entire history of Buddhism. This
structure was a crucial element of dissent by passivity, in that it created an alternative and
counter-cultural social structure through which the entire social fabric was re-defined in
relation to Buddhism: everyone was either a member or a supporter of the Sangha class,
which, standing on the fringes of society, had the potential to destahilize the established
secular powers.
While scholarly oprmon IS divided on this, it is possihle to argue that these
arrangements represented a call for a parallel society, a different order of being initiated by
following Buddha's renouncer ideology. However, like all other areas of Buddhist studies
this is only an alternative analysis of what little history there is availahle. Twenty-live
centuries have passed, during which already scarce information has been constructed and
reconstructed through the lens of history. History may not he able to provide us with an
authentic account of Buddha (Clark 1930). As we know, no history has the ability to
totally escape the socio-political orientation of the narrator. With an appreciation of the
limitations of our historical knowledge in mind, we will now turn to an investigation of the
early Sangha movement.
1.3 The first Sangha: A social background
Understanding and interpreting the origin of Buddhism have always presented historical,
archaeological, and sociological challenges. Many parts of Buddhism are highly contested
by many scholars of different schools, in part because the Buddha did not record any of his
teachings, and in part because of the many controversies and divisions within the different
schools of Buddhism. Scholarship on early Buddhism is still at an early stage of
development, without much progression from its beginnings in the 1800. Eugene Clarke
reflected on this condition seven decades ago, with his assertion that the discoveries at
The eightfold path incorporates Samyag-drsti (the right view), Samyag Samkalpa (the right resolve), Samyag
Vacha (right speech), Samyag Karmiinta (right action), Samyag Afiva (right livelihood), Samyag Vyaydma
(right efforts), Samyag Smrti (right mindfulness), Samyag Samddhi (right meditation).
present have "not advanced our knowledge in any significant manner" (Clark 1930). Still,
as J. W. De Jong, a scholar of early Buddhism, noted:
It would be hypocritical to assert that nothing can be said about the doctrine of earliest
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have been proclaimed by him [the Buddha], transmitted and developed by his disciples
and, finally, codified in fixed formulas.
(De Jong 1993:26)
We know, for example, that the Indian society In which Buddha lived, preached, and
called his first Sangha disciples was anything but monolithic. Historians and Indologists
agree that Buddha's society was multilingual, multiethnic, and multi-faith, and that it had
multiple forms of governance (Schopen 2002; Stein 2010; Thapar 2004). However,
Kapilavastu, where Siddhartha was born during the fifth or sixth century BCE,45 was one
of the city-states known as Janapadas, located in a remote area relatively free from the
dominant influence of Brahmin socio-politics. The fact that Kapilavastu was separate from
the Hindu Brahmin society facilitated the existence of a casteless structure.t? and based on
the model of governance he later recommended to the Vajjins and his own followers,
Buddha was probably influenced by a semi-democratic or, at least, oligopolitical structure
(Dig 11:73-75). Buddha was born a member of the Sakya ethnie, and was often referred to
as "Sakyamuni" (the sage of Sakya). His mother tongue is not known, but is suspected to
have been a 'non-Indo-Aryan dialect' (Gombrich 1988:49) or similar to Magadhi (De Jong
1993), while Pali, in which the canon were composed, is a later language preserved and
promoted by the Theravadins,
There are two main schools of thought regarding the nature of the society of
Buddha. Some argue that Buddha's society was in a state of permanent transition and
plagued by socio-political tensions, while others maintain that his society was stable and
prosperous, which enabled the development of an elitist discourse on society, life and
45 After nearly two centuries of debates, scholars have not been able to agree on the dates of Buddha's life.
At a conference in Goettingen as recent as 1988 no less than 18 different theories were presented by scholars
on the dates of Buddha (Bechert 1991). Most books available on Buddhism place the Buddha into the sixth
century BCE with 563-483 as one of the most commonly quoted dates. However, recent scholarship is
moving away from this theory, placing Buddha's life firmly within the fifth century BCE. As Nakamura
noted, "[g]iven the poor state of early Indian chronology, one can appreciate one scholar's statement that it is
quite remarkable to have a dating theory fall into such a limited difference of merely one century"
(NakamuraI977: 12 ff, quoted in Dillon 2000:525).
46 The caste system derives from Brahmanic Hinduism, which categorizes the society according to four
Varna (Colors). In Lanka, the influence of caste is found amongst the Sinhalas, the Tamils and even the
Muslims. The Sinhala caste system has at least 24 major and sub categories. Goyigama (famers), Durave
(tree climbers), Karave (fishermen) and Salagama (Cinnamon peelers) are the four major Sinhala castes
(Jiggins 2010).
death. After giving an extended account of various socio-economic and political aspects of
Buddha's society, Darian argues:
We must emphasize that while economic factors were important in the rise of Buddhism,
the aspiring merchant was able to succeed financially under the Hindu caste system. And it Page I 54
is questionable whether he would have chosen Buddhism if not for other, irresolvable
status dilemma.
(Darian 1977:226)
Still, while Buddhist literature does not reveal a "consciousness of a period of dramatic
change having been traversed" (Bailey and Mabbett 2003:3), it is fair to say that the time
of Buddha was a period of change and that society was in transition (Darian 1977).
At Buddha's name-giving ceremony, many learned astrologers were said to have
predicted that the princely boy would be a Cakravattin (an emperor) or a sage and leader
of society. It is important to note that almost all accounts of the early life of Buddha
present these two futures for the young boy. This represents an evolution in the outlook of
the recorders of Buddhist history. While Buddha's attitude towards power and rule seems
quite detached in Pali Buddhist texts, put together at least a few centuries after his death,
the conceptual identity of the Buddha (and later the Sangha) was replaced with that of an
emperor. It is noteworthy that the king and the Sangha are both considered as occupying
positions of influence and rule: one by power and the other by way of radical renunciation.
H. L. Seneviratne (1999) postulates that throughout the modem history of the
Buddhist sasana, the Sangha preferred to position themselves in one of two power
positions, preferring either to be the kings or to be beside the kings. The conceptual
approach to power and kingship found in the post-Buddha texts seem to gravitate around
four central notions, as presented by Gokhale (1966):
1. A powerful centralized leader is inevitable in a world where the number of
spiritual virtuosi is decreasing.
2. Kingship is a divine gift awarded for merits gained in a previous life.
3. Kings should have the knowledge and ability to maintain a balanced
treasury and an effective standing army.
4. A king should be the compassionate father figure who rules the state with
the virtues of dhamma.
The ruler king and the renouncer sage are two antithetical but deeply intertwined themes at
the center of Buddhist theology. The relationship between the two positions is dialectical,
not unlike the relationship between the concepts of nirvana and karma. Nirvana is the
ultimate place of nothingness and bliss, which one can achieve with the power of kusala,
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(positive) Karma (merits). Throughout the course of human life, one can accumulate all
the necessary merits to guarantee the path to Nirvana. These concepts represent two equal
yet opposite poles of human life: one demand the act of merit collection here and now
while the other forces humans to focus on Nirvana. The first rule applies more to the lay
world, while the latter applies to the Sangha. For this reason, the laity has five principles to
follow while the Sangha follow 227 rules.47 In the Theravadin tradition the Sangha are the
key intermediary of merit collection for the lay world, and their first duty is to show the
path of salvation to the lay world (Bechert 1973; Bond 2003; Malalasekara 1967; Rahula
1956). These tensions between nirvana and karma and between Sangha and layperson
were present from the very early stages of the Buddhasasana,
Another key influence of the Buddha movement on political governance concerns
the attitudes towards political power as they are described in Buddha's original teachings.
His discourse advocated withdrawal from society and living on alms, but the Sangha were
still considered a privileged group because it was their responsibility to share the dhamma
with the rest of society. Furthermore, unlike the contemporary Sramanas, Buddha
encouraged his followers to assist their community in whatever manner available. One can
imagine that rulers may favor groups that cultivate attitudes that urge men to seek an
otherworldly life rather than worldly political power. What appears to be an attitude of
inwardness and quietude is also the complete opposite of the model used by the Brahmin,
who survived on state and temple treasuries, who based their spiritual power based on the
Vedas - which were written in Sanskrit, the language of the elite - and whose social and
civic leadership always ran parallel to that of the king, thus competing with kingship. As
Bailey and Mabbett argue:
[..] it was natural for the ruler to seek legitimacy in a new and universal ideology. [ ... ] it is
therefore not surprising that rulers such as Asoka should have expressed disapproval of
trivial ceremonies but patronized lavishly the community of Sramanas.
(2003: 175)
47 The five moral rules of Buddhism- Pahca S ila - are: do not kill; do not rob; do not fornicate; do not lie;
and do not become intoxicated (ODB:21 0). For the 277 rules a Sangha is to follow in Theravada Buddhism,
see: htlp:llw\Vw.accesstoillsight.org/tipilaka/vill/sy/bhikkhu-pali.hlml, Accessed on Aug 10,2010.
The key point of differentiation is that Buddha, whether by strategic choice or simply
because of a difference in philosophical approaches, did not challenge the rulers in any
open, direct manner. Instead, he provided a socio-political and economic alternative to the
status quo, in which the rulers tried to preserve their power and counter wide-ranging
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societal changes while constantly being challenged by the Brahmin elites. The other-
worldliness of Buddhism may have appealed to rulers as it seemed to divert attention from
the concrete living conditions of the ruled to more abstract and transcendent ideals. Could
this new movement be used to domesticate society and thus to consolidate existing power
structures? It is possible that this is the reason why the rulers and elites during the time of
Buddha and after were often eager to accept and patronize Buddhism politically. However,
the possibility that Buddha's apolitical polity and his asocial or even antisocial
engagement indirectly strengthened the existing power structures has not been sufficiently
researched. Some scholars (Dutt 1984; Kosambi 1946, 1952, 1955, 1963; Thapar 1989)
present this argument, and we believe that this proposal may help us understand the
politics of Buddhism, especially the Theravada version, through the lens of political
science.
Buddhism revolutioned some parts of Indian. It transformed almost every aspect of
the society and its peoples. However, it did not become what Hinduism to India. Even at
its peak times, Buddhism was a second religion, where there was already an established
and heavily institutionalized religious ideology (Hinduism). Nevertheless, Buddhism
established itself as being capable of convincing the masses, who had little to no
expenence with a systematic religious philosophy. Buddhism in general and the
Theravada tradition in particular, seems to have been able to successfully use state power
and strategic diplomacy to advance its path. Certainly, this is true in the case of the Post-
Asoka era in Lanka, Burma, and Thailand - all prominent Theravada states in the modem
world. This relationship between the Theravada tradition and state power and hegemonic
diplomacy is another area of Buddhist history for which there is only a very limited
scholarship.
1.3.1 The rise of the Sangha
Responding to the uncertainty
Most scholars agree that Buddha lived in an era of major transformation. Thapar (1960)
shows that many social structures, some centuries old, were changing rapidly. The four
key kingdoms of ancient India - Avanti, Vatsa, Kosala, and Magadha - were thriving due
to good weather, heavy monsoon rains, and surplus harvests, assisted by new irrigation
techniques which improved output (Gokhale 1980 and 1969; Thapar 1960). At the same
time, major class divisions began to form based on occupation, influence and wealth.
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Within this class system, there were ruling elites, soldiers and administrators, and tenured
or bonded labourers. Newly established rulers sought new land and opportunities for
political expansion, often in competition with each other. New cities and increased
migration uprooted large numbers of people, changing traditional ways of life. Although
they offered economic opportunities, new settlements were often ridden with parasites and
insects, spreading illnesses such as malaria. From the Buddhist literature we learn that
many lay people wanted to become Sangha as a way to adopt a simpler, more secure life
(Vn. 1:18; Thg. 5548). Stokke (2002) and Chakravarti (1988) outline a number of the
socio-economic reasons why soldiers, thieves in hiding, criminals, debtors, bonded
labourers, runaways, and former sex slaves joined the order. The marginalized members of
society - those who had been disadvantaged by the rapid social changes, and thus those
who felt they had very little to lose - were attracted by the idea of a radical renunciation as
the foundation of an alternative way of life that promised peace.
The new way of life seemed appealing also because it did not rely on religious
rituals, which were usually obligatory and often came with financial burdens. Instead,
Buddha invited the masses to look at the meaning of life from within. Buddha proposed
that one should approach duhkha not by searching for a way to manage or overcome
suffering, but by becoming aware that all experiences are anicca, impermanent.
Buddhist psychology also states that all pleasurable experiences are fleeting and
continually changing. Pleasure is therefore experienced as loss (suffering), which leads to
new desires and the attempt to gain new pleasures to compensate for the loss. The view
that a separate self exists perpetuates and is driven by desires in the endless cycle of
becoming (co-dependent production).
(Christensen 1999:40)
Accordingly, Buddha explained that most of the factors that influence human life come
from within rather than from external forces or events. In many ways, this is a reductionist
approach. It may have appealed to many who were dissatisfied with their immediate
reality but unable to avoid or change it. In addition, this individualistic and inward-looking
48 Theragatha means literally "the verses of the elders". It is the eighth book of the Kuddhaka nikdya in the
Sutta Pitaka of the Tripitaka.
discourse ran counter to the rigid caste system due to its emphasis on equality, which may
have been attractive especially to the middle and lower classes. Buddha consciously
constructed a narrative against the hierarchy of the Hindu caste system. While he was born
into a higher caste, he challenged a system that denied the potential of individuals and
bonded them for the duration of their worldly lives, denying their nirvana (Krishan 1998).
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II Responding to suffering and lossof meaning
From the standard biographical accounts of Buddha's life, we know that his decision to
leave a civic life was based on the fact that he could not find happiness or meaning even
while surrounded by luxuries. Buddha's father, advised by astrologers, kept the young
prince away from anything that would disturb him emotionally. Yet on one of his rare
journeys outside of his palace, the prince saw four disturbing signs of reality (satara pera
nimiti): an old man, a sick person, a corpse, and a sramana. He witnessed the four points of
suffering: jiiti (birth), jarii (decay), vyiidhi (sickness), and marana (death), causing him
intense sorrow. The news that his son had been born, after thirteen years of marriage, only
intensified his worries (Rahula 1974: ix). He named the child Rahula (fetter). In the
aftermath, his servants tried to entertain him and his father arranged a magnificent party to
celebrate the birth of a grandson, yet Siddhartha left home that night, disturbed by the
emptiness and ugliness of all sensual entertainment. Prior to his final departure (the mahii-
nikhamana), Siddhartha saw his son for the last time and vowed to return only after
finding answers to his questions. This narrative illustrates the psychological tensions
Buddha was trying to negotiate. He had entered into a mental state called saf!lvega (the
shock that leads to a renouncer life) (Coomaraswamy 1943). As explained in the
Anguttara Nikaya'" (3:38), samvega carries a number of possible meanings; in this case,
to tremble or start with fear. Johnston explains the term in the following way:
49 Anguttara Nikaya is one of the five sections of the Sutta Pitaka, The other four nikayas are DTgha (long),
Majjama (middle), Samyutta (linked), and Khuddaka (short). The text records the discourse between Buddha
and members of the Sangha and others. The Dlghanikaya contains 34 long suttas, the Majjhirna-nikaya
contains 152 suttas of middle length, the Samyutta-nikaya comprises 2889 suttas grouped together
(samyutta) according to their contents in 56 samyuttas, and finally the Anguttara-nikaya is a collection of
more than 2300 suttas arranged in eleven sections. Whereas the suttas in these four collections are for the
most part in prose, the fifth collection, the Khuddaka-nikaya, comprises many famous texts in verse such as
the Dhammapada, the Suttanipata, the Theragatha and the Therigatha. In the Theravada tradition the
volumes Tripitaka (three baskets), comprising (i) the Abhidhamma Pitaka, on metaphysics, (ii) the Sutta
Pitaka, on discourse, and (iii) the Vinaya Pitaka, on discipline, are the most important texts. For details see
http://www.accesstoinsight.orglptflbuddha.html, a Pali Text Society supported link, Accessed on 20 June
2010.
SaI11Vega as a religious term denotes the first step towards conversion, when the
perturbation of mind is produced by something and leads to consideration of the inherent
rottenness of the world and so to the adoption of the religious life.
(Brekke 1999: 61)
Brekke adopts a controversial position in his analysis of Buddhacaritam:50 Page I 59
The Buddha is essentially, what William James called the sick soul: Make the human
being's sensitivity a little greater, carry him a little farther over the misery-threshold, and
the good quality of the successful moments themselves when they occur is spoiled and
vitiated.
(1999:64).
It is difficult to state firmly, in any conclusive sense, that the primary reason for Buddha's
and the Sangha's renunciation was the impact of a deep-rooted cognitive dissonance.
Brekke takes his cue from a Western notion of zo" century psychological analysis to
determine the mind-set of a religious movement from twenty-five centuries ago. Then he
selects texts such as the Buddhacharitam, a poetic epic, composed by a non-Buddhist
author, in a language used by the rivals of Buddha (the Brahmins). Furthermore,
frustration, fear, disappointments, a deep cognitive dissonance, and similar negative
energies alone could not have shaped the Buddha's character. Historians testify to the fact
that Buddha had a great aptitude for critical analysis, even in front of his critics and
enemies. Later, his ability to lead a successful social movement also bears witness to the
fact that he had strong communication and public relations skills as well. The fact that he
continued to live a renouncer lifestyle for another fifty years also indicates that Buddha
had more than fear as a motivation. Brekke himself agrees that the "fear alone" thesis is
too reductionist (1999:862). Evidence of Buddha's dialectical discourse and the
surrounding metaphysical arguments, as recorded in the Pali canon, are witness to the
sound intellectual capacity of Buddha's philosophy. If one is to try to argue that these
theological philosophies are the works of other, later followers, as in many established
religions, consideration should be given to the fact that Buddha and his preaching could
not have survived if it had failed to surpass the already well-established intellectual
discourse of the Brahmins. However, Buddha's sensitivity and attention to detail, and the
50 Bhuddhacharitam is a 2nd Century C.E. Sanskrit poetic epic composed by Asvaghosa, For the most part
that printed in The Buddhacarita or Life of Buddha by Asvaghosa., which was edited and translated by
Professor Edward B. Cowell (first published in 1894 [text] & 1895 [translation], reprinted together New
Delhi, 1977). The readings and translation have been supplemented by E.H. Johnson's text and translation
entitled Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha (first published in Lahore, 1936; reprinted Delhi, 1995).
psychoanalytical impact of these traits, are key aspects of his decision to depart from a
comfortable lifestyle in favour of renunciation.
III Formingnew identities
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Forming a new social group identity through networking appears to have been a key phase
in the first stages of the establishment of the Sangha Samaja, beginning with Buddha and
his first disciples. One half of Vinaya Pitaka record the first months of Buddha's life after
the awakening (Vin. 1_4).51 Although he initially decided to be silent, after persuasive
requests from the god Brahma, he chose to go forth and become a teacher of the dhamma.
Before doing so, Buddha contemplated whom he should teach first. He thought of his two
former teachers Uddaka and Kalama Ramaputra and, realizing they both had died a few
days before, decided to visit the five friends with whom he had practised ascetic
meditation prior to choosing his "middle path." The men were over two hundred
kilometers away, and Buddha walked to meet with them. The five (Kondafijna,
Mahanama, Assaji, Vappa, and Bhatia, former fellow seekers) became Buddha's first
disciples.
In that part of the Vinaya Pitaka, we find the story of Vasa, a rich merchant who
had had a similar spiritual awakening. He was wandering without a home, and came to be
a Sangha under Buddha, bringing his mother, his father, and his father's former wife to the
faith. Vasa, as a Sangha, then called four and then fifty of his household members to the
Sangha fold. The first Sangha community was established, now numbering sixty with the
inclusion of these new converts. Research has highlighted the important role played by
social networking for the survival and growth of micro-movements (Gokhale 1986; Stark
and Bainbridge 1980). When society changes through rapid urbanization, the density of
the average social bond is reduced. The opportunity to live closely and associate at a
personal level, as in rural settings, is taken away. Urbanization causes community
members to live in close proximity but without personal and individual contacts, sharing
only geographic and physical, rather than emotional and spiritual, space. The social
dynamic changes, and people begin to seek answers to their new challenges and
opportunities in order to fill the vacuum of meaning created by the new realities. Often,
finding likeminded people who follow the same ideology helps to manage this process,
51 For the full English text, see htlp:llwww.ancient-buddhist-texts.netiTexts-and-
Translations/Mahakhandhako/index.htm.
and hence it is rational to use contacts in order to identify groups of people with similar
mind-sets.
New members then introduce other contacts to the group, as part of a process of
reconfirming their decision and increasing their level of comfort and their influence within
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the new movement. Gokhale has shown that for eighteen of the individuals included in his
study of the early Buddhist converts the primary reason for conversion was the influence
of relatives (Gokhale 1965, as cited in Brekke 1999). One of the key attractions of
becoming a Sangha during Buddha's time is the fact that, unlike other contemporary
religious movements, Buddha did not require any prequalification to become a Sangha.
Further, the casteless and non-hierarchical structure that Buddha proposed for his
movement was a huge attraction in a society where every decision was based on caste
membership. A casteless organization created opportunities that had never before been
available, attracting a greater and wider social network and prompting the creation of a
new sense of identity-based belonging.
IV Counter-cultural resistance
One of the major points of confusion in interpreting and understanding Buddhism arises
from the fact that Buddhism has a number of conflicting dynamics at its center. The
popular question in the West is how Buddhist societies, such as Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, and Lanka, could produce the level of violence and illiberalism that has been
seen in the last half century. For many asking this question, there is only one Buddhism:
the one experienced by Western powers during the 19th and zo" century colonial era. The
dominant understanding of Buddhism in the West is built on this version, which some
have termed 'British Buddhism' (Almond 1988; Lopez 1999).
Buddhism as experienced by members of a Buddhist society stands in sharp
contrast to this monolithic ideal. The lived experience of Buddhist countries reveals that
Buddhism can mean many different things to many different people. Buddhism, wherever
it arrived and flourished, evolved through at least three different processes. Building on
the arguments advanced in the work of Gombrich (2009, 2006, 1999, 1996, and 1988),
Harris (1999), Spiro (2004, 1996, 1982), and Tambiah (1996, 1992, 1986, 1984, 1976, and
1970), we propose to distinguish three "types" of Buddhism:
• Intellectual Buddhism, as described in the Pali texts,
• Institutionalized Buddhism, which defined a dialectical social relationship
between the sasana and the state, and
• Indigenous Buddhism, which established the practice and promotion of the
Buddhist beliefs in conjunction with, and often assimilating, indigenous
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folk spiritualities
The dominant contemporary understanding of, and approaches to, Buddhism are governed
by the first and the third of these interpretations. Colonial officials and Western
Indologists and anthropologists have produced a large quantity of analyses of intellectual
and indigenous Buddhism. In retrospect, it appears that most of this analysis travelled on a
rigid trajectory, perhaps governed by any number of historical motivations (including a
colonial approach to studying Buddhism). Thus, there are a number of contesting sets of
variables within Buddhism, including ruler vs. ruled, Western vs. oriental, developed vs.
primordial, and rational scientific vs. emotional traditional. Understanding
institutionalized Buddhism has either been ignored or, at best, considered a secondary
priority. Early attempts at a sociological deconstruction of Buddhist societies largely
suffered due to these limitations and their heavy dependency on the established
interpretations of intellectual and indigenous Buddhism.
Attempts to understand the reality of institutionalized Buddhism by using Western
concepts have not produced many noteworthy results. Fortunately, there is now a growing
interest in understanding the dynamics that gave rise to some of the bloodiest political
violence in postcolonial, post-cold war conditions in Buddhist states such as Cambodia
(Broadhurst 2002), Laos, Myanmar (Bischoff 1995; Holliday 2008), Lanka, and Thailand
(Jerryson 2009). The continuing social and political crises in these predominantly
Theravada states have come under the scrutiny of political anthropologists and conflict
resolution practitioners, and increasing attention is being paid to the influence of
institutional Buddhism on these conflicts. Yet it is a conceptual as well as an empirical
challenge to move away from the existing paradigms. In order to understand the dynamics
and working patterns of institutional Buddhism, a fresh reading of the politics of early
Buddhism and the subsequent establishment of Buddhist politics becomes necessary.
Reconstructing the institutionalization process of the early Buddhist order promises to help
in this endeavor, despite the challenges, discussed above, involved in interpreting the
canonized texts. At this point, we seek to map the institutionalization of the Buddhist order
and the resultant political powers this process created. This is not to argue that this facet of
Buddhism is more important or authentic than the others, because claims like this would
only lead us into the dead end of debates on what Buddhism "is". For our purposes, it is
sufficient to state that all these aspects of Buddhism travel as parallel and yet intertwined
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and mutually influencing social dynamics, but by highlighting the processes of
institutional Buddhism we will be able to investigate whether early Buddhism outlined and
effected an alternative power arrangement in society.
Scholars of Buddhism are divided on the attitude that Buddha held towards kings
and their political power over both society as a whole and individual human lives.
Tambiah claims that Thai society based its attitude towards royal and political power on
Buddha's politics as articulated in his deliberations, supporting his 1976 work World
Conqueror and World Renouncer: A study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand with
references to canonical writings (1978). Spiro, on the other hand, argued that Buddha was
apolitical or even anti-political (1978, 1977). Richard Gombrich, in an attempt to mediate
between these positions, argued that both views could find support in the canonical texts.
The canons were so broad that they left room for more than one interpretation. In fact, he
pointed out that the canons may support contradictory and opposing views (1998).
From the key texts of the Tripitaka and other Buddhist literature such as the Jiitaka
Kathii, the Buddhacarita and the Va1J1saliterature, it is clear that Buddha regularly
interacted with the kings of his time. The Vessantara Jiitaka52 is a popular story in which
Buddha, in one of his previous births, was a prince - heir to the throne. While aspiring to
become the future Buddha he gave away his right to be the king, family, and finally his
own head as a gift so that the merits he collected would be great. During his lifetime,
Buddha advised righteous kings as well as immoral and unjust kings. He also adhered to
the requests of kings and accepted gifts and rewards from them. He intervened to settle
wars, and at other- times he ignored the ruling powers altogether. In the Cakkavatti
Sihaniida Sutta, Buddha presented the ideal model of a king (Dhammapada 129;
Dlghanikaya 1:7 & 135, 3:61, 80-98 & 127-49; Mahavamsa 1:44-70 and. 71-84;
Samyuththa nikaya 1: 75-76, 86; Vinaya Pitaka 1:7,122).
Contrary to the dominant Hindu tradition of the time, Buddha did not believe that
kings were semi-gods or divinely appointed. The Buddha had an entirely different and
52 The Jataka stories tell of the 547previous births of Buddha, while he was aspiring to be the future
Buddha. The 54ih Jathaka narrates of a time when Buddha was king. The full story is available at
http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/j6/j60l3.htm. Accessed on 20 June 2010.
more realistic concept of kings and kingship. In the Aggaiiiia Sutta, he posited a social
contract theory of monarchy. According to the Hindu myth, the first king of India was
Mahasammata, a name whose origin the Buddha reinterpreted as meaning 'elected by the
majority' (D.III, 93; Ja.II, 352). Thus according to the Buddhist theory, kings derived their
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legitimacy from general consent, i.e. from the people they ruled. However, several stories
in the Jataka implicitly suggest that people had a right to overthrow a king who was cruel,
unjust or incompetent (Ja.I, 326; III, 513-14; VI, 156). It is clear that the texts support and
uphold Buddha's multifaceted relationship with kings and their politics. One possible
explanation for this relationship is that Buddha called for a radical renouncer life, and yet
within such a life he found reasons for getting involved in the affairs of "this world,"
including the politics of the day - a model that provided the foundation for the Sangha
community.
While the canons support both political involvement and an apolitical Buddha in
an eschatological sense, it is evident that Buddha's primary influence on society was
exercised in a more indirect manner. Rather than using direct social or political influence,
Buddha undermined the contemporary order by living a different kind of life, and the
retelling of his life story was the most effective teaching tool at his disposal as he aspired
to become the Buddha in order to find the way of salvation for the entire living world.
Buddha's life manifests his belief that intervention was both necessary and possible.
Thus Buddha, like many other religious founders, played the role of a prophetic
teacher, who had found salvation and was willing to share his insights with others. In this
role, he presented an alternative to the existing world order and, in the process, gained
some of the authority that had been lost by the worldly authorities, who failed to relieve
the masses of their suffering. Buddha never sought authority in this world; instead, he
sought to create an alternative and superior order. By empowering individuals to place
their faith in a moral and ethical authority, he helped them acquire some distance vis-a-vis
worldly authorities, thereby evoking an alternative, "parallel" order in which people
related to each other in a different manner. Moreover, Buddha advised his Sangha to adopt
the very same alternative "mediator of power" role in their society by using their spiritual
ability to lead their people to a condition: Nirvana, far better than the one the king could
offer. By placing himself in an in-between position, and by appealing to the significance
of both this-worldly and otherworldly aspects of existence, the Buddha was able to appeal
to a broad audience with different people responding to different aspects of his teachings.
Some Sangha who followed him would have preferred the total renouncer life based on
soteriological peripatetic notions. Others would have expected an eschatological
reordering of society, while others still would have preferred the role of the "intermediary"
agent between concrete questions of individual existence and abstract questions about
cosmology. Buddha's teaching and example were able to traverse the entire range of
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philosophical questions, thereby providing a framework in which even the most minute
issues and problems found their very own cosmic significance and place.
Experts agree that Buddhism's massive success and deep influence (especially
when compared to competing sramana traditions) were largely due to the relationship it
maintained with society and to the dual role played by the Sangha, who were both
renouncers as well as spiritual leaders for the rest of society. The apolitical tone and
casteless ideology was eagerly embraced by the new middle class trading societies,
providing the structural support for the establishment of the Buddhist social ethos. Yet,
even if the tone was apolitical, the result is still political: a new way of life that to some
extent cultivated a greater distance from the political powers. From its inception,
Buddhism allowed the Sangha to obtain a degree of autonomy from society and thereby
inaugurated a Sangha-state relationship based on interdependency.
In a limited way, this argument supports Weber's observation that the Sangha
community moved from its beginnings as an unstructured social movement to a property-
owning and monastic order exploited by the rulers for domesticating the masses in later
years (Weber 1958). This also may relate to what the literature calls 'oriental despotism', a
patrimonial structure of power based on a rigid bureaucracy preventing a Western-style
state formation in "hydraulic societies" (Leach 1959; O'Leary 1989; Wittfogel 1957).
However, as we have argued, these theories do not explain the institutionalized Buddhist
politics of the early Sangha in Lanka. In fact, if we are to believe the theories, the Sangha
were an agency within Lanka's socio-political structure. Our analysis suggests, in contrast,
that the Sangha created a parallel - and to some extent autonomous - order within the
existing socio-politics of the state. This is crucial if we want to understand the radical
nature and effectiveness of the resistance they were to offer to proposals and trends that
threatened to undermine their understanding of Lanka's unique position as the protector of
Buddhism. Chapter three of this study will look at the lives of three Sangha - Venerable
Walpola Rahula, Venerable Gangodawila Soma, and Venerable Athuraliye Rathana - who
in more recent times used exactly this authority and autonomy traditionally claimed by the
Sangha in order to mobilize the Sangha in Lanka, (and through them the Sinhalas) to
engage in politics in a more open, radical and direct manner. We speak in this context of
an attempted Buddhicisation of politics, but it is important to point out that the activities of
Rahula, Soma and Rathana drew on the potential that the Sangha role entailed from its
very beginnings. During various "waves of resistance", the Sangha were able to actualize
this potential according to the requirements of the situation. Modem Western scholars
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should not be surprised by the power, which the Sangha hold. During 'normal' times, this
power remains latent; but when they feel they need to take action they can reliably use
their position in Lankan society.
When the Sangha enter into Lanka's mainstream political activity, they do not shy
away from endorsing political violence. They were supporters or even direct conspirators
in plots and conspiracies to remove or assassinate kings; the fate of Kiirti SrI Rajasimha is
a prominent example. They opposed democratically elected governments, planned the
assassination of a Prime Minister, and took part in armed rebellions in 1971 and 1988.
They are, and have historically been, opposed to any power-sharing arrangement with the
Tamil minority, whose demand for equal rights was overshadowed by the terror politics of
the separatist LTTE. That the Sangha were able to act in this manner apparently without
alienating the surrounding society is due to the fact that they occupy a unique position in-
between the state and the laity. In this position, they are unchallenged. The fact that they
can claim this authority is partially due to social and political dynamics initiated by
Buddha. This heritage, however, did undergo an evolution whereby the dhamma
conception promoted by Buddha within a multi-religious society became an exclusive
claim defining a mono-ethnic and mono-religious society as proposed by the Mahavamsa
epic (see 1.4 below).
There is an extensive body of literature available on the development, growth,
establishment, and decline of religious sects (e.g. Barker 2006; Beckford .1976; Cornwell
2007; Crotty 1996; Freston 1994; King 1982; Shah 2006; Wilson 1982, 1970, 1960). Until
recently, the greater portion of these studies concentrated on Christian sects, largely
operating in the West. However, of late there has been a new focus on non-Western
religions, beginning with variants of Islam as an after-effect of 9111 (Cesari 2009; Lincoln
2006; Rabasa et al 2004). Yet the historical context in which Buddhism developed went
largely unnoticed among Western scholars. What little research is available is already
some decades old and is limited in its ability to explain the Sangha-led politicization of
Buddhism. This narrow research base makes it difficult to comprehend how and why the
Sangha in modem Theravada states are either bringing forth or renewing a militant brand
of Buddhist engagement with their respective polities (Jerryson 2009; Joll 2010;
Juergensmeyer 2010, 1995; Kitiarsa 2009).
For these reasons, any attempt at reconstructing the nature of the original Sangha
Samaja and the many schisms and splits that marked its subsequent history (Pandit 2005;
Sujato 2008) is challenging, but that challenge confirms the legitimacy of the attempt. It
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may be necessary to examine multiple explanations, and to understand the original
dynamics that drove able and intelligent men to renounce their ordinary lives and to
embrace a radical sect. Areas of focus, if information is available, include the life and
message of Buddha, the wider socio-economic conditions during his lifetime, and the
demographic and psychosocial composition of his first group of followers.
The Buddhist community, the Sangha, and the dhamma are closely interrelated.
There is no Buddhist community without the Sangha, who embody the faith and its life
philosophy. There cannot be a Sangha without the dhamma, which includes an invitation
to take the path of a Sangha. Finally, there cannot be a dhamma without the active
preaching of Buddha, who taught the Sangha to memorize his teaching. The life, message,
and impact of Buddha has fascinated scholars and philosophers for centuries and has
established itself as an independent branch of learning in history, religious studies and
sociology. Particularly after the British encounter with the Buddhist world during the 19th
century and the early decades of the 20th century, the academic study of Buddhist theology
in English and other European languages was widespread (Almond 1988; Baumann 1995;
Gombrich 2009, 1990; Harris 2006).53 While our study of the Sangha movement will draw
on the modem understanding of the life and teaching of Buddha, it is important to stress
that the goal of this work is not to study the literal or metaphysical interpretations of the
dhamma. We wish to trace the transformation of the Sangha, within the historical context
of Buddhist expansion, from being a peripheral sect to their ultimate position as king
makers championing a renouncer state religion. What were the transformative influences
that enabled the Theravada version of Buddhism to flourish in a state like Lanka, and how
did the Sangha help preserve Buddhism in the country in the face of internal and external
threats to the faith?
53 For a comprehensive bibliography on Buddhism in European languages, see
http://www.globalbuddhism.orglbib-bud.html and http://www.buddhanet.netle-
leaminglbuddhismlbibliography.htm, both sites accessed on 15 June 20 Io.
1.4 Mahiiva1flsaand its impact
Everyone who ventures to understand the history and contemporary politics of Lanka
discovers the influence of the narratives in the Mahavamsa" epic (Mhv.) and their current
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political interpretation (Anderson 1999; de Silva and Bartholomeusz 2002; Spencer 1990).
While it is clear that ethnoreligious nationalism is a major framework for the Sinhala
Sangha, we still need to identify its major sources. From school textbooks through to
political debates and serious academic research, the impact of the Mahavamsa on Sinhala
society cannot be overestimated.
The approach to, and treatment of, the Mhv. has been as controversial as the
substantive issues its contents raise. It is generally agreed that the epic was compiled by
Venerable Mahanama of the influential Mahavihara fraternity of Sinhala Buddhism in the
6th century AD, and was later continued by other monks. The Mhv. is the key book in the
Varpsa55 literature (Strathern 2004; Walters 2000). The text and the narrative style are
similar to, and borrow heavily from, the 4th century epic Dipavamsa. Because the Mhv.
covers a timeline stretching nearly 25 centuries, the text is useful to diverse fields of study,
including religion, history, archaeology, politics, and even anthropology. The epic was
originally "compiled for the serene joy and emotion of the pious," an objective that is
restated at the end of each new chapter.
The modem treatment and discussion of Mhv. has led to diverse opinions, and
the debate about the meaning and vision implied in the text continues to this day
54 Mahiivamsa means great genealogy or the story of the great race/clan. To date there are many translations
of the original Pali texts. The first English translation was prepared by George Tumour, The Mahiivamsa in
Roman Characters with the Translation Subjoined, and an Introductory Essay on Pali Buddhistical
Literature. Vol. I, containing the first thirty-eight chapters, Cotto 1837, by the order of Arthur Hamilton
Gordon, Governor of Ceylon. Original copies of this text are held at the Universities of Cambridge, Oxford,
Edinburgh, and at the British Museum. A digital version of the second part of the book is available at the
digital library of the University of California. The Sangha of Ceylon wrote not only on ecclesiastical matters
but also on political history as they saw it. Dipavamsa is the oldest known Pali chronicle; the
Sdsanavamsadipa by Sangha Vimalasara in 1929 is the latest one. In between these two, we have
Sumangalaviliisini by Buddhaghosa, a key Sangha commentator of Buddhist literature (5th Century CE),
Samantadipika, Mahiibodhivamsa, Dipavamsa, Vamsatthapakasini, Dhatuvamsa, Thiipavamsa,
Cetiyavamsatkatha, Naliiadhathuvamsa and Saddhammasangraha. Mahavamsa is the most influential epic
in Lankan religio-politics. Ciilavamsa is the last section of the Mahavamsa, See: (Law 1947, 1994) for more
discussion. Wilhelm Geiger's translation is the one most commonly used today. See The Mahiivamsa or, The
great chronicle a/Ceylon, translated into English by Wilhelm Geiger, assisted by Mabel Haynes Bode,
under the patronage of the government of Ceylon. London: Pali Text Society 1912. This research refers to
the digital copies of both these translations.
55 Vamsa is a generic term used to denote the chronology .
(Dharmadasa 1993, 1977; Gunawardane 1979, 1971; Mendis 1946).56 Some have
considered it a religious work of poetry that should be read with a sympathetic attitude
(Bloss 1973; Collins 2003, 1998, 1992, 1990; Scheible 2006; Stock 1986, 1983). Others
interpret it as a political narrative that uses exaggerated metaphors and symbolism to
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justify the supremacy of Sinhala Buddhism (Bechert 1978; Kemper 1991; Spencer et al
1990; Smith 1978; Tambiah 1992). Some scholars see it as a valuable resource for
studying the history of India and Buddhism (Berkwitz 2008; Thapar 2007, 1981). A small
number of scholars (Bartholomeusz 1994; DeVotta 2007)57 have interpreted the Mhv. as
an ethnic interpretation of Sinhala supremacy over others in Lanka, thus informing the rise
of what is known as "Protestant" Buddhism in the late 19th and early zo" centuries as part
of the struggle against colonial rule in what was then Ceylon (Baumann 1997; Berltelsen
1997; Gombrich 1995; Kulananda 1992; Prothero 1995). The Mahavamsa continues to
influence the present political, religious, and ethnic mind-set of the Sinhala Buddhists.
Berkwitz suspects that the Mahavamsa in many ways "controls the modem Sinhala
psyche" (2003:579).
A text is meaningless and fails to inspire life unless it is re-read, re-interpreted,
and re-applied - and the Mhv. text is no exception. For the purpose of this research, the
contemporary readings and use of the text as "history" form our central focus. The purpose
of these modem readings are twofold: first, to create an overarching Buddhist identity
centred on Lanka as the "blessed land," visited by Buddha (Walters 2000); and second, to
reinforce Sinhala hegemony through a narrative of the Sinhalas as the first "civilized"
settlers and thus the legitimate rulers of the island. In our study, we will explore the
historical use of the text as a tool by which the Theravada Sangha community religionized
the Sinhala race and their politics. Through the same method, the authors politicized the
Buddhism of the Sinhalas. Thus, while primarily written as a religious text of history, the
Mhv. nevertheless provides the foundation for an ethno-religious political ideology. In the
words of Smith, "By this transformation, the basis was laid for the ideology of state-
Sangha relations, which proved historically relevant. In this way, history was made by
historians in early Ceylon" (Smith 1978:7).
56 The 1970s and 80s produced a large collection of literature chronicling the debate on the Mhv. between
Dharmadasa and Gunawardene.
57 Is it beyond the scope of this research to provide an extensive discussion of Buddhist history as it is
imagined and recorded in literature; however, an overview of'Vamsa literature (especially as it relates to the
Mhv.) can be found in Berkwitz 2004.
As a reflection of the important link between the visits of Buddha (Chapter 1-3) and his
prediction that the island would be the centre of his teaching, Mahavamsa identifies
Vijaya, the father of the Sinhala race, as the founder of a particular religious-political
nexus, of which the Sangha became the "interpreters" as well as the agents. Further
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justifications for Sinhala dominance also come from the repeated references to Damilas, or
Tamils, defeat at the hands of the warrior King Dutthagamini (chapters 1,24,25,27,282,
30_33).58 With this background, the purpose of reading the epic Mhv. becomes didactic
and polemic in that it helps to Buddhicize Sinhala politics and rationalise ethnic Sinhala
majoritarianism. From the 19th century onwards when the texts were made available to the
public (ironically under colonial rule), the Mhv. was taken as a reliable historical
document (Walters 2000), re-creating a certain "Mahavamsa mind-set." This reading has
continued to define Sinhala politics, despite serious questions concerning the reliability of
the Mhv. as a historical source (Emmanuel 2000).
A full review of indigenous and western scholarship on the Mhv. is beyond the
scope of this research. 59 In order to understand the current justifications for a certain
version of Sinhala Buddhism, largely based on the Mhv. the epic and its texts will be
analyzed only with a view to establishing how the Sangha, the general political
community, and popular culture receive, interpret and promote the text. Buddhist histories
in Lanka are produced and consumed primarily in order to provide reassurance of a
spiritual, cultural, and (where possible) ethnic relationship to the Buddha. The writers of
the Mhv. intended to make the Sinhalas a unique people. In other words:
Just as the Buddha had somehow taken possession of Lanka, so it was the destiny of the
Sinhala kings to conquer and rule over the whole island. These rulers would prevail over a
unified state and indeed a whole society that was dedicated to the preservation and
cultivation of Buddhist ideals.
(Strathern 2004: 193)
Tambiah commented:
This constant strain to identify the religion with the state and the Buddhist state, in tum,
with a Buddhist society creates perpetual internal cleavages of a sort that are absent in
Hindu India (except when that society collides headlong with a militant, excluding religion
like Islam).
(Tambiah 1973 :59)
58 Dutthagamini (161-137 BCE) is the hero warrior king of Mahavamsa, According to Mahavamsa, he did
not like the Tamils' presence in the Sinhala-Buddhist land. His mother had dreams that her son would get rid
of the Tamils, and when he became the king of Ruhuna, he waged an all-out 15-year war against the Tamil
king Elara of Anuradhapura, eventually uniting Lanka as a single entity under his rule.
59 See Kemperer (1991) for a review of the importance of the chronicles for Sinhala culture.
The earliest available record of the Mahavamsa in modem times comes from an English
translation of the original Pali text by George Tumour, dated 1837. Tumour was a
government agent in the Rathnapura province of Ceylon under the British Raj. The
original text, until then known only to a few monks, was translated with the help of the
Page I 71
commentary, "Mahiivamsalke' which was found in another ancient temple in Mulkirigala,
in the deep south of Lanka. The translation, published by Oxford University Press for the
Pali Text Society of London, generated so much interest that the colonial government
commissioned a search for all such historical texts in Lanka and India. This marked the
beginning of a systematic archaeological exploration in modem South Asia. However, it
was the German translation of the Mahavamsa seven decades later by Wilhelm Geiger that
prompted an analytical examination of the ancient text. The British government appointed
Geiger to produce an English translation of the text, which was published in 1912. One
can easily agree that if it had not been for the liberal efforts of the British colonists, the
Mahavamsa epic, which was to become a core reference for the ethnoreligious politics in
Lanka for the last 100 years, might have remained the hidden, little-known text that it had
been prior to the 19th century.
While these European translations created a renaissance among Modernist and
Oriental schools in the West, who argued for a more liberal, non-colonial approach to
understanding the social structure in Lanka, it had the opposite effect at home. The Sinhala
elites, who for some time had been arguing for greater independence from the colonial
administration, found a new and powerful legitimation for their claims and in the process
created waves of nationalist passion based on nostalgia for the lost "golden era" glorified
in the Mahavamsa. Key religio-political revivalists of the early twentieth century, like
Anagarika Dharmapala, Venerable Walpola Rahula, and others, based their demands for a
Dhammadipa and thus a pan-Buddhist identity on the Mahavamsa version of the island's
history and society (Seneviratne 1999).
Dharmapala (1864-1933) was an important Buddhist reformist who agitated for a
total Buddhist society in Lanka. He created the concept of' Sinhala Bauddhayii', a Sinhala
who is essentially a Buddhist, which has become a key term in the modem ethno-national
political lexicography of Lanka. The Mahavamsa managed to inspire Sinhala nationalists
including scholar monks (Rahula 1965), cultural activists (Sirisena 1971),60 academics
(Dharmadasa 1995), and social critics (Amarasekara 2003, 1992, 1980) like no other text.
Yet the goal, the circumstances of its composition, and the religious orthodoxy of the
authors of this great chronicle should make us question the purpose of the text (Mendis
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1932). It was Geiger, two decades after his scholarly work on the chronicles, who
maintained serious doubts regarding the impartiality of the narrative. The chronicles start
with the record of three different visits of Tathagata-Gautama the Buddha to the island of
Lanka, thus making Lanka the only place outside India to be visited by the great teacher.
In its opening chapter the Mahavamsa describes in formal and venerating language the
visit of Buddha, who blessed the island and prophesied that it would always remain
Buddhist. Geiger, however, warned:
There is a good number of fables, legends and tales of marvels in the Mahavamsa, and we
must in each particular case attempt to find out whether there is in the narrative an
historical kernel of truth or not.
(Geiger 1930:208)
The three places that Buddha allegedly visited - Mahiyangana (in the east), Niigadipa (in
the north), and Kdlaniya (in the southwest) - are among the most venerated worship
centres of modem Buddhism in Lanka. Worshipers have gathered at these viharas for over
one thousand years. However, modem scholarship based on archaeological findings has
shed serious doubts on the significance of these places and events as narrated by the
Mahavamsa (Emmanuel 2000). One could argue that in a spiritual context, narrations of
omnipresent ability, the super-powerful, and the divine abound. Therefore, these visits of
the Buddha, even if they were mere inventions of the writer, need to betaken seriously for
what they have managed to inspire, especially because this thesis is more concerned with
the socio-political impact of the text and its wider narratives than with the authenticity or
the theology of Sinhala Buddhism.
The contents, authorship and relevant periods of the various parts of the Mahavamsa are
assumed to be as follows:
60 Piyadasa Sirisena was an inspiring ethno-nationalist writer who produced popular volumes on the history
of the Sinahala race based on the Mahavamsa, See (Amunugama 1979) on Sirisena's new image of the
"Sinhala Buddhist".
1. Mahavamsa Part I Covering the time period from King Vijaya to
Mahasen (from 563 BCE to 556 CE), composed by
Yen. Mahathera Mahanama around the 5th century
CE
2. Mahavamsa Part II
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Covering the time period from King Mahasen to
Parakramabahu I (from 556 CE to 1150 CE), written
by Yen. Mahathera Dhammakitti in the 13th century
CE
3. Mahavamsa Part III Covering the time period from King Parakramabahu
I to Parakramabahu II (1150 to 1200), written in the
late 16th century by an unknown author
Also referred to as Culavamsa, covers the time
period from King Parakramabahu II to Sri Vikrama
Rajasinha (1273 to 1815), written in the late 19th
century by vanous authors including Yen.
Hikkaduve SrI Sumangala
4. Mahavamsa Part IV
One of the most serious challenges to the accuracy of the Mahavamsa account concerns
the sixth chapter of the epic, which describes the arrival of prince Vijaya on the day of the
parinibbiina (departure from life) of Buddha. Prince Vijaya claimed to be the grandson of
a ferocious lion that terrorized the jungles near the kingdom of Lalapura in India.
According to astrologers, the princess of Vanga country, near Lalapura, was to become the
mother of a new and pure race. She wandered away from the palace, met and fell in love
with the lion of the jungle, and bore him twin children. At the age of 16, Sinhabahu, the
son, escaped the caves and later killed his lion father for 3000 gold pieces. He settled near
the kingdom of Lalapura. He took his twin sister as wife and had children. One of
Sinhabahu's sons, Vijaya, was evil and had become the oppressor of the people. Learning
this, Sinhabahu, put Vijaya and 700 of his followers on a ship and sent them upon the
southern sea. The ship carrying Vijaya landed in Tambapanni ("place/beach of copper"), a
northwestern port in Lanka (Mahavamsa 1:1-35). Vijaya, first through diplomatic
marriage to the indigenous beauty Kuveini, and later by bringing military support from his
homeland India, conquered the indigenous rulers and established his kingdom to become
the father of the Sinhalas (Mahavamsa 7: 1-15). However, as Geiger points out, the oldest
period of Sinhalese history from Vijaya to Mutasiva (Mhv. Ch. 6-Ch. 11, 6) is rather
obscure. The story of Vijaya's descent from a lion is a typical legend of totemistic
character and explains his clan name Sihala. (1930: 210).
Apart from the totemism and incest that account for the mythical origin of Vijaya,
the Mahavamsa record is striking also because it appears to endorse the political
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intimidation, terror, and violence used to conquer the natives whom the Mahavamsa terms
Yaksas (devils). In contrast to the lives of the evil natives, the rule of Vijaya is
continuously presented as superior and justified. As Anthony Smith explained, this
account reflects, "the construction of the core of a historical 'ethnie' that lives in the
myths, memories, values and symbols ... and in the characteristic forms or styles and genre
of a certain historical configuration of a given population" (1986: 15).
The writers of the Mahavamsa may have felt that they needed to give a diachronic
account of Buddhism and the Theravada school in order to detach the evolution of
Buddhism from the highly ritualistic structure of Brahmanic Hinduism (Eliot 2007;
Coomaraswamy 1986, 1967; Obeysekere 2001). Nevertheless, as argued by Obeysekere,
Buddhism could neither detach itself totally from the Hindu social context nor preserve the
original purity of a rational philosophy; rather, there was what we may call a "process of
fusion" with Hindu practices and beliefs. In addition, at the time when the chronicle was
composed, there were numerous internal controversies of a theological and practical
nature amongst the Sangha. After the third Sangha council under Emperor Asoka, the
Theravadin tradition, which let down roots in Lanka, was divided into three monasteries:
Maha-vihara, Abhayagiri-vihara, and Jethavana-vihara, This division was so deep that it
took another 1000 years to achieve a form of reconciliation (Tambiah 1985). However, the
narrative of the Mahavamsa, which was composed as late as the sixth CE, retrospectively
records the totemistic origins and the "identity" creation of the Sinhalas, possibly moved
by the emence threats to the capital of Anuradhapura (Harischandra 1998; Smither 2007).
Anuradhapura is the one remaining symbol of a glorious Sinhala civilization, which had
existed at least since about 500 BCE until the Cola Kings, who were South Indian
Dravidian Tamils, captured it. De Silva says the chronicles were the work of Sangha of a
certain fraternity (Mhv. XV: 1-9) to advance a certain ideology: "the central theme of the
later chapters of Mahavamsa was an epoch-making confrontation between the Sinhalese
and the Tamils, and extolled as a holy war fought in the interest of Buddhism" (2005: 17).
It is remarkable that the Mahavamsa chronicles, which record the influence of a
humanist spiritual philosophy such as Buddhism, should advocate and promote a deeply
divisive ethnocentric nationalism. What motivated the authors to present the Sinhala
ethnie and its Buddhist affiliation as superior to the parallel "other," the Damilas? Even
more astounding and sociologically important is the fact that the cardinal aim of the
chronicle appears to be the desire to construct the racial supremacy of the Sinhalas and
therefore to attempt to undermine some of the core virtues of Buddhism. In many ways the
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core of the Mahavamsa teaching often appears to contradict the fundamental virtues of the
Pali teachings of Buddhism, such as metta ("love based on benevolence"), koruna,
("unreserved compassion"), muditii ("rejoicing in the good fortunes of another"), and
upeksii ("emotionally detached state of impartiality"). In contrast to these virtues, the Mhv.
constructs four fundamental ideological principles that guide modem Sangha politics:
1. Mhv. asserts that the Buddha used fear and physical pain on Yaksas (the original
inhabitants of the island) in order to expel them before taking charge of the land.
According to the Mhv. the Yaksas are sub-human beings, whose failure to
understand the teachings of Buddha led to their expulsion (Gunawardana 1978: 96-
106).
2. Mhv. also asserts that Vijaya, the founder of the Sinhala race, killed the Yaksas
and others and became king.
3. Mhv. claims that throughout history the Sangha helped the kings to fight off non-
Theravadins, with Dutthagamini as the most remarkable example.
4. Directly and indirectly the Mhv. account implies that the use of violence for the
protection of Buddhism is appropriate and that such violence is a service to
Buddhism and thus to Buddha himself.
1.5 The Sinhala Sangha
The relationship between the Sangha and the political sphere in Lanka has gone through at
least three key periods of change: the inauguration of the Buddhasasana by Gautama
Buddha in India and its transmission to Lanka around 300 BCE; the growth and
development of a civilization with Buddhist identity in Lanka, and the rise of a "Protestant
Buddhism,,61 that ran parallel to the Christian missionary movements during the colonial
era.
61 We use the term Political Buddhism to denote a process of instrument ali zing the Buddhist texts, ideals,
values, and institutions in order to achieve a political goal. This we differentiate from Pali Buddhism, which
The arrival of Buddhism and the subsequent establishment of the sasana and its samaja in
Lanka was a political as much as a spiritual project. Reliable records of early Buddhism in
Lanka are largely found in the texts written to promote and protect the faith and activities
of a select group of people. Biases and personal or group-oriented motivations are
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unavoidable in these texts, which include the Vamsa literature and related texts such as the
PUjavaliya,62 Stupavamsa (Berkwitz: 2006), and Nikaya Sangrahaya (Ananda 1989).
Scholars have struggled to extract from these texts, which remain the most comprehensive
narratives available on the subject, an accurate history of the developments. It is a strange
fact indeed that India, where Buddhism began, should have lost most of its original texts
either as a result of natural processes or because of struggles for dominance between rival
religious groups. Out of these texts, the Mahavamsa stands - with all its biases - as the
only piece of record that can provide a continuous history. While the accuracy, reliability,
and purpose of this text is questionable for many reasons (Emmanuel 2000), the text is
used by scholars in many different fields to trace the trajectory of South Asian Buddhist
history and its impact on the relevant societies.
According to the Mahavamsa, the arrival and establishment of the Theravada
version of Buddhism in Lanka occurred during the rule of King Devanampiyatissa.
Bhikkhu Mahinda - believed to be a son of Emperor Asoka of India - was sent to convert
the king, who would later establish the sasana in Lanka.63 Based on other historical
markers, this event would have occurred during the latter part of the third century BCE.
Emperor Asoka, following his grandfather Emperor Chandragupta of the Maurya dynasty,
expanded his monarchical rule uniting the greater part of the Indian subcontinent (Harry
2006; Keay 2011, 2001; Seneviratne 1996; Thapar 2006). Asoka crushed the rebellious
Kalinga army, but the devastation and the human suffering caused by his ruthless army
disturbed him and, in his mood of regret, he listened to a Buddhist Bhikkhu who explained
to Asoka the meaninglessness of the victories of this world and invited him to follow the
path of dhamma. Asoka not only converted to Theravada Buddhism, but also arguably
became the most influential figure in the history of Buddhism and its establishment as a
is found in the canon, and Popular Buddhism, which is what the Buddhist masses practice in Lanka. Further,
Political Buddhism is distinct from Buddhist Politics, which is the attempt to re-arrange society according to
Buddhist values.
62 Piijiivaliya was compiled by Sangha Mayurapada in the 13th century. See full text at
http://enrigueta.man.ac.uk:8180/lunaiservlet/detail/Manchester~91 ~ I~ I044 79~ I06049, accessed on 15
August 2010.
63 However, Kosambi (1969) and Tharpar (1994) have both argued that outside the Sinhala chronicles, no
other records can be found that would corroborate these historical developments.
world religion. Asoka envisaged a new world order that was governed by dhamma and to
that end sent missionaries into nine different directions covering key locations in the east
and west. The Mahavamsa records the arrival and the conversion of King Devanam in the
island of Lanka (Geiger 1912, 1950 pp. 91-93; Mahavamsa XIV: 1-23).
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The Mahavamsa account very clearly records how a renouncer religion could
become the epicentre and ideology of the state. It took nearly 300 years for Buddhism to
become India's royal court religion after Buddha's Mahaparinibbana, but in Lanka, it
became the state religion in just one day. Buddhism in Lanka was never (nor was it ever
meant to be) a civil religion that permeated society from the bottom up. Instead, it arrived
and was established because of what were initially a state-to-state and later a state-to-
society process. Buddhism arrived, convinced the ruling elites, and then became the
religion of the king's court before it reached the masses in any meaningful manner, in
what was perhaps a process of first spiritualizing the ruling secular power and then
domesticating the rest of the state. Religion and state are here not separated; on the
contrary, the state is impregnated with religious ideology. This original configuration,
which primarily involved the ruling elite and the Sangha in ancient Lanka, remains the
historical model with far-reaching implications even for today's society in Lanka. The
Sangha fraternity in Lanka, unlike their Indian initiators, did not build up a meaningful
relationship with the ordinary society and its common citizens. Instead, there was a royal
relationship involving political and economic power.
After the shock of 9111, Western academics hurriedly returned to studying the
complex relationship between religion and politics (AI-Syyad 2002; Appleby 2000; Bayes
2001; Blank 200 I; Brown 20 I0, 2000; Bunt 2002; Dark 2002; Gaus and Vallier 2009;
Griffin 2002; Haynes 2010; Heyking 2000; Jenkins 2002; Juergensmeyer 2001; Lewis
2010; Macklem 2000; Murden 2002; Sacks 2002; Stump 2000; Ungureanu 2008; Walsh
2000). This renewed interest, however, has not undermined the common modernist bias,
which take religions seriously only as an obstacle to the inevitable unfolding of modernity.
In Lanka, however, the inseparable relationship between Theravada Buddhism and the
state is a foundational political reality. The institutionalisation of Buddhism in Lanka was
the result of geo-political realities and international politics, especially the formation of a
strategic alliance of regional powers with a super-power ideology. Throughout the history
of Lanka, the formation of state power vis-a-vis the rest of the society has progressed only
because of the interaction between Theravada Buddhism and its Sangha, who were more
than ready to act as the intermediaries of power.
The religious institutionalization of Buddhism in Lanka was instrumental in legitimizing
the ruling elite, and in return, the kings endorsed Buddhism (as presented by the Sinhala
Sangha). This reciprocal legitimization continued for centuries and constructed a religio-
political reality that the society has come to accept. The role of the Sangha in explaining a
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new spiritual philosophy on life, suffering, and death was deeply attractive to a society
that seems to have not had any organized religious discourses. Furthermore, as the history
of Lanka shows, the benevolence of the king and ruling elite, to the extent that it was
influenced by this new religion, could also have helped ensure that the people embraced
the religion.
Modem archaeological findings confirm that the establishment of Buddhism in
Lanka, nearly a century after it originated in India, had a different trajectory than in India
(Chakrabarti 1995). In Lanka, Buddhism received state recognition and protection from
the day it arrived. According to the account included in the Mahavamsa, the king
embraced the teachings, accepted the Sangha, and declared the island to be Buddhist
within a six -hour period (Mhv. XV: 1-9).
In contrast to the original peripatetic Sangha life style, the Sangha in Lanka
preferred to be Griima viisin, living near cities with direct state sponsorship in order to
help their faithful followers. The wanderer tradition was secondary compared to the
"settled" Sangha who received unlimited state sponsorship. This transition from a
wandering preacher to a counsellor of a fixed abode is often cited as an example of a
decline in the Sangha's spiritual orthodoxy. However, as Ivan Strenski (1983) and many
others have argued, this change reflects a process of socialization, which was necessary
even if it led to a more relaxed observation of the rigid Vinaya codes. Thus, some 100 odd
years after Buddha, when Buddhism arrived in Lanka the Sangha established themselves
as an order of stationary monks (Bechert 1978, Smith 1978). In addition, because the
Sangha abandoned their itinerant tradition, it was easier for the laity to offer them alms
and collect their good merits. It is this reciprocal exchange with the laity that eventually
helped the Sangha to become proprietors with powerful economic interests. It is also for
this reason that Amaya vdsi and Piimsiikiila, the jungle dwelling and extreme ascetic
orders, did not become as influential in Lankan society. While they were held in great
esteem because of their self-denying spirituality, the secular civil laity was unable to
benefit from their practices (Bechert 1992; Coningham 1995; O'Conner 1993; Yalman
1962).
The Mahavamsa records that the King requested to live within the boundaries (sima) of
the Sangha command (Mhv. XV: 182-184), thus intensifying the Sangha -state nexus.
Walpola Rahula, one of the most influential recent Sangha activists, commented:
From the 3rd Century BCE, to the end of Sinhalese rule in the 19th CE, only a
Buddhist had the legitimate right to become the king of Ceylon. By about the ro"
century, this belief had become so strong, that the king of Ceylon had not only to
be a Buddhist but a Bodhisattva.
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(Rahula 1956, 1966: 62-63)
The Mahavamsa text reflects how the socio-political structure of the Sangha Samaja
developed over the centuries. Three aspects of this structure are highlighted throughout:
the Sangha positioned themselves between religion and society; and they were the
unquestioned gatekeepers who could give access to spirituality and religion; they also
positioned themselves as key advisors to the ruling elite; and in this position, they were
held in the highest esteem by all segments of society.
Preserving this delicate position was not always straightforward. There were
numerous occasions on which the state intervened to "clean" Sangha society (siisana
sodhanai by disrobing and expelling some of the wrongdoers. "Impurities" within the
Sangha had occurred from the time of Asoka, who expelled a large number of them at the
third council for two main reasons: disregarding Vinaya discipline, and fighting between
the different nikiiyas. Lankan history shows that these internal fights were so intense that
during the reign of Parakramabahu I the king dismissed the Abayagiriya and Jetavana
faculties, bringing all the Sangha on the island under one authority and supervising the
ordination of any new Sangha (Mhv. LXXIII: 20-22; LXXVIII: 25-30).
It was during this era that the concept of Sangha Raja - a supreme leader of the
Sangha, elected from among their ranks - was considered, despite Buddha's opposition to
the practice. Centralized state control of the politics of Sangha society continued until the
15th century. The arrival of, and long occupation by, white Christian colonial powers was a
historical turning point, not just for the politics of Lanka but also for the way in which the
Sangha related to Lankan society. The attitude of the Christian colonists towards
Buddhism in general and the Sangha in particular fundamentally reshaped Sangha society.
The sociological and political changes that occurred during these centuries have been well
documented and analyzed (Bond 1992; Frost 2002; Gombrich 1999, 1998; Harris 2008,
2007, 2001; Scott 1992).
Under colonial rule, the Sinhala Sangha took on different political roles - some as
collaborators; others remained indifferent to the colonial powers, and still others became
rebels. The relationships they developed with each of the colonial masters (Portuguese,
Dutch, and British) influenced their society, and the resulting changes from the 16th to the
Page I 80
early zo" century laid the foundation for the socio-political mind-set, which characterises
the Sangha in Lanka today. Analysing this transformation, the social anthropologist Kitsiri
Malalgoda went beyond the scholarship of Obeyesekere, Gombrich, and Tambiah by
highlighting the political re-awakening of the Sinhala Sangha during that time, often
provoked and manipulated by the colonists.
The British, who had the longest and most influential rule in Lanka, approached
Buddhism with modernist values while also manifesting their colonial and missionary
zeal. Most observers agree that the modern form of Sangha engagement with the Sinhala
society was largely shaped as a protest against the systematic dismantling of the Sangha-
state heritage and the social changes resulting from the state-sponsored promotion of
Protestant Christianity. In order to counter the influence of the Protestants, the Sangha
successfully copied their methods and transformed Buddhism into what Obeyesekere and
Gombrich termed Protestant Buddhism. The experience of colonial oppression thus
affected the role of the Sangha and their psyche in important ways:
• The British failed to keep their promise to preserve the important political role of
the Sangha. As a result, the interdependence and mutual legitimization that marked
the state-Sangha relationship were dissolved. The British systematically
undermined the power and wealth of the Sangha by introducing land reforms and
taxation laws.
• As the Sangha lost their central influence, non-central Sangha associations were
formed, largely dependent on the good will and support of local elites.
• Locally and regionally, the identity and self-understanding of the Sangha was
therefore more open to the influences of geography, caste, sub-caste, doctrine, and
personality.
• These changes were accompanied by the emergence of a "Protestant"
consciousness among the Sangha, which was directly primarily against the
Christian missionaries and the colonial rulers but could also be re-directed against
other groups and people perceived as posing threats.
• Also in response to the broader forces of modernity and globalisation, the Sangha
redefined their role from being the "guide to the other world (and the other life)" to
being more concretely the "protector of the ethnie and polity".
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1.6 The Sangha under colonial rule
Ironically, the structure and strength of the contemporary Sangha community developed
under colonial rule. As we review this evolution in the Sangha self-understanding, we note
that the three different colonial powers dealt with the Sangha in three distinctly different
ways. The Catholic Portuguese were particularly aggressive in their conversion attempts.
By 1551, the king of Kotte, who had grown up under Portuguese Franciscan teachings,
was baptized as a Catholic, thus becoming the only Christian ruler of Lanka. In
comparison to the Portuguese, the Calvinist Dutch were more tolerant towards Buddhists
and the Sangha, partly because their trade interests superseded religious considerations
(Malalgoda 1976:28-45). The British however, had the most complex relationship with the
Sangha in Lanka.
After 300 years of disarray, the Sangha society had lost its structure. The Tamil
king Kiirti SrI Rajasimha, in his efforts to consolidate his rule and find favour in the eyes
of the elites and masses, became a reformer, supporter, and promoter of Buddhism and its
Sangha. His strategy was to strengthen the Sangha and harness support through them. In
1753, he invited the Siam (Thailand) Sangha to help re-establish the order of the Sangha
within the Theravadin tradition. The new order, named Siyam Nikiiya, had two distinctive
features: based in Kandy, they were the official custodians of the Tooth Relic, and they
belonged to the Goyigama (also spelled Govigama) caste. The king then ordered all the
Sangha, even those in the areas now controlled by the Dutch, to come under the leadership
of Siyam. Based on a theological argument over whether the new chapter should be
AralJya vdsi (jungle dwelling and meditating) or Vihiira vdsi (living at the edge of the
village where they could help the people), the Siyam chapter eventually split into two,
with Asgiriya taking to the mountain range and Malvatu largely settling on the river banks.
After failing in their efforts to win over the king for a trade partnership, the Dutch
promoted the higher ordination of southern, lower-caste men in order to weaken the king.
Since the Siyam of Kandy would not accept this, the Dutch sent these men to Burma. The
first southern member of the kardve (fishing) caste to be ordained was Sangha
Amgahapitiye NaQawimala in 1803. This order began as Amarapura Nikiiya, named after
the 17th/18thcentury capital of Burma (Bischoff 1995; Buddhadatta 1965, 1958). By 1811,
the Dutch had helped five such southern Sinhala groups to be ordained in Burma.
In 1861, a group of Siyam Sangha rebelled against caste rigidness and broke off to
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start the Ramafifia Nikaya, which officially disapproved of caste separation and invited all
castes into monkhood. However, there is no record to indicate that they invited or
permitted non-Sinhalas to become Sangha. The modem Sangha community in Lanka has
roughly 40 different nikaya with differences based on customs, regions, lineage, or temple
traditions. The three chapters described above remain key players, of which Siyam is the
largest and most influential.
Gombrich (1971) argued that the nature of "colonial Buddhism" changed during
the period of British rule. While the colonial period as a whole witnessed the growth of
intolerant political agitation, the Portuguese and Dutch periods were still marked by "fluid
boundaries," which allowed the Sangha to continue working with society. While the
Portuguese (1505-1656) were aggressive in their conversion efforts and in the process
engaged with the Sangha, the Dutch (1658-1786) actively promoted the establishment and
growth of various Sangha fraternities for trade or political ends (Crane and Barrier 1981;
Malalgoda 1976; Rogers 2004). In contrast, the English tried to exclude the Sangha and
indeed Buddhism more generally from the management of the colony. According to
Obeyesekere (1970), it was during this period that we saw the rise of "Protestant
Buddhism", which was advanced by Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933) and his
contemporaries.
The British approached the situation in Lanka in this manner for a number of
reasons. First, notwithstanding the powerful church-state nexus in their own country, their
modernist outlook may have suggested that state and religion were to be separate; second,
they understood the colony as a missionary opportunity and accordingly proceeded to do
what they could to undermine the validity of Buddhism in a territory now ruled by the
British. For example, Methodist Missionary Rev. Spence H. Hardy argued that it would be
illegal for the British government to protect Buddhism (Houtart 1974). Finally, the British
may well have understood Buddhism's powerful influence on society. Undermining this
influence would have strengthened the power of the colonial rulers. These considerations
may have led the British administration to ignore the spirit of the 1815 treaty, where the
British promised to respect the Buddhist faith in the country. Instead, they actively worked
towards the exclusion of the Sangha from politics, and they replaced the pirivena
education with mission schools, which often benefited from state support (Houtart 1976a,
1976b; 1977, 1978; Liston 2000). The Pirivenas were the bhikkhu schools of higher
learning, which over centuries had allowed the Sangha to cement their cultural hegemony.
By 1852, the British declared the total withdrawal of their support of Buddhism and
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actively promoted the construction of Anglican churches, including some just next to
famous temples such as Kandy and Kelaniya. These developments had different effects in
the Up Country, with largely Goyigama Sangha, and the Lower Country, with largely non-
Goyigama (Durave, Karave, Salagama, and others) caste Sangha orders. It is clear that
their exclusion from the politics of the country implied for all Sangha a material and
spiritual loss. Accordingly, regardless of their differences, anti-colonialism became the
focus of resistance for the sasana. The Sinhala Sangha interpreted colonialism and the
spread of Christianity primarily as a threat to Buddhism and the Sangha community,
which meant that the defensive lines that the Sangha drew between themselves and various
"others" were drawn along ideological lines. Buddhism thereby provided the fundamental
space where freedom was to be articulated, and the Sangha became the key agents for
redefining the state.
When the British missionaries launched an aggressive conversion campaign, which
directly and openly attacked Buddhism, it was primarily in southern Lanka that the Sangha
led by prominent activists such as Hikkaduve SrI Sumangala, Mohottiwatte (or later
Migettuvatte) Gunananda, and Ratmalane Dhamrnaloka, opposed the missionaries with
organized protests."
The lower country Sangha, whose orders were initiated under the patronage of the
Dutch, did not own or manage large properties and hence relied on the support they
received from lay people. Wealthy business owners in the South had built large temples
for the Sangha and !n return expected the Sangha to support their businesses and political
ambitions. As a result, the Sangha in these areas were particularly close to the lay people,
and due to their mutual dependency, the Sangha had reasons to think that they were called
to act on behalf of lay society against colonial oppression. Suddenly, they had' become
political leaders, and they found the support of lay people and even foreigners such as
Rhys Davids and Henry Olcott. Ironically, the British attempt to separate state and Sangha
in order to make Buddhism a "private" affair of believers backfired. The Sangha were not
to be excluded; on the contrary, the very attempt to exclude and marginalise them
64 A detailed discussion of the monks who actively promoted and participated in these protest movements is
available in Malalgoda (1976); Seneviratne (2001); Tambiah (1986); Wickramasinghe (2004).
provoked them to openly adopt the role of political leaders.
This creation of a political Buddhism was directly influenced by the discourses
emerging from Vidyodaya'" and Vidyalankara." the two most prominent pirivenas. As
Jonathan Watts (2004) argued, the colonial administration promoted a secular nation-state
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identity and marginalized the traditional position enjoyed by the Sangha, moving them to
the periphery and unintentionally launching a search for new forms of "engaged
Buddhism." This process, now famously termed "Buddhism Betrayed" (Tambiah 1992),
produced two distinct discourses: Vidyodaya promoted a Sangha re-entry into the power
centers of politics, while Vidyalankara argued for a rational Buddhism of the type that was
vigorously promoted by Dharmapala. However, many contemporary commentators
(Abeysekara 2002; Berkwitz 2003; Deegalle 2005, 2004; De Silva 2006; Seneviratne
1999) agree that it was the elitist interpretation of the role of the Sangha promoted by the
Vidyodaya circle and prominent monks such as Venerable Walpola Rahula that inflamed a
new brand of postcolonial political Buddhism.
The role of the Sangha in politics in general and in peace-building in Lanka in
particular has gained considerable academic attention (Abeysekara 2001; Berkwitz 2008;
Blackburn 2002; De Silva 2006; Degalle 2006; Juergensmeyer 1999). The Sangha are the
third reality of the "Trividha Ratna," the triple gem of Buddhism." and the Muradevata, or
the guiding deities of the land, the religion and its people. What was largely an elitist
engagement in advisory politics appeared to take an explosive tum around the mid-Iv"
century. A few years after the defeat of the Kandyan kingdom, the last sovereignty in
Ceylon, by colonial British troops, the masses were without an indigenous leadership.
Among the pioneers who challenged British colonial rule was Ven. Kudapola Thera, who
inspired a rebellion in 1848, a century before the British would grant independence.
Wariyapola Sri Sumangala, Giranagama Mahinda, Sikkim Mahinda are only a few of the
prominent Bhikkhus who played a direct political role and whose memory can inspire
nationalist mobilization even today. This intervention of the members of the Sangha
Samaja in the politics of Lanka has never been reversed.
Anagarika Dharmapala was one of the key leaders advocating a radical redefinition
of the role of the Sangha (Amunugama 1991, 1985). Venerable Walpola Rahula's
65 This was the first such institution to train Bhikkhus outside the temples. It later became a full university.
See http://www.sjp.ac.lklaboutus/history.html. Accessed on March 21, 20 IO.
66 Today Vidyalankara operates as a training centre for monks. See http://www.vidyalankara.com. Accessed
on March 21, 2010.
67 Buddhists accept the Buddha, Dhamma (his teaching), and Sangha (his monks) as the "triple gems" that
provides guidance and advice.
Bhikshuwiige Urumaya - the Heritage of a Bhikkhu (1946)-articulates this radicalization in
a powerful manner by presenting the call for a new Sangha self-understanding as a
continuation of the Sangha tradition and heritage. The book was published in Sinhala two
years before independence, and an English translation was published in 1974, three years
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after the 1971 insurgence of Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP).68 This re-engagement of the
Sangha with society eventually led to the formation of an all-Sangha party, the Jathika
Hela Urumaya (JHU), which ensured that the Sangha would now also feature in the
electoral politics in post-independence Lanka (Deegalle 2005; 2003). The JHU manifests
the notion of the supremacy of the Sinhala ethnic religiosity and thus resonates with
widespread nationalist sentiments. We will have occasions later in the thesis to discuss
these developments in greater detail.
1.7 The Sanghaand post-Protestant Buddhism
The scholarly analysis of the arrival, establishment, growth, institutionalization, relative
decline and re-emergence of the Sangha and their politics in Lanka has so far tended to
focus on two aspects. There is a body of literature which looks at the Sangha (and
Buddhism) in Lanka as the result of the extension and expansion of the intellectual and
social influence of Indian Buddhism (Dutt 2005, 2004, 1998, 1988, 1960, 1962, 1952,
1957,1941,1930; Geiger 1953,1930; Gokhale 1994,1992,1990,1986,1976,1969,1965,
1962, 1946; Gombrich 2006, 2005, 1996, 1992, 1990, 1984, 1975, 1966; Rahula 1978,
1977,1974,1953,1947; Tambiah 1992, 1984, 1977,1976,1973,1970,1968). And there
is also literature that looks at the establishment of Buddhism in Lanka as a political project
with the Sangha as the most visible symbol and the most effective agent of this project
(Abeysekara 2004, zooi», 2001b, 2000,1999; Bechertz 1991,1988; DeVotta 2009,2008,
2004, 2002, 2000; Gunawardane 2003, 1988, 1979; Kemper 1996, 1995, 1993, 1884,
1984, 1980, 1979).
Following independence, Lanka tried to adopt a "modem" approach by both
recognising the prerogative of Buddhism while accommodating the other three main
religions - Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. Article 9:2 of the 1972 constitution states
68 Janathii Vimukthi Peramuna is the Maoist/Marxist party that launched two anti-state armed rebellions in
Lanka, in 1971 and 1988. JVP has fragmented since then. However, the largely southern Sinhala party is
considered the third political force in Lanka after the main United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party.
that "The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and
accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddhasasana, while
assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e)". Every government
since 1948 tried to manage this delicate balance of maintaining Buddhism as a superior yet
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equal religion on the island, but it is clear that even this "foremost but equal" balance runs
counter to the state-religion relationship that is symbolized and actualized by the Sangha.
The Sangha community in Lanka develops many different features of Theravada
Buddhism and practices different aspects of its teaching. Beside the major three nikaya,
which are largely a caste based formation, the Sangha in Lanka can be identified in at least
three broad ways based on their political (in)activity: those who are politically active and
able to mobilize the political consciousness of the Sinhala Buddhists; those who try to be
apolitical even while sharing the same public space, and those who have totally withdrawn
from the social space. As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on politically active Sangha
and their impact on the modern democratization process of the island, taking into account
the multi-ethnic (and multi-national) political reality of the state. The early zo" century
polemical rhetoric of Anagarika Dharrnapala, who campaigned for a laymen-led
Buddhism, transformed into a search for a liberal and intellectual Buddhism that began
immediately after independence and developed during the 1960s. The highly anglicised
and urbanized middle class Sinhalas sought to reconcile the authoritative discourse of
Buddhism with a more liberal framework. During this period, often referred to as the
Sanskruthika Navodaya (era of cultural reawakening), a Sinhala civil intelligentsia
promoted a re-reading of Buddhism and its influence in accordance with the changing self-
understanding of the urban Sinhalas.
Martin Wickramasinghe, Lester James Peiris, Ediriweera Sarachchandra, Walpola
Rahula, Mahagama Sekara, and John De Silva were among the leading figures in this
search for a redefinition of the Sinhala people and their culture as a whole. These members
of the cultural elite tried to contextualize Lanka's past in order to construct a (somewhat
artificial) indigenous identity. In this process of "in-culturing", they were attempting to
move away from the remaining influences of Indian cultural hegemony in Lankan social
identity and its Pali/Buddhism heritage. They encouraged a new dress code for Lankans,
promoted the use of Sinhala in public discourse and declared the rural village a sanctified
place of authenticity. However, these elitist projects were not drawn from the wider
national or regional social dynamics, but were largely manufactured urban imaginations.
Accordingly, they failed to have an impact on the Sangha community, their ideology, or
on state policies, which had already taken an "ethnic turn". As a result, these projects
contributed to the hegemonizing of Sinhala culture, imposing "Sinhalaness" on the whole
of society. For the non-Sinhala Tamil, Muslim, Burgher, and Malay minorities, this
"national" cultural construct was nothing but a systematic process of further
marginalisation and isolation.
Parallel to this process, minorities began to search for their own versions of state
and society. The Burgers, who for two centuries had enjoyed the close patronage of the
colonial state, found their future options limited. Most of them migrated to either Australia
or the UK, searching for a better life, and the remaining Burgher population actively
developed ways to assimilate into the mainstream society (Roberts 1994, 1993, 1989,
1979).69 The Muslims (Moors and Malays) also began to seek new legitimacy within the
changing socio-political landscape. While economic and political survival may have been
their primary reason for engaging in this search for legitimacy, the Muslim population did
not interpret the societal changes as part of a process meant to undermine their ethnic or
national identity. In contrast, the political psychology of the Tamil population was
different.
The Tamils in the north had benefitted from prolonged mtssionary education
projects and thus were able to secure respected and protected civil service positions as
well as central professions in the active economy. Thus, as the major social and political
changes began to take place and "Sinhala-ness" became the measure of things, they saw
their own position undermined. Initially they questioned this Sinhalizing of the wider
society but received no tangible response from the ruling Sinhala elites. With virtually no
channels open for them to voice their concerns, the Tamil elites initiated a full-scale
campaign proclaiming their own identity outside Lanka's sovereignty. Regional political
changes, which included the formation of new states such as Singapore and Bangladesh
during this time, may have ignited imaginations of an independent ethnic Tamil State in
the north and east, where Tamils were the majority population.
After the assassination of SWRD by Sangha Thudawe Somarama in 1959, the
reputation of the Sangha suffered greatly (Manor 1990), preventing them from adopting an
even more prominent role in public politics. Many leading Sangha activists became
backbench supporters of one of the three major parties (UNP, SLFP, or the Leftists), and
many others "took refuge" in cultural and traditional roles such as teaching, astrology, or
69 Roberts himself is of Lanka Burger origin and thus analyzes the situation of Burgers in the country on the
basis of his own experience. See http://thuppahi.wordpress.com/, Accessed on 15 June 2010.
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native medicine. In fact, the period between the 1959 assassination and the 1971 revolt
shows a relative withdrawal of the Sangha from politics, perhaps suggesting that Sangha
political activism is largely possible when they are neither in a controlling nor in a
marginalized position in the political system. At all other "normal" times, the Sangha are
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actively seeking to increase their political influence. The 1971 armed rebellion and the
role that the (mostly young) Sangha played in that revolt stand as an early indicator of the
changing nature of the Sangha activist involvement in society (Kodikara 1989; Moor
1993; Samaranayaka 1999). In many ways, the turn towards activism of this kind could
also be interpreted as a serious collapse of any effective Sangha leadership, leaving the
Sangha without an alternative self-understanding and without a meaningful project.
Leaders such as Walpola Rahula had left the country due to the intensity of the political
debates. The Sangha had many reasons to be disillusioned: a failing political system, an
indifferent and immobile hierarchy, and an ever-growing threat to their culture and
identity. The fact that the Sangha became again involved in a second armed rebellion in
1988, seventeen years later, indicates the degree of their frustration (Goodhand 1999;
Grobar and Gnanaselvam 1993; Mathews 1989; Pfaffenberger 1988).
By the late 1980s and mid-90s, the Sangha had regained their political place in
society. 1988 witnessed an unprecedented level of Sangha involvement in the second JVP
revolt. The signing of the Indo-Lanka Peace Agreement in 1987 and the subsequent arrival
of the Indian Army in the north were key developments causing this remobilization.70
However, the government crushed the uprising, albeit with questionable methods
(Abeysekara 2001; Keerawella and Samarajiva 1994; Singer 1991, 1992; Uyangoda
1989). Abeysekara argues that this was the first time since pre-colonial times that so many
Sangha were arrested and killed in Lanka. As a result of these developments, the role of
the Sangha and of the politicians had become blurred; even notions such as justice and
violence had lost their precision in light of prolonged state and non-state terror politics,
with some of the Sangha heavily involved.
The 1994 general election, after 17 years of UNP rule, was seen as a paradigm shift
In Lankan politics. The radical economic, social, political, and constitutional
transformations on the island combined with the devastating impact of the war had created
deep resentment across the party divisions. As a fresh hope for change, Chandrika
Bandaranaike, daughter of former Prime Ministers SWRD and Sirimavo Bandaranaike,
70 The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord was signed in July 1987 but the LTTE opposed the Accord and continued
to fight, which in 1988 led to the arrival of a IOO,OOO-manstrong Indian army in Lanka.
returned from her exile and contested the election. A number of factors including her
family ties and the fact that she was the widow of Vijaya Kumaratunga, a popular actor-
turned-political activist, helped her victory. It is not uncommon in Asian politics for a
female relative of a male political leader to assume power, as in India, Bangladesh,
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Philippines, Pakistan, and Lanka (Richter 1999, Thompson 2002). Yet the most important
reasons for Chandrika's victory were her promises to introduce transparent government
and to seek political reconciliation with the ethnic Tamils. Tessa Bartholomeusz
commented:
Kumaratunga's landslide victory in 1994 can be attributed to numerous factors, one of
which is Kumaratunga's ability to respond to popular desire for political and ethnic
reconciliation by configuring herself as the embodiment of Buddhist motherhood, a deeply
felt and widely recognized metaphor for dependent co-arising (and therefore for
compassion and cooperation).
(1999: 223)
Chandrika tried to use her popularity to transform political consciences in the wider
society and to promote a power-sharing mechanism with the Tamils, accepting the LTTE
as a legitimate partner in peace talks. Yet her support dwindled once it became clear that
she was unable to fully appreciate the political nature of Buddhism in the country.
Chandrika had been a member of the French student movement during her studies there in
the 1960s, and thus may have been out of touch with the rituals of power that her new role
required her to undergo. Her father and mother had used popular Buddhist customs and
sentiments in order to construct devout Buddhist profiles for themselves. In contrast, to
date there are no public images of Chandrika offering flowers at a Buddhist shrine, a
customary picture that every political actor in Lanka, Buddhist or not, would have to
produce in order to appear legitimate. Sangha groups were suspiciously monitoring the
liberal agenda of tlte new government and their worst fears became a reality when, in
1995, just within a year of coming to power, Chandrika's government proposed a
comprehensive power devolution as a political "package." This proposal suggested
defining Lanka as a union of five regions with equal powers, out of which a central
(federal) government would be formed. The UNP and JVP opposition interpreted the
package as a destruction of the unitary nature of the island and thus as a betrayal of the
land of Buddha.
The dormant Sangha forces united in their opposition to the package, once more
attempting to convert their de facto political status to a de jure position. Opposing the
package became a new beginning for a Sangha politics that was to change the destiny of
Lankan politics in the few years that followed. The new radical Sangha aimed not just to
change politics but also to become a political force itself by forming an all Sangha
political party that was the first of its kind in the world. They were determined to contest
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the election. This new activism was a response to wider societal changes that threatened to
deeply affect the Sangha samaja, As George Bond (2003, 1992) has shown, the Sangha,
already faced with numerous challenges due to the rapidly changing economic, political,
and social conditions, were further challenged by a growing movement of lay devotees.
A lower-middle class, semi-urban lay movement led by socially engaged Buddhist
organizations like the Sarvodaya" was growing in numbers, displaying considerable
activism and involvement. They engaged in meditation and other practices without the
leadership of the Sangha, seeking an alternative interpretation of Buddhism within the
Lankan context. The lay Buddhist movement was calling for a reform of the traditional,
institutional and indigenous Buddhism, partially ignoring the Sangha leadership. However,
this was not the first time that Lanka had seen a lay revival campaign. The biggest such
movement was arguably the one led by Anagarika Dharmapala, Olcott, and their
supporters in the early 20th century. In the past, however, the success of such lay
reformists was largely based on the fact that they promoted a Sinhala Buddhism wrapped
in an ethno-nationalist discourse. The creation of Buddhist Sinhala schools as an
alternative to missionary education, demanding the Vesak holiday,72 and designing and
demanding the acceptance of a Buddhist flag, are key achievements of this lay movement,
which often operated without any Sangha leadership (Prothero 1995; Roberts 2000). Yet
even if they were able to function without Sangha leadership, it is likely that they were
permitted to act in relative autonomy because their aims were not in direct conflict with
the Sangha outlook.
Donald Swearer distinguished three types of lay Buddhist movements in Lanka:
those that help the Sangha in their religious duties; those who collaborate with the Sangha
to promote social welfare; and those who seek Sangha leadership/support for political
reforms (Swearer 1970). We can identify at least four major laity revivals in Lanka in
recent history: first, Anagarika Dharmapala, Olcott and their supporters campaigned for
71 Sarvodaya is the largest lay Buddhist organization campaigning for a society organized according to
Buddhist values. See http://www.sarvodaya.org/activities/peace/recent-history, Accessed 3 May 2011.
72 Vesak is the month corresponding to April/May in the Western calendar. Vesak has become the most
significant period in the Buddhist calendar because according to Theravadin belief, the birth, enlightenment,
and death of Buddha all took place on the full moon day of this month.
modernization, along the lines of Protestant Buddhism; second, Buddhism became the
basis for a political/cultural awakening during the 1956 Buddha Jayanthi year; third, the
meditational and disciplined life promoted by the Vinaya Vardhana and Sarvodaya
movements explored Buddhism without direct Sangha involvement, and finally, Buddhism
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became a key reference point for lay activists within the context of the debates
surrounding the war in Lanka. None of these movements aimed to question or challenge
the Sangha, but rather to reform and redefine their role (Bond 1992; Matthew 1999;
Seneviratne 1999; Tambiah 1993, 1992, 1986). Perhaps, as Michael Ames argued, the
Vinaya Vardhana (discipline developers) was the only movement during the last 100 years
that directly challenged the lifestyle and authority of the Sangha. The lay movement that
argued for a negotiated peace based on Buddhist teachings challenged the Sangha position
on this issue, but ultimately was unable to affect the deeply entrenched forces of ethno-
nationalism represented and mobilized by the Sangha.
1.8 The Sinhala Sangha and the Tamils of Lanka
The relationship between the Sangha and the Tamils of Lanka is yet another un-researched
area within Sinhala Buddhism. For centuries, there was a strong Buddhist influence
amongst the Tamils of India and to some extent amongst the Tamils of Lanka. Monius has
pointed out that the Tamils' mono-Hindu identity is a recent development. Accordingly,
until the end of the Sangam era (second to fourth century CE) the Tamil literature was
dominated by Buddhist and Jain themes composed by Buddhist and Jain authors. The later
Cholas and Pandava kingdoms systematically prioritised the Hindu faith and turned
Buddhism into the 'other' religion (2001 :3-4). Scholars believe that the composition of the
Tamil epic Manimekalai - the story of a Jain woman who converted to Buddhism - is a
solid witness to the vibrant influence of Buddhism amongst the Tamils. Scholars suspect
that great Buddhist writers of the 5th century CE like Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta either
were Tamils or were of Tamil origins (Barua 1945).
In Lanka, the ideological narrative of the Mahavamsa, while confirming Buddha's
visit to Nagadipa in the north of island, constructs the very opposite of this history. In the
Mahavamsa, the Tamils are invaders; they are unholy and illegitimate, even if they were
righteous rulers such as King Elara, The central hero of the Mahavamsa, King
Dutthagamini, is praised for his war-like attitude towards the Tamils and for finally
diminishing the Tamil kingdoms. @«®@:J(Demala)- the Tamils - is a derogatory term in
the Mahavamsa narrative. Therefore, the account of the Mahavamsa effectively constructs
the Tamil identity as an enemy of Buddhism and hence by implication as an enemy of the
Sinhalas.
Prior to the arrival of the European colonists, the strongest Sinhala kingdom in
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Kandy was for centuries ruled by kings of Tamil origin. Some of these kings, such as Kfrti
SrI Rajasimha, devoted extensive energy and material resources to the revival of
Buddhism at a time when Buddhism seemed to become an institutionally moribund
religious tradition (Holt 1996). In fact, the revival led by Kirti SrI in the eighteenth century
succeeded in re-creating a Buddhism that was "revived and re-established in classical
form, as it happened, for the last time in the history of Ceylon" (Malalgoda 1976:258). Yet
the communal identity of the Sinhala elites and their conviction that the Buddhist religion
and its way of life were superior - a conviction that was sustained and cultivated by the
Sangha - deeply marked the socio-political psyche of the Sinhalas.
During the British colonial period, the Tamils benefited from the education
provided by missionaries and obtained influential positions within the colonial
administration. As a result, the Sinhalas perceived the Tamils as traitors. The "Protestant
Buddhist" revival under Henry Olcott and Anagarika Dharmapala had a strong ethnic bias.
Ignoring the historical contribution made by the Tamils to foster Buddhism, Anagarika's
Buddhism was essentially and exclusively a Sinhala faith. He coined the term "Sinhala-
Bauddhaya" in order to describe the close, essential relationship between the Sinhalas and
Buddhism. By trying to tum Buddhism into an "ethnic faith", he further distanced the
Tamils from Buddhist culture and thereby from the Sangha, who propagated such
thinking.
While some Tamil elites such as Pollanampalam Arunachalam and Ponnampalam
Ramanathan worked together with the Sinhalas during the struggle for independence, the
subsequent Sinhala refusal to share power eventually convinced the Tamil leaders that
they needed to create their own political parties along ethnic lines. As they began to
demand equal rights, they angered the Sangha, who began to dismiss the Tamils and their
politics as antithetical to the Sinhala-Buddhist state. Since the country became
independent in 1948, no other group in Lanka has opposed the Tamil political demand for
greater political and cultural autonomy in the northern and eastern regions more than the
Sinhala Sangha. They have opposed and blocked every effort by moderate Sinhala leaders
to look for compromises.
In the post-independence era, over the last sixty plus years, the relationship
between the Sangha and the Tamils has broken down to such an extent that there are
hardly any modem Sinhala Sangha who are able to preach the dhamma in Tamil.
According to the Sinhala Sangha mind-set, the Tamils did not seem worthy of sharing the
teaching of Buddha. After the end of the war in 2009, some Sangha have moved to the
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northern and eastern area, but the purpose of their travels is not spiritual. The Sangha
willingly became a part of the further militarization of the conquered Tamil area, thereby
provoking a renewed and hardened antipathy among the Tamils. From ordinary citizens to
academic scholars like Stanley Tambiah, Tamils have responded by articulating their
criticisms of the Sangha. An improved if not healed relationship between the Sangha and
the Tamils is an essential condition for political peace and civil stability in Lanka.
1.9 Conclusion
Dramatic political transformations do not come easily within the Lankan Buddhist
discourse. As with Chandrika in 1995, the lay movements in the 2000s were trying to
plough a terrain that had hardened over twenty centuries of ideological conflict. The
Sangha were not willing to have their influential position and powers curtailed. Instead,
they turned inwards and developed a narrower notion of Buddhism that would soon show
signs of becoming a "Sinhala Buddhist political fundamentalism,,73. The Sangha looked at
the vulnerable sections of the society and called for further radicalization. They appealed
to the Sinhalas to embrace a total 0'i5J'8C;Q2t5)@ (Bauddhakama) or "Buddhistness," like the
Hindutva of Indian politics. The Sangha wanted the state to cease all negotiations and
proposals that entailed the possibility of a power-sharing arrangement with the Tamils. For
them the island belonged to Buddha and thus only to Buddhists. This position was non-
negotiable: every village had to be Buddhist in culture and nature. No non-Buddhist
centres of worship were permitted, and the Sangha did not hesitate to set fire to many
churches, especially to the new evangelical churches.i" They also demanded that a new
law be enacted to prohibit conversions from Buddhism to other religions. Many suburban
city centres were decorated with Buddha statues, flags, and other symbols, and all key
roundabouts in the cities had a white Buddhist statue placed in them. In the morning and
73 Richard Gombrich argued that the term "fundamentalism" could not be used for Sinhala Sangha as they do
not borrow their ideology from any Buddhist text/scriptures (1989). However, as we have demonstrated,
Sinhala Sangha draw their ideology from passages of Mahavamsa, which amounts to a socio-political
fundamentalism.
74 See a list of such attacks at http://www.tchr.net/religionchurches2.htm. Accessed on Aug 10, 20 IO.
evening, the chanting of Pirith 75 was to be broadcast in public, and they demanded that the
state media have more Buddhist centred programming. They demanded state banks to
practice Buddhist economic principles and other Sinhala businesses at the national level to
adopt an openly Buddhist identity. They urged the state to design state buildings reflecting
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Buddhist architecture. Schools were to have more scheduled classes to teach Buddhism.
The Sangha appealed to the masses to think of their country as a Buddhist state, indeed as
Buddha's state. Contrary to its intentions, the poorly planned liberal project of Chandrika
provided the impetus for a new wave of ethnoreligious awakening amongst the Sangha. As
they combined their religious awakening with a nationalist agenda, it was bound to
resonate with a large spectrum of the Lankan society. The result was a new brand of
militant Sangha willing to use intimidation and political power to advance their cause. In
the struggle between traditional forces and forces of change, tradition not only prevailed
but also outdid proponents of change in terms of radicalism (Brekke 2007; DeVotta 2004;
DeVotta and Stone 2008; Rowell 2009). In summary, the evolution of the self-
understanding of the Sangha in Lanka went through four major phases:
1. From the Pali Tripitaka teaching to the Mahavamsic outlook (from 300 BCE to 500
CE),
2. from monastic worldview (Lokottara) to social worldview (Laukika) (500 CE to
1700),
3. from a universalistic, open outlook to an ethnic and caste orientation, (1700-1900),
and finally
4. from being supporters of political groups and policies to direct political
engagement (1900-2010).
During the transitions from one phase to another, key Sangha leaders made crucial
contributions, as indicated in the table below:
75 Paritta is Theravadin traditional chanting in Pali for protection against evil. (ODS: 213)
Time Key Sangha Contribution
1698-1779 Valivita Saranamkara • Re-established the Upasampada
• Argued for non-Goyigama caste
members to be ordained, leading to the
establishment of Amarapura, Ramafifia
and other sub chapters
1827-1911 Hikkaduve SrI Sumangala • Re-established the Sangha as learned
advisors in society
• Reformed Sangha education,
encouraging Sangha to study in secular
institutions
1864-1933 Anagarika Dharmapala • Argued against the traditional Sangha
monastic orientation, urging the Sangha
to get engaged and involved in
reforming lay society
• Argued that those of Buddhist and
Sinhala ethnicity are the owners of
Lanka
1907-1997 Walpola Rahula • Constructed a "Sangha heritage"
• Provided the academic/intellectual
support for Sangha involvement in
society including party politics
1948-2003 Gangodawila Soma • Argued for a Sinhala Buddhist re-
ordering of modem Sinhala society
1966- Athuraliye Rathana • Campaigned for a military victory
against the Tamil Tigers and against
political power-sharing
• Argued for a Sinhala Buddhist political
system to create a Dharma Samiija
(righteous society)
The militant Sangha opposition to a negotiated peace arrangement with the LTTE and
their support for the military campaign and eventual victory over the Tamil Tigers was one
of the most important moments in the unfolding of the contemporary Sinhala Sangha and
their sasana. Having introduced the historical formation of the Sangha as arguably the
most influential agent of war and peace in Lanka in this chapter, we will now look in
Chapter two in greater detail at the various "waves of resistance" that mark this evolution.
We will see that the climax of this evolution - the Sangha agitation in favour of a military
solution to the war against the LTTE - is the result of a historical dynamics in which the
Sangha at key moments resisted developments and trends that threatened to undermine
their status and self-understanding. These "waves of resistance", in tum, contributed to the
very formation of this self-understanding. Chapter three will then complement this
analysis by looking at the intellectual and spiritual formation of the latest three key
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activists in the above table: Walpola Rahula, Gangodawila Soma, and Athuraliye Rathana.
This is in order to understand how they were able to make the crucial ethical choices, as
Buddhists and as Sangha, which allowed them to actively engage in Lankan politics and to
support a course of action that embraced the use of extreme degrees of violence.
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Chapter 2
An Army in Yellow Robes:
Sangha Political Resistance 1815-2010 Page I 97
"In order to guarantee the success of the war effort, we will always help our war heroes
through action."
Yen. Elle Gunawansa Thero (July 2000)76
76 Here pictured preparing the newly appointed Army Commander Lieutenant-General Lionel Balagalle for
the blessings of the Triple Gem, Photo taken from http://www.dharmayathanaya.org.lk/Photo_files/.
Accessed on 15 March 2010.
2.1 Introduction
The arrival, establishment, growth and defense of Buddhism in Lanka occurred under the
leadership of the Sangha. Once introduced by the Indian Theravadin Sangha, the sasana
was placed under the leadership and protection of the Sinhala Sangha. Throughout their Page I 98
2300-year history, the Sinhala Sangha have performed two fundamental functions: first,
they are to defend, protect and promote Sinhala Buddhism; second, they are to fight those
they perceive to be threats to their faith. The epic writings of the Mahavamsa are thought
to be the historical record of the heroic efforts of the Sangha and of the kings who helped
them fulfill their role. In accordance with their self-understanding, we can identify various
'waves' of Sangha activism throughout their history. Starting from the mid-18th Century,
seven major waves can be identified as follows:
Time Key leaders of political activism Purpose of political involvement
period
KTrtiSri Rajasimha Reestablishing the proper Sangha
1750-1770 Sangha Valivita Saranamkara ordination after some 300 years
Dutch Rulers Helping the Lower Caste Sangha
1800-1815 Sangha Amgahapitiye Nanawimala Beginning of the Amarapura fraternity
Wesleyan Missionaries Defending Sinhala Buddhism against
1860-1875 Rev. Daniel John Gogerly Christian missionaries
Rev. Spencer Hardy 5 great public debates: Pdnadura viidaya
Sangha Mohottivatte Gunananda
Sangha Hikkaduve Sri Sumangala
Arrival of the Theosophists Establishing a 'Protestant' version of lay
1885-1900 Col. Henry Olcott Buddhism
Anagarika Dharmapala Buddhist schools
Buddhist flag
D.S. Senanayake Sangha initiative to support the struggle
1930-1945 Sangha Walpola Rahula for independence
SWRD Bandaranaike Constitutionalizing Buddhism as the state
1956-1972 Sangha Mapitigarna Buddharakkhita religion
Sangha Walpola Rahula Making Sinhala the official state language
Proclaiming Lanka a unitary state
Chandrika Kumaratunge Urging the Sinhalas to return to their
1995-2010 Velupillai Prapaharan Buddhism
Mahinda Rajapakse Advocating a Buddhist Government led
Sangha Gangodawila Soma by the Sangha
Sangha Athuraliye Rathana Justifying the war against the Tamil
Tigers
Rejecting the federalist proposals
Even a cursory survey as provided by the table above shows that the key features of these
waves of political activism all relate not just to the purity of Buddhist teaching but also to
the political status of Buddhism: from reforming Sinhala Buddhism (1750-1815), to
defending the same (1860-1900), to making Buddhism an essential feature of a united and
independent state (1930-1972), and finally to fighting perceived threats (1995-2010). This
trajectory of political involvement changes as it proceeds from reviving the Buddhism of
the Sinhalas to waging a war - both spiritually and literally - in order to cement and
protect the Sinhala claims to the right to rule over the entire island and its culture. The
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uniqueness of the Sinhala ethnie, and their legitimacy as rulers of the blessed land of
Lanka: these are the recurring key themes, re-ideologized with each wave of political
involvement, of the Maha Sangha.
A study of the recent colonial history and its impact on the modem politics of
Lanka cannot escape the issues of ethnoreligious nationalism referred to above. Any study
of Lanka's present political condition requires us to adopt a historical perspective
particularly with respect to the tradition of ethnoreligious nationalism that shaped the
present situation of the Lankan polity. Studying present day Lanka is to step into her past
because her political present, as we shall see, unfolds with remarkable continuity from her
past (Allan 1992, Kemper 1991, Roberts 1981, Phadnis 1976). Stephen Berkwitz, a
scholar of modem Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, captures this continuity when he argues:
"The Sinhala Vamsa that describe how the Buddha's relics were brought to Lanka
illustrate that emotions can be cultural products that are instilled by historical narratives to
accomplish a variety of ethical, social, and soteriological ends" (Berkwitz 2003:579).
Similarly, Steven Kemper summarized that in Lanka, the present is always the 'presence
of the past'
The author of Mahiivamsa had every reason to look for continuity in the past. When
Mahanama compiled the first Mahiivamsa, he tried to make two connections - first with
the Buddha himself, making the Theravada monkhood, to which Mahanama belonged, the
guardians of orthodox belief; the second with the Sri Lanka monarchy, drawing a
connection between religion, state and what was to become the Sinhala people.
(1991:2)
In Lanka, one can see that the continuous unfolding of the Theravada Buddhist tradition
and its concomitant politics has only changed in response to outside - often-forceful -
intervention (De Silva 2001; Amunugama 1991; Keyes 1978; Swearer 1970). A sizable
body of literature is available on the historical nature of ethnoreligious nationalism and its
violent conflicts that generated the present political conditions in Lanka. These analyses
are generated from within a variety of disciplines including history (De Silva 1997, 1982;
Malalgoda 1976; Phadnis 1976; Roberts 1992), postcolonial studies (DeVotta 2007,
2005,2004; Krishna 1999), religious anthropology (Bartholomeusz 2002, 1998; Bond
1998; Deegalle 1992; Gombrich 1992; Spence 1990), and conflict analysis (Fox 2006,
2005, 2004a:715, 2004b:55, 2004c, 2003:119, 2001:53, 2000:423, 1999:289). Most of
these analyses are provided from the political standpoint of liberal democracy and
incorporate - sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly - the assumptions of modem,
Western liberal culture. In other words, they tend to argue that the current crisis in Lanka
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is primarily caused by the country's failure to implement the principles of modem,
Western democracies. Accordingly, the argument goes, the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist
claim to exclusive 'ownership' of the island and its governance denies the multi-ethnic
reality of Lankan society, thereby marginalizing and frustrating the aspirations of non-
Sinhala and non-Buddhist groups. The response from the margins in tum fueled further
ethno-nationalist measures taken by the Sinhala elites. DeVotta, for example, spells out
this argument:
The Lankan case makes clear that outbidding and ethnocentrism can become embedded
and path dependent. Indeed, many Sinhalese benefited from the ethnocentric practices
successive governments pursued and they now protest against any proposal that promotes
devolution or dispassionate governance. The fact, however, is that while these ethnocentric
practices have benefited the majority community, they have led to an illiberal democracy
and influenced the principal minority community to seek a separate state.
(2005: 154)
Five years later, following the end of the war, he further argued:
Nearly all these terms could be applied to Sri Lanka as well and the island has been
branded a 'control democracy', 'illiberal democracy, 'ethnocentric democracy', and
'ethnocracy'. That noted, during the Mahinda Rajapakse era it is authoritarianism and
nepotism that have, in the main, ruled the day. For instance, under the Mahinda Rajapakse
government, no criticism of the military and its leaders has been tolerated and those who
have reported on crimes perpetrated by military figures or corruption within the military
have been abducted, assaulted, imprisoned, murdered, and disappeared.
(2010:336)
While there is considerable truth in such claims, they fail to explain exactly why the
Lankan political culture refuses to embrace 'liberal' values and practices. This limitation
also applies to studies that specifically explored the rejection of federalism by the Sinhalas
(Horawitz 1993, 1990; Oberts 1998; Wilson 2000; Thirutchelvam 2000; Uyangoda 2007).
For example, Uyangoda, a well-noted political scientist of Lanka, defending federalism
wrote:
At a time when a fairly serious attempt is being made to find a political settlement to Sri
Lanka's ethnic conflict, it is important to defend the idea of federalism, notwithstanding
the fact that the present negotiation process between the UNF government and the LTTE
has its own drawbacks [... ]. Firstly, the framework of co-existence is usually a
constitutional model that should have the capacity to provide adequate flexibility to
determine modes of power-sharing between the center and the periphery as well as among
ethnic communities [... ]. Secondly, the post-conflict political reform exercise should be
understood. A project of state remaking in Sri Lanka presupposes a radical shift from the
unitary state model as well as the legacy ofmajoritarian democracy. The present emphasis
on federalism represents a significant conceptual shift [... ]. Thirdly, federalism should not Page 1101
be understood as a mere exercise in devolving power to the periphery. It presupposes that
the ethnic communities are equals and deserve equal worth and recognition. A discursive
shift towards equality among communities is useful to enrich our political imagination at a
time when transition from war to peace requires a great deal of creativity in
constitutionalism.
(2003:10).
In conclusion, Uyangoda firmly argued:
However, as I pointed out in this paper, resolving Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict requires
addressing some fundamentals of politics in a polity that has been tom apart by violence
and war. Sri Lanka's state needs to be re-built on pluralized ethnic foundations while
structures of power sharing should be created at state, sub-state and local levels. A
program of deep federalization should define ethnic relations in regional units of
federalism as well.
(ibid: 11).
These observations and suggestions are not atypical. While the argument for federalism in
Lanka as a means to solve the bloody ethnic crisis was logical and sensible, very rarely did
analysts attempt to unpack the Sinhala Buddhist objections to federalism. This inability to
address the core objections mainly from the Sangha reflects a 'political blind-spot' of
cultural hegemony. If the majoritarian ethnoreligious nationalism of the Sinhalas should
be the key reason for the failure of the Lankan democracy, then would it not be obvious to
explore the very foundations of such nationalism? Why have the Sangha refused liberal
democracy in general and federalism in particular? What exactly is the reason for the
apparent incompatibility of these different sets of beliefs and principles? It is not enough,
we argue, to treat the Sinhala and Sangha position as 'independent variables'. Buddhist
societies are often studied through the western analytical lenses of 'democracy" and
'nation' rather than from the perspective of the relevant society and its historical and
present socio-political anxieties. Fortunately, some recent approaches combining politics
with anthropology - as e.g. in Uyangoda and Crosby (2008) - appear to move beyond the
limitations of conventional studies. Our study too aims to contribute to removing a 'blind
spot' of cultural hegemony.
The arm of this chapter is to provide an overview of the continuous unfolding of
ethnoreligious nationalism as promoted by the politically mobilized Sinhala Sangha,
covering a period from 1815, when the British colonial rulers united the three historical
kingdoms in Lanka into one administrative unit (Mendis 2005; Duncan 1994), to the
present. We argue that this unfolding took place in a series of 'waves', with new waves
often being sparked as a response to perceived threats to the Lankan religious polity and
the hegemony of the Buddhist Sangha. We will focus on key events that sparked renewed
Sangha agitation, which then continued and often deepened the Buddhist identity politics
that was informed by the Mahavamsa ideology ever since its conception. The mytho-
historical narratives of the Mahavamsa - such as the origin of Vijaya (Strathern 2009,
2009), positioning the Sinhalas above and against other, inferior ethnicities (Schieble
2006), and making the Sangha and their interpretation of Buddhism the cornerstone for the
definition of Sinhala society and its polity (Gunawardene 1995) - never failed to energize
these historical waves of resistance.
Following brief remarks on the restoration of Buddhism in Lanka during the 18th
century, our analysis will divide history into two sections. First, we will look at the period
from 1815 to 1948, a period during which the colonial office incrementally introduced
initiatives of limited participation for the local elites, which in tum initiated the
restructuring of local politics along ethnic lines. The same period also witnessed the
emergence of a 'Protestant Buddhism' and the renewal of a vision of a classical Theravada
Society in Lanka. The second period, from 1948 to 2009, can also again be divided into
two major periods. The period from 1948 to 1983 witnessed the emergence and
consolidation of the Sinhala Buddhist hegemony and of politically sanctioned violence
against minorities, culminating in the ethnic pogrom against the Tamils living in the
South. These events in tum led to the birth of the ultra-militant Tamil separatist
movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The period from 1983 to 2009
thus sees the military struggle between the Lankan army and the LTTE. Throughout this
time, as we shall see, the Sangha were advocating and supporting a military 'solution' to
the problem, thus demanding nothing less than the military defeat and annihilation of the
LTTE. This was achieved in May 2009, marking another key moment in the history of
belligerent Sinhala Buddhism.
We will emphasize the historical dynamics that unfolded from the various waves
of Sangha resistance and politics. Moments of Sangha involvement were not isolated
events, but were connected, giving rise to a political dynamics culminating in a violent
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crisis. There are some studies on Sangha resistance during the relevant period (Stirrat
1992; Wickramasinghe 2006), but they fail to highlight the political dimension and long-
term consequences of the Sangha interventions.
The revival of the Sangha community and the renewal of its political influence
occurred during the reign of king Kirti SrI (1734-1784). The king's attempts to restore the
sasana and its administration by repairing and reorganizing a large number of temples in
the district of Kandy and other parts of the island is well documented (Coomaraswamy
1908; De Silva 1981; Malalgoda 1976; Sivasundaram 2009, 2007a 2007b; Skeen 1868,
1862). Chapters of the Culavamsa (100: 133-136) praise the King for his work. Yet despite
such praise, the king encountered opposition from both the nobles and the Sangha. The
elites held his ethnicity against him, while the Sangha did not trust him as he had been of
Saivite faith before he embraced Buddhism as his adopted religion. In spite of his
considerable contribution to the restoration of Buddhism in the country, the Sangha
considered him a non-Buddhist, and a non-Buddhist cannot be king of the Dhammadipa,
Samannakodi Disawe and Moladande Batvadana, two regional rulers, planned to have the
king assassinated and to appoint the visiting Siam (Thai) prince as their ruler (Malalgoda
1976:66). The plan found the support of Tibbotuwave Siddhartha Buddharakkhita and
Valivita Saranamkara - the Bhikkhu whom the king had appointed as Sangha-raja, i.e. as
the chief of all Sangha. In modern times, these events set the scene for the subsequent
Sangha involvement in power politics.
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2.2 Sangha and Sasana in Lanka
There is no other historical force that has influenced and shaped the very fundamentals of
Sinhala society more than Theravada Buddhism. Nearly twenty-three centuries since its
recorded arrival, Theravada faith has been the cornerstone of Sinhala culture, society and
politics (Gombrich 2006, 1988; Harris 2006; Rahula 1956). The continuous influence and
socio-political power that Buddhism and its Sangha enjoyed in Lanka could be compared
only to a few other cases such as the Orthodox Jewish priesthood in Israel (Lustick 2005)
or the Shiv Sena of India (Hansen 2005, 2001). Malalgoda observed that the notions of a
'chosen people' were "observable no less among specific Buddhist communities like the
Sinhalese and the Burmese than among the Jews" (1970: 424). Modern research has
proven that unlike many similar historic civilizations, the Sinhala civilization was
constructed around a conceptual theocratic social order where the Sangha played the most
decisive role not just in the religious affairs but also in the socio-economic sphere and very
importantly in the politics of the society (Coningham et al. 2007; Fleming 2006; Shaw
2004).
In the Buddhist trinity, the Buddha (person), the dhamma (his teaching) and the
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Sangha (the monks) are placed in a hierarchical order. Within this hierarchy, the person of
Buddha and his dhamma are considered above the Sangha in a comparative sense, yet in
practice, especially in Theravada societies, the Sangha is treated as the embodiment of
Buddha and his dhamma and accordingly has grown to be the most influential aspect of
the three. Wherever the Theravada school arrived and became established, it is the
structure and social interaction of the Sangha, the priesthood, which finally shaped both
the present and the future of the faith. This is true in almost all states, including Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, where Theravada Buddhism is established as the foundation
of social structure. The Sangha-state nexus is thus the key historical dynamic that shapes
contemporary Sinhala politics, and it holds the key to decoding the current complexity.
It is intriguing that the Sangha, as the renouncers of the secular world order, in the
process of doing so have become the guardians and guides of the same world and society
in which they are symbols of spiritual withdrawal. This tension is inevitable because the
Sangha are the bridge between the Buddhist faith and the world within which it operates.
The Sangha engage in the search for their own nirvana, marking the end of the cosmic
journey of life in samsara. This is the status that every Buddhist aims to attend. However,
the Sangha are also the teachers for the rest of the secular world to find the path to nirvana.
The Sangha, in this in-between position are only becoming the true followers of Buddha,
who himself struggled with these two conflicting responsibilities. The balancing act of
withdrawing in order to search for spirituality and yet also of staying involved so that the
dhamma will spread, recruiting believers and disciples, is an inherent tension in the life of
a Sangha. The Vinaya Pitaka - the canonical code of conduct in Buddhism - expects every
Sangha to endure and live this duality (Vin. I: 21, I: 40). This then becomes the core
philosophy of the Theravadins and their way of life. While the renouncers are expected to
live a very basic and simple life dependent on the offerings of the believers, the act of
teaching to a wider audience necessitates an institutional order. In the same framework,
when a Sangha harbors an encompassing compassion towards his whole society, he needs
the support of the king or the state and its governing mechanism (Bartholomeusz 1994;
Burnouf 2010). Thus, the Sangha in Lanka are not merely spiritual teachers but are also
the key protectors and guides of their society and every aspect of it, including politics.
This socio-political embeddeness of Theravada ethics (Smith and Froese 2008) forms the
most formidable political force in Lanka's history and present. The complexity of this
inside out (detachment) and then outside-in (re-engaging) movement of the Sangha meant
that the politics of Sinhala society have always been subjected to the religious and
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'cosmic' nature of the Sangha project. While the state and its politics eventually (and often
reluctantly) accepted the role of the Sangha in redefining the society, the Sangha in turn
established themselves as the most important influence in forming and defining the state.
The exchange of merit-collecting (puhiu: kriya) became the operational principle for this
Sangha-state contract (Becherts 1992; Egge 2002; Gombrich 1971; Keyes 1983, 1984;
Samuels 2008).
Merit collecting is the aim of every believing Buddhist. S/he collects merits in
order to be born in a better status that would lead to eventual nirvana. There is no better
way of colleting merit than to support the Sangha and Sasana. While lay Buddhists benefit
from such merit collecting by supporting the Sangha, the Sangha in turn direct the lay
people on the path to nirvana. Theorizing the Sangha-state structure, Tambiah argues that
dialectical tensions are central to this contract:
[O]ur thesis has been that canonical and postcanonical doctrines, the commentaries and the
verbalizations of the believers, the structures embedded in their myths and rites, the
patterns of their actions - which together reveal the coupling of Buddhism and the polity -
are ridden with dialectical tensions, paradoxes, and ambiguities, which occur as
parameters. By parameter, I mean that a constant component of the mix can vary in
different cases and the variations - which are impelled by circumstances and are responses
to situations - constitute the set or family of occurrences. Thus, the ideological armature
can show pulsation between modalities.
(Tambiah 1979: 516)
According to Tambiah, the Sangha and the political leaders of the state are the key pillars
of the cosmic order, and the relationship between these two forces is thus the crucial
source of order in the Theravada states:
According to the Buddhist scheme of things relating to the world, there are two foremost
or superior beings, the bhikkhu and the king, but the former is superior. The king is the
mediator between social disorder and the social order; the bhikkhu is the mediator between
home and homelessness, between a world of fetters and a free state of deliverance,
between the Buddha and the Cakkavatti as the two wheels of the Dhamma, between the
Sangha and the polity and society in which it is located, between this-worldly and other-
worldly pursuits. It is this totality that also makes Buddhism a world religion and not
merely the pursuit of a few virtuosi.
(Tambiah 1979: 12)
Recent scholarship on the Sangha-state relationship has in some ways departed from
Tambiah's classical analysis (Abeysekara 2008; Crosby 2008; De Silva 2006; Goh 2007,
2004,2002,2001; Mackinnon 2004; Rambbukwella 2008; Wijeratne 2003). For example,
Ananda Abeysekara demands that the traditional 'Buddhism-Betrayed' lenses be widened
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in order to conceptualize the terms 'religion', 'politics' and 'religious-violence' from
within a 'post-secular' order:
Rather the questions, terms, and parameters defining which persons, practices, and
knowledge can and cannot count as religion or violence, civilization or terror are
produced, battled out, and subverted in minute contingent conjunctures. Put differently,
they are authorized to come into (central) view and fade from view, to emerge and
submerge, to become centered and dec entered within a microspace of competing
authoritative "native" debates and discourses.
(2001: I)
Thus, the question of how religion and politics relate to each other needs to be approached
from within the relevant society and political system. According to Abeysekara, our
ethical-liberal political parameters always tum religion into a "problem" whereas we may
have to accept that the only appropriate way to approach religion is to consider it an
'apriority', i.e. an unavoidable social reality. Abeysekara demands a new kind of 'un-
inheriting' that will reinterpret history away from essentialist, binary positions:
So if we are to understand, religion, violence, and culture, as nonessential, "historical"
ideas, that is, as discursive traditions, or as "embodied arguments," we must, then, explore
those micro spaces in which categories like religion and violence come to be invested
with, and divested of, making authoritative meanings. The failure to do so, in my view,
leads to the uncritical reproduction of native knowledge about such categories.
(Ibid: pp.42)
Kate Crosby, similarly, showed that traditional readings of Theravada societies had always
suffered from outsider hegemony.
Social anthropological studies, on the other hand, have continued to focus on socio-
political and socio-economic power structures, taking the nation-state as their true object
of study. The parameters of this study are set by the concerns of western societal analysis
rather than the priorities and authorities of the traditions and people under scrutiny.
Pioneering attempts to assess modern Theravada in relation to its own authorities
combined these flaws, dismissing the validity of priorities, beliefs and practices that fail to
match their outsiders' decocted essence of the very partial canon that these same outsiders
had selected as authoritative, and ignoring the vast wealth of texts, both written and
otherwise, transmitted within different forms of Theravada.
(2008:2)
Many of these more recent analyses stress that the Sangha-state nexus has to be
understood from within the local political context, from an 'insider' perspective (Schober
2008). This is especially true for the Sangha in Lanka (and other Theravada states), who
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propagating the use of violence. The situation in Lanka is thus different from the situation
in Japan, Taiwan and Tibet, where the Sangha generally adhere to principles of non-
violence, discouraging violent political mobilization (Ardley 2000). In these societies, the
tradition is not Theravadin. However, it can be argued that the activities and the political
involvement of the Sinhala Sangha violates fundamental Theravada beliefs and rituals -
especially the notion ahimsii - as described in the canonical writings (Aung- Thwin 2008).
The ideology of the Mahavamsa, which presents Sinhala Buddhism as the purest
manifestation of the teachings of the Buddha (based on his three visits) and the island of
Lanka as the blessed (Sri) abode of that teaching, appears to sanction the very violation of
these teachings in order to protect them.
Allan Clement, a Sangha turned dhamma activist, has, in his ethnographical
account Instinct for Freedom (2006), recorded the brutal ethnic war in the jungles of
Burma involving the soldiers of the military junta and bhikkhus who had given up their
robes so that they could join the war. Clement juxtaposes two extreme attitudes among the
bhikkhus: some would completely adhere to ahimsa principles even when confronted with
brutal and violent oppression; and others would take up arms and kill if required in order
to protect the followers of Buddha. As Clement's analysis shows, while some understand
the noble qualities of Buddhism (metta, mudita, karuna, and upeksa) as implying, ahimsa
others understand them as a call to protect the faith community with extreme measures if
necessary. The tension between these two attitudes exists also in the individual life of each
Sangha, especially iT the political context suggests that his religion, state, or ethnie are
threatened. The Sangha thus assume that they are the ones who have to distinguish
between what is a danger to their community and what is a blessing. They become the
'gatekeepers' in charge of preserving the purity of their community.
Because of this tension, which unfolds from a quest for purity and authenticity, we
often find a contradiction between the Adhigama Dharma, the experiential dimension of
Buddhism, and the Agama Dharma, the scriptural and doctrinal level of Buddhism, within
Sangha practice. In light of these contradictions the question arises of how a Buddhist
ethic operates in practice - how, in other words, the Sangha empirically rationalize their
actions in relation to scriptural and traditional authority. How do they concretely and
individually justify their involvement in violent politics? Even more recent scholarship,
while acknowledging the urgency of the question, has struggled to find a suitable
framework for an analysis of this evident contradiction (Abeysekara 2008; Berkwitz 2008;
Page 1108
Cosby 2008; De Silva 2006; Harris 2001; Jerryson 2009; Kovan 2009; Roberts 2001;
McCargo 2009; McGranahan 2005; Samuel 2004; Wijeratne 2003; Wijeyaratne 2010). In
our study, we propose to approach the question empirically by examining in some detail
the mindset of key Sangha who over the years have advocated the political involvement of
their community. The examination and analysis of their biographies, including their
intellectual and spiritual trajectory, will form a central part of our study. As we shall see,
however, their own formation was informed by the very history of this political
involvement. Over the centuries, Sangha political agitation established itself as a tradition,
which would operate in the background until actualized in waves of mobilization, usually
in response to perceived threats to the religious polity. In order to be able to understand the
mindset of key Sangha activists, it is important to be able to understand this historical
dynamics, which is fuelled by 'waves' of political resistance and activism.
2.3 Restoration of Sasana 1750-1815
2.3.1 1750-1770: Upasampadii and the Kandy Sangha Authority
The Sinhala kings traditionally married south Indian royalty for political, military and
caste reasons. This was also the custom of Vijaya, the first Sinhala king (Mhv. VII: 69-
74). These marriage arrangements brought the Niiyakkar family of south India into the
ruling circles of the Kandyan kingdom. In 1750, the sudden death of the childless king
Vijaya Rajasimha made Kirti SrI Rajasimha (KSR), the king's first brother-in-law, the
ruler. As a way of consolidating his rule and reversing the unfavorable attitude amongst
the Sangha towards his Hindu identity, the king distanced himself from the Dutch
occupying the south coast. KSR promoted and expanded Buddhist institutions appealing
to the Sinhala masses through various popular projects. There were three basic reasons for
his evangelical Buddhist activities. First, KSR tried to present himself as the defender of
the faith protecting Sinhala interests against the political and military threat posed by the
Dutch East India Company. Second, KSR was clearly struggling against the internal elites
- even escaping assassination attempts - and thus felt the need to establish himself as a
legitimate ruler hiding his Tamil-Hindu background. Lastly, due to these threats and his
precarious situation he may have genuinely desired the comfort of the religion and the
advice of its Sangha whom he knew so well (Holt 1999, Pieris 2010:336).
The impact ofKSR's work resulted in one of the greatest revivals of Buddhism in
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modern Lanka. His support not only expanded the faith but also reestablished the Sasana,
which by this time had become nothing but a remote institution amongst the elite
Goyigama and Raddala caste of Kandy. This revival was possible largely due to the
initiatives of a single Sangha: Valivita Saranamkara (1698-1778). Saranamkara developed
an alternative way of life guided by the Vinaya and became popular amongst the laity. His
attempts to bring monks from Siam (Thailand) and re-establish the higher ordination failed
twice under king Vijaya Rajasimha. KSR, capitalizing on the situation, broke with
tradition and asked for help from the Dutch to facilitate the sea voyage of Thai monks to
Kandy, thus allowing for the reestablishment of the higher ordination process for the first
time in 300 years. KSR, under the advice of Valivita, established Asgiriya and Malvatte,
two new Sangha communities, and assigned "vast amounts of land to them" (Malalgoda
1976: 60-65). "There is hardly a Vihara of any importance in the Kandy district," wrote
Coomaraswamy, "which was not restored or newly built by him" (1956: 12). By 1765,
Kandy Sangha exerted such influence over the entire island, by royal command, that all
monks were instructed to visit Kandy in order to be interviewed and in order to have their
ordination approved. Thus, the revival of the faith facilitated the re-establishment of
centralized Sangha control in all matters concerning Buddhism and its relation to society.
2.3.2 1770-1815: The Southern Sangha Rebellion
The central control exerted by the higher (Goyigama) caste Sangha in Kandy was
unacceptable to the. lower caste coastal region Sangha, and hence they sought to
undermine this control. As an act of protest, dissatisfied southern Sangha had their very
first Upasampadii in 1772 at Totagamu Vihara, followed by another in Tangalle in 1798,
both being disapproved of by the Sangha in Kandy.
The political and military contest between the foreign colonialists and the Kandyan
kingdom was at an impasse as well. With the tension between the Kandy and the southern
Sangha in the background, it was evident that the key to gaining control was not just
military might but also the ability to influence and change the delicate social-cultural
balance. The Dutch had tried to do exactly this by attempting to assassinate king Vijaya
Rajasimha with the help of Sangha Suriyagoda Rajasundara, Valivita's teacher
(Malalgoda, pp.58-59). The political division forced the Sangha to take sides and to show
their political loyalty as they were looking for royal patronage and recognition. They
decided to seek support from their own caste's Dutch trading partners, who were willing to
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sponsor their temples and life. In 1799, Holjoti Dines De Silva Jayatilaka Sriwardhana, a
leading Salagama caste merchant with strong ties with the Dutch company, helped finance
a journey of southern Sangha to Burma for a higher ordination ritual and recognition. On
their return in 1803, the Burmese monks who travelled with them helped create a new
chapter for those who had been refused recognition by the Kandyan Sangha. This was the
beginning of the Amarapura chapter in (southern) Lanka, named after what was then the
Burmese capital. Amarapura granted higher ordination to lower caste Sangha and thus
stood as a direct challenge to the Siyam nikaya of Kandy. This was to have major
consequences later as most of the revivalist Sangha of the 19th and zo" Century in Lanka
were to come from Amarapura. Amgahapitiye Nanavimala, a dissatisfied Siyam member
of the Goyigama caste of southern origin, became the first chief Sangha of the Amarapura
chapter. However, after just a few years other castes such as Durave and Karave also
desired to have their own chapters with Sangha ordained from their own caste. In 1807,
Attudave Dhammarakkhita, who again received large financial and social support from
Sinhala traders with Dutch connections, returned from Burma to start the Riimahha
chapter. Thus, the Sangha fragmented and yet thereby gained new momentum in an
attempt to gain influence on the shifting political and financial powers in the country
(Kemper 1980:27,1984:401).
2.4 Redeeming the SinhalaLand1815-1948
Many Theravada states have histories of Sangha political involvement and resistance.
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Lanka and Thailand have a political history deeply colored by
the saffron robe and its power politics, often including violent conflicts with the state. The
Sangha's main concern is to influence and possibly control political power in such a way
that the supremacy of the Theravada faith and its ethnic and religious hegemony is
guaranteed. Accordingly, Sangha resistance spnngs into action whenever changes are
proposed to undermine this supremacy. Religious political resistance has received
considerable attention in the literature (Appleby 2003, 1999; Juergensmeyer 20 I0, 2003,
1999; Nussbaum 2007). Still, the case of Lanka is special as it combines the ethics of
ahimsii with violent politics, thus requiring the Sangha to 'reinvent' their Buddhism in the
face of anything they perceive as 'para', i.e. as foreign to the land and faith (Scott 1994,
1992, 1990, 1985). These waves of appropriation of the Buddhist tradition stretch like an
historical arc from the Mahavamsic text to the political manifesto of the Jiitika Hela
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Urumaya (JHU), the political party of the Buddhist monks, which was founded in 2002
and won nine parliamentary seats at the 2004 general election. Even at the time of writing
(September 2012) this thesis, the JHU remains a strong defender and coalition partner of
the Rajapakse government.
The period from 1815 to 1948 records a significant trend in Sangha politics. 1815
was the year in which Lanka fully surrendered to the British colonists, and 1948 was the
year in which the country gained administrative independence. On 8 March 1815, largely
due to internal rivalry and betrayal, resulting from the eccentric rule of the king Sri
Vickrama Rajasimha, the chief ministers (Adigars) signed the Kandyan Convention
surrendering the Kandyan Kingdom, the last indigenous rule of the Sinhalas. Until then
Kandy had been in many ways the center of Buddhism on the island. The subsequent
capture and banishment of king Rajasimha, an ethnic Tamil and the last king of Lanka, by
the British troops ushered in a radical period of politics and governance in the Buddhist
land. The original text and much of the background of the Kandyan Convention are
missing, thus making it difficult to reconstruct the circumstances. However, according to
available primary texts, the Kandyan chiefs, advised by the Sangha, were not only
concerned with their welfare, but with the protection of the Buddhasiisana in Ceylon.
Even at the point of surrender, they compelled the British to undertake the protection and
promotion of not just the religion of Buddha but also of its bhikkhus and their inherited
properties as places of worship. A few historical texts reproduced from the 14-point
agreement demonstrate the seriousness of this commitment:
(Sth)The religion of Buddha, professed by the chiefs and inhabitants of these provinces is
declared inviolable, and its rites, ministers, and places of worship are to be maintained and
protected."
The British accepted the condition that the Sangha and Buddhism be protected. For the
Sangha this was the essential, minimum condition they would place on their surrender to
British rule. They were drawing on a historical precedent set by the Tamil Hindu
Nayakkar kings, who had ruled the island under similar agreements. It was not the ethnic
77 Captain De Brussche L., Lettres on Ceylon, 1817, Appendix Proclamation II, page 151; similarly in
Marshall H, Ceylon, 1837, the convention IX, page 274, and Enclosure to Despatch, Brownriggs to Bathurst,
November 5, 1816, e.o. 54/61. British Library archives.
background but the hope and promise to have, in a sense, a "Buddhist ruler" that was
paramount. However, under British rule such hopes were short-lived.
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The expectation and promise that the Buddhasasana was to be protected was the core of
the compromise between the Chiefs of Kandy and the British administration. However, the
promise was not kept. The British administration deliberately but subtly sabotaged the
promise in two premeditated ways: by marginalizing the Sangha and keeping them away
from the routine governance of the colony and by formulating decrees to acquire a vast
amount of profitable agricultural land formerly belonging to the Sangha. By 1817, such
measures had further undermined the Sangha confidence and self-understanding as the
protectors and guarantors of the faith and the land. The 1817 rebellion in the remote
districts of Ova and Wellassa in the Kandy region took the British rulers by surprise. The
citizens of the region were suffering economic hardship, which contributed to the unrest.
The Sangha played a key role in initiating the protest, as De Silva explains:
This was Vibave, an ex-bhikkhu posing as Doraisami, a member of the deposed royal
family. The pretender claiming to be a Nayakkar prince is the point worth noting, both as
evidence of Nayakkar dynasty's popularity amongst the Kandyans and as an
acknowledgement as indigenous rulers. Vibave made his entry at the shrine (dedicated to a
Hindu god) of Katharagama in July 1817 soon after the annual festival there had been
brought to a close. He made a declaration that he had been chosen by the god
Katharagama to be the king. A population that was disconnected with the British rule was
very receptive to his appeal. The rebellion that broke out in September 1817 took the
British by surprise.
(DeSilva 2005:303)
The Sangha-king identity suggested in these actions is intriguing and revealing, as it
shows the Sangha attitude regarding the rightful rulers of the land. The monk Vibave was
exchanging his Sinhala identity with the identity of a Tamil prince, who was considered
legitimate by the populace. Furthermore, it is significant that he chose a Hindu deity -
Kataragama - to give legitimacy for the restoration of the association between Buddhism
and government. Tradition records that the deity Kataragama was assigned the duty of
protecting Buddhism in Lanka (Obeyesekere 1977, 1978; Pfaffenberger 1979). There were
two turning points in the otherwise successful guerrilla-style rebellion. One was the
capture of the Tooth Relic by the British forces, an event of great symbolic significance.
The Mahavamsa records how a tooth relic of Buddha was brought to Lanka, the Danta
Dhatu, which is considered the most important relic of all as it was associated with the
words spoken by Buddha (Yalman 1962:321). In the Theravada tradition, the one who
owns the Dantha will rule the Buddhist world (Berkwitz 2006; Trainor 1997). The other
was the revelation of the real identity of the monk Vibave. Possession of the tooth relic
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legitimized the British as the true rulers of the Buddhist Island. The rebellion provoked
such nationalist fever amongst the Sinhalas that the episode is still a 'living memory' in
school texts and popular culture, and modem Sangha still refer to their leadership during
the rebellion as a true example of their vocation.
The British crushed the rebellion ruthlessly and increased the separation between
the Sangha and the state. In 1832, they dismissed the special treatment given to the Kandy
region and annexed it to the island creating one unitary state. The Colebrook-Cameron
reform commission provided the legal framework for unifying British Ceylon as one
single political and economic administration. The British were not interested in running a
loss-making colony. They tried everything possible to extract profit from the island. First
cinnamon, then coffee, and finally tea plantations were introduced to interior farmlands.
By 1840, the rulers had introduced the Crown Land Encroachment Act (Moore 1989),
which vested rights with the colonists to take over any land deemed wasted or
underutilized. Traditionally the Sinhala peasants had no record or deeds for most of their
land because it had been handed down from generation to generation. The authority of
interpretation to decide to whom the land belonged was always with the British
government agent. Accordingly, the Sinhala farmers lost a large proportion of their
traditional land. The Sangha were especially affected, because they were looking after
large and often idle stretches of land belonging to their temples. Acquiring land was an act
of profit making, yet unknowingly the British rulers had stepped on the sensitive fabric of
Sangha politics by dismantling the link between the Sangha and their villages (Evers 1998,
1969, 1968, 1967), visibly distancing the Sangha from the royal courts and undermining
their economic strength.
2.4.2 1848: The Matale Rebellion
Because of the confiscation of land and the introduction of new taxes, a new Sangha led
rebellion followed in 1848 (Warren 2004, Kostal 2006). Unlike other rebellions, the
Matale Rebellion initially unfolded without elite support. The temple, which represented
religious and moral authority, and the Sangha, who were the agents of that authority, had
been marginalized and excluded from the daily governance of the island. Two of the key
leaders of the rebellion, Sinchia Fernando and Hennadige Francisco Fernando, were from
the coastal regions of Kelaniya and Moratuwa near the port city of Colombo. Possibly, in
an attempt to hide their non-Buddhist background, they adopted the names Gongalegoda
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Banda and Puran Appu respectively. The two leaders gathered support from the peasants
of Matale, The political revolt clearly also had a socio-economic background (Warran
2004).
The 1848 rebellion was a grassroots revolt against the oppressive colonialism. The
movement gained momentum as Sangha leaders based in historical Mahiyangana got
involved; Yen. Giranagama of the Dambulla cave temples also supported the revolt.
Giranagama became the rebellion's ideologue, accepted by the peasants as their Buddhist
leader. Following the traditional custom, he crowned Gongalgoda Banda as the new king
and Puran Appu as the chief commander of a new Buddhist government. The rebellion
thus aimed to restore the ancient social and political order in which a king guided by the
Sangha ruled the Buddhist land. However, the revolt was no match for a well-equipped
and trained British army. The rebellion was quickly crushed although the rebels were able
to inflict considerable damage on their British enemies (De Mills 1933; Silva 1945;
Warren 2004).
The dismal failure of the Matale rebellion left deep scars in the nationalist psyche
of the Sinhalas across the island. In response to the anti-colonial Buddhist nationalism that
was gaining strength, the Colonial Office began an initiative to restore the place of
Buddhism in the public eye, partly in order to contain the growing anger and frustration
amongst the natives. While there was no intention of restoring the Sangha to their former
prominence, a gesture was required to safeguard economic and social stability. In the face
of much criticism from the missionary lobby, which by then had arrived in the Buddhist
island in numbers and strength to convert the heathens, Governor George Anderson
opened some remarkable avenues for Sangha to become re-involved in state affairs. While
this gesture of reconciliation was meant to calm the disappointed Sangha, in fact some
radical Sangha exploited the moment as an opportunity to mobilize and agitate further
against the British. After the failed rebellion, the Sangha (almost) never again took any
part in armed confrontation with the colonists. Instead, they tried to position themselves as
closely as possible to the center of power and to advance their interests in a more indirect
manner. Two further waves of resistance in 1883 and 1915 saw the Sangha aim at other
enemies using different tactics. Instead of agitating against the colonists, whom they know
they could not defeat, the Sangha turned their attention to those who were seen as
collaborating with the regime: the Catholics, Muslims and Tamils.
While the damage caused by the loss of land was material, the Sangha would soon
have to confront what was, from their point of view, an even greater threat. The England
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based missionary agencies with their overt evangelical zeal appeared to the Sangha as the
'spiritual dimension' of the colonial threat. Malalgoda argued that it was a struggle for
'recognition' that involved the Sangha in interdenominational competitions (Malalgoda
1973). The Sangha, who were not strong enough to organize a rebellion against the
colonial regime, were at least able to respond to the challenge posed by the missionaries
by organizing protests against the encroachment on the Buddhasasana, This configuration
of forces allowed the Sangha to engage in political mobilization while appearing to remain
a spiritual force. Sangha mobilization against the missionaries focused on three areas of
activity: preaching, printed propaganda, and public education (Young and Jebanesan 1995;
Young and Somarathna 1996). By agitating against the missionaries, the Sangha were able
to utilize 'religion' as a '19th century term for ethnonationalism' (Da Silva 1998).
Sirimalwatte (2009), drawing on Spencer (2008), maintains that later political protests and
violence were a direct consequence of the ethnoreligious nationalism that was nurtured in
key Sangha temples as a result of their agitation against the missionaries.
2.4.3 1860-1875: Defeating the Wesleyan Missionaries
The missionaries in Lanka used traditional methods such as education, preaching, and
distributing printed material to advance their cause. Missionaries from the London
Mission Society arrived in Lanka in 1805. The subsequent arrival of the Baptists (1812),
Wesleyans (1814) and Church of England missionaries (1818) resulted in multiple
missionary activities in many regions, especially after the British gained control over the
entire island in 1815. Education programs supported by missions as well as church-
sponsored newspapers and other publications often questioned or condemned the Buddhist
faith, irritating the Sangha. Isolated, individual Sangha responses to these provocations
took a decisive turn when Reverend Spencer Hardy authored and published 'Kristiyani
Prajgnapthi' (KP) "Christian Doctrines" in 1849. KP, which went through several editions,
presented a more direct challenge to Buddhist doctrines. These attacks and challenges
united the Sangha who had otherwise fragmented on issues of caste, region, and order.
It is a Buddhist tradition to defend doctrine and recruit new believers through
public discourse. With colonialist confidence, British missionaries challenged the
Buddhist monks to take part in public debates to explain and defend their faith. Five public
debates, one of them later called Piinadura Viidaya, took place between 1850 and 1870.
As an unintended consequence of this challenge, the missionaries provoked Sangha
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leaders, such as Migettuvatte Gunananda, who until that point was preoccupied with his
literary work but suddenly embraced a new kind of militancy. De Silva described the
effects of these debates as follows:
Of the five debates, the first and second at Baddegama and Varagoda (both in 1865) were
conducted in writing. The Udanvita (1866), Gampola (1871) and Panadura (1873)
controversies were public debates. The Panadura debate was the most notable of them all.
There the Venerable Migettuvatte Gunananda proved himself a debater of a very high
order, mettlesome, witty and eloquent ifnot especially erudite. The emotions generated by
this debate had lasting effects on the next generation of Buddhist activists. The Anagarika
Dharmapala, for instance, came to view the Panadura debate as "the great historical
controversy between the Christian missionaries and the Buddhist yellow robed monks
[where] the Christian party [was] ignominiously defeated. This was the first moral
conquest which the Buddhists had gained against the Christians since the latter came to
Ceylon."
(de Silva 1992: 218)
The Sangha felt that they had "won" the Panadura debates. Accordingly, the period from
1860 to 1875 saw an unprecedented unity and willingness amongst the Sangha to take
their faith beyond the temple and defend it publicly. The Panadura "victory" seemed to
suggest to the Sangha that they could fight back the missionaries and colonists on their
own terms (De Silva 1998; Kloppenborg 2004; Malalgoda 1979).
2.4.4 1883: Buddhist-Catholic Riots
The violent riots of 1883 and the Sangha activities that sustained them were a
manifestation of the growing militant Buddhism among the Sangha, especially among
those in the South-West regions of the island. These regions had repeatedly suffered
colonial oppression since the 16th century, first by the Portuguese and then by the Dutch.
Both colonial masters did their utmost not only to establish their versions of the Christian
faith but also to destroy the indigenous faith and its places of worship. Available historical
records show the ruthlessness of this colonial practice. However, British missionaries went
beyond their Dutch counterparts and became confrontational and openly aggressive in
their missionary work. This was largely due to inter-denominational competition and thus
to their eagerness to establish their 'brand' of congregations and to receive state patronage.
By this time, inevitably, the missionaries provoked the Sangha and their dayakas,
In 1883, the political temperature reached an explosive level. With the arrival of
Colonel Olcott (Proch 2009; Prothero 1993; Swearer 1970), an American Buddhist
Theosophist (Trevithick 2008), to organize and support the Buddhist cause, Sangha
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political engagement became ever more mobile, strategic, and militant. Colonel Henry
Steel Olcott was a Civil War veteran who had read about the Panadura Debate, and upon
his arrival, he proceeded to support the Buddhist revivalist cause by adopting the same
techniques that were available to the Christian missionaries: the printed press, public
education and political lobbying.
On the Easter Sunday of 1883, Migettuvatte Gunananda conducted a mass rally
and procession in Kotahena, a Catholic stronghold near Colombo. The Catholics had
suffered under the Anglican administration and were not in the mood to give in to further
intimidation, even if it originated with the Buddhists rather than the Anglicans
(Bartholomeusz 1995). They attacked the procession, thereby provoking an island-wide
violent response by the Buddhists. The riots were led by the Sangha and their followers,
resulting in death and destruction. The events reflected the changing nature of the Sangha
resistance and its politics. In fact, the violent riots in Kotahena were only a surface
phenomenon. Sangha agitation regarding the Buddhist identity of the people and the land
had gone much further and prepared the people for further, more radical acts of resistance
(De Silva 198; Rogers 1987a, 1987b; Stirrat 1999, 1992; Sumathipala 1969).
The history of Sangha mobilization challenges Benedict Anderson's 'imagined
communities' thesis, which presents a 'big bang' genesis of ethno-nationalism that
depended on the rise of print capitalism. Anderson's account does not provide a valid
framework for understanding the historic realities of ethnoreligious nationalism as it
emerged among the ~inhala Buddhists. Ethnoreligious nationalism among the Sinhalas as
constructed in the pages of Mahavamsa predates the modem concept of nation and
nationalism. However, Anderson's thesis provides some help as we try to understand the
emergence of a nationalist identity among the Catholics in Lanka. The Dutch and the
British colonists repeatedly marginalized the nearly three centuries old Catholic church in
Lanka. The largely coastal community of Sinhalas who converted to Catholicism during
the Portuguese period was never accepted as a legitimate 'identity' by the mainland
Buddhists. Their 'alien' faith, culture, lifestyle and political loyalty marked them as an
'enemy within'. The Catholics, in tum, used the print media to promote their cause. The
Messenger, a weekly tabloid, became the official organ through which the church
developed and promoted her socio-politics, Catholics used their well-preserved school
system to accentuate a national identity. Those efforts were directed against both the
British and the Buddhists (Bouden 1979).
Rogers summarizes the novelty of the 1883 riots:
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Religious revival created a sense of solidarity that rioters could tap for wider support; such
a unifying force had been lacking since the Kandyan Kingdom's loss of legitimacy. The
other instances when rioting spread beyond one locality in the 19th century, the tax protests
of 1848 and the grain riots of 1866, were collections of local protests, not unified
responses based on alternative visions of social order. The religious riots of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries were motivated by an ideology that could provoke outrage in
localities not directly affected by the issue in question.
(Rogers 1978:591)
As a consequence of the 1883 riots, the state prohibited all open-air religious activities - a
harsh treatment for the practice of Theravada Buddhism. Nevertheless, the Sangha, now
better organized and internationalized, had gained new momentum to continue their
revivalist activities with a great infusion of ethnoreligious nationalism. The Sangha
demanded that Vesak, the birthday of Buddha, be declared a national holiday and that the
newly designed Buddhist flag be recognized. Olcott gave moral, legal and material support
for this wave of agitations.
Growing international anti-colonial sentiments, supported by the liberalist
approach of the colonial civil administrators, helped to strengthen the Buddhist nationalist
cause. As noted previously, the 1837 publication of the Mahavamsa in English was part of
a revival of the mytho-narrative of Sinhala supremacy and helped reconstruct the glorious
socio-political heritage of the Sangha. The revival and its underlying ethnoreligious
nationalism were nurtured under the careful leadership of key Sangha such as Gunananda
and Hikkaduve Sri Sumangala, The year 1915 was of great symbolic significance, as a
century before the Sinhalas had lost their last kingdom, and the British, who had promised
to protect Buddhism, had failed to deliver their promise (Frost 2002).
2.4.5 1915 Buddhist-Muslim Riots
The toxic political and socio-economic conditions that led to the 1915 riots are well-
documented (Ali 1981, 1984; Blackton 1970; Oep 2001; Fernando 1969; Fernando 1970;
Jayewardene 1970; Kannangara 1984; Kerney 1970). A century after the 1815 Ceylon
surrender to the British rule, frustration and anger caused by the marginalization of the
Buddhist faith were mounting. The entire socio-politics of the Sinhala society had been
transformed in a manner unimaginable to the Sangha (Jayasuriya 1977, Mendis 1954).
On 28 May 1915, the Buddhists in Gampola - an ancient capital of Ceylon in the
Kandy district - were conducting a religious procession very near to a mosque. Enraged
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Muslims challenged the Buddhists and accused them of deliberately disturbing and
provoking the Muslim community. This 'minor' incident soon spread violence and
confrontation to other parts of the island, leading to statewide communal riots and violent
conflict between Muslims and Buddhists. The riots provided the Buddhist communities
with an outlet for their anger, thus provoking extreme degrees of violence.
The general politics of the island had undergone many changes since 1883. The
colonial administration had started to realize the need to work with the local elites in the
governance of the island. Most of the Colebrook-Cameron commission recommendations
to indigenize the administration had been in place, yet the Sangha's hopes for genuine
power-sharing if not governmental control in daily politics were continuously frustrated.
Their demands, supported by well-organized campaigns, received a lukewarm reception.
As Ali (1981) points out, there were divergent political currents at a crossroads. The
Muslims in Ceylon were looking to their Indian brothers in a search for a pan-Asian
Islamic brotherhood, while the Buddhists in Ceylon were trying to protect the unique
ownership and leadership they claimed to have over the island. The colonial rulers were
far too insensitive to feel the subterranean developments in the nationalist politics of the
Sangha. They treated the riots as a rebellion against their rule, reacted by imposing martial
law, and introduced orders to shoot on sight. After 10 days, state troops had killed at least
63 people and imprisoned some key Sangha and political figures, including the future
Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake (Fernando 1969).
By the end of the riots, the colonial office had committed one of its worst blunders
in mishandling the fast growing frustration in the Sangha ranks. The decision to ignore the
signs opened the gates to a radicalized and indigenized path for politically motivated
Sangha. After his victory in the public debates, Mohottivatte Gunananda had become the
natural leader. He established the Vidyodaya Pirivena (schools) for young monks. By this
time Hikkaduve SrI Sumangala, the trusted commander of the campaign, Valigama Sri
Sumangala, another activist monk and Colonel Olcott, the key driving forces of the
Buddhist awakening, had all died and the Buddhist nationalist movement and its
aspirations were waiting for a public space to be redefined. Anagarika Dharmapala, by far
the most influential Sinhala Buddhist nationalist in the recent history of Ceylon and
hardened disciple of the theosophical movement and protege of Olcott, turned out to be
that iconic revivalist figure that the movement was waiting for. This wealthy, English-
speaking campaigner was a vibrant speaker, educated at a leading missionary school, and a
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writer who had published his own Sinhala Bauddhayii (The Sinhala Buddhist) newspaper.
Meanwhile, Piyadasa Sirisena, a prominent ethno-national novelist, edited the Sinhala
Jiithiya (The Sinhala Race). The epicenter of these divergent forces was Vidyodaya, which
would become one of the core Buddhist nationalist schools for key Sangha who would
actively reshape the political destiny of Lanka.
In the self-understanding of the Sangha, their involvement in the riots of 1915
marked a significant milestone in Sangha politics, challenging the destiny of the island and
its political culture. The two decades leading to the administrative independence of Ceylon
were tarnished by deep intra-group rivalries amongst the Sinhalas based on region and
caste backgrounds. These complications only aggravated the differences and for some
time made it impossible for any unity to unfold amongst the Sinhala elites as they
confronted Tamil political activists. Still, by the end of WW II, in the changed global
order, when the British had decided to leave the Indian sub-continent, the Sangha in Lanka
were well positioned to permanently reshape the politics of the island. When Ceylon was
ready to be de-colonized, the Sangha fraternity had succeeded in implanting a new and
dynamic definition of their role in society. Anagarika eloquently summarized the new
definition:
[... ] Buddhism (no longer) should be regarded as "other worldly". [... ] For Buddha
desired "the evolution of social order which aims at the perfection of mankind and doing
full justice to the rights of man." [... ] The Buddha was a "social revolutionary", who
urged his disciples to adopt a "socialistic way of life"; indeed, he was a staunch
"democrat". [... ] Marxism was a leaf taken from the Buddhist books. The early Sangha
were "real communists" and theirs was a classless community. If Buddhism is to have a
new birth, it must become a social religion, a synthesis of the Buddhist tradition and
progressive humanism.
(Guruge 1965:547)
Based on these ideas, Sangha politics was widening the boundaries of a 'Protestant
Buddhist' ideology. The ethno-nationalism promoted by the Sinhala Sangha made non-
violence and other virtues of Pali Buddhism look artificial and restrictive, and the
primordial ethnic affiliation became the most natural and centrifugal force for their social
engagement. They thereby continued to replace the present with the past. They aimed to
infuse the present social order with the ancient political model in which the Sangha, rather
than the society, were at the center of political power. The extraordinary interest in
Oriental ism and remarkable archaeological findings at the time, supported by the
modernist nature of the Victorian British rule, only helped to foster such thinking and
furthered its structural political mobilization (Almond 1998, Blackburn 2011).
Encouraged by the charismatic leadership of Anagarika, Walpola Rahula, a
bhikkhu from an upper middle class family in the deep south of Lanka, entered the
intellectual discourse on the role of the Sangha in the changing context. He is considered
to be one of the most influential, academically able and intellectually profound Sangha in
modern Ceylon. Being the first Lankan monk to enter a secular university and earn a
foreign degree, he was well suited to the role of theologizing the modern role of Sangha.
Rahula, who we will discuss in detail in the next chapter, in many senses intellectualized
the modern Sangha social conduct. His 1947 paradigmatic analysis, Bhiksuvage Urumaya
(later published as Heritage of a Bikkhu in 1972), became the textbook for the future
Sangha political agenda. Rahula gave leadership in drafting and formulating historical
political documents such as the Vidyiilankiira Declaration of Bhikkhus and Politics, and
the Kdlaniya Declaration of Independence - a manifesto demanding total independence
from the British. Through the collective impact of these developments, by the middle of
the 1940s, the Sangha had once again positioned themselves as the most important actors
in the realpolitik of Lanka. Sangha
political mobilization had one pnmary goal: to reinstall the Mahavamsa glory of
Theravada Buddhism and to restore the role of the Sangha as the politically dominant
force. They sought to revert to the pre-colonial social order in an attempt to organize the
social structure along the lines of the Theravadin cosmic order in which the Sangha
occupied the epicente!. The removal of colonial rule was seen as a precondition for such a
return. The Sangha who initiated and guided such mobilization now had the support of a
growing class of elites who had once been 'nobodies', but who after a century of
commercial dealings with the colonialists and after benefitting from the open education
system created by the missionaries, had become 'somebodies' (Jayewardene 2000). By
1948, the ethnoreligious nationalism of the Sinhalas had become a socio-political force
that extended beyond the walls of the Sangha temples. The new form of ethno-nationalism
in Sinhala politics was prominently led by the lay elites. During this second period of
resistance, the Sangha exchanged their avant-garde role for a secondary position as
advisors to organized political parties and their leaders. This era witnessed serious splits
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based on caste and chapters in the already divided Sangha community. They tended to
support either the growing leftist movement or one of the Sinhala majoritarian parties,
largely depending on their regional or caste affiliations (Jayewardene 1972; Matthews
1989).
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2.S Defining the SinhalaNation 1948-1983
2.S.1 1948: Ethnicizing the elections
After decades of repeated attempts at constitutional reforms, the Colombo elites accepted
the Soulbury Commission report and its proposal as the constitution for an independent
Ceylon (Edrisinghe and Selvakumaran 2000). The Soulbury Commission was the third
colonial commission to review the transfer of power in Ceylon and to recommend a mode
of self-rule. For the British, the stable and smooth transfer of power must have been a
comforting achievement in comparison with the turmoil they faced in India and Burma.
The Colombo elites, while divided in their ethnic political ambitions and agendas,
nevertheless managed to find unity in their support of the leadership of D.S. Senanayake
(DSS). DSS, a key leader of the Temperance Movement and loyal supporter of the
Buddhist cause, was an agricultural entrepreneur with deep nationalist and western values
(Fernando 1973; De Silva 1982; Senanayake 1985). He was sympathetic to minority
concerns and was able to provide strong leadership to the divided Sinhalas and managed to
reach out to extremely determined individuals like nationalist SWRD of the Sinhala Mahii
Sabah, and G.G. Ponnambalam of Ceylon Tamil Congress. DSS may have hoped that the
elites would honor the constitutional guarantees and lead the island towards a working
democracy.
The independent government formed on 4 February 1948 reflected the political
demography and stood as a symbol of fragile hope. However, beneath the overt signs of
unity, the political foundations had developed deep cracks along ethnic, linguistic, and
religious lines. Ethnically motivated political activism such as SWRD's Sinhala Maha
Sabah and the Tamil Congress slowly eroded the fragile unity, while the ever-influential
radical section of the Sangha emerged with a new political agenda supported by
theological justification. The first government of Ceylon, however, was unwilling to
address these issues. It feared the growing popularity of the leftist parties among the urban
working class and the immigrant Indian laborers in the plantations. The pro-western
United National Party (UNP) led by DSS - a wealthy planter himself - eventually
introduced the Citizenship Act in an attempt to both neutralize the leftist power among the
economically crucial plantation section and consolidate the rural (largely Sinhala)
conservative vote. The Citizenship Act disenfranchised nearly 600,000 Indian Tamil
workers and their seven constituencies in the Assembly. Amitha Sashtri noted:
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Thus, Senanayake's partisan and shortsighted efforts to consolidate an advantageous
coalition with Kandyan elite at the expense of the Estate Tamil immigrant workers had the
long-term consequence of increasing the importance of and resort to racism in the political
rhetoric and mobilization in the following period.
(Shastri 1999:84)
A section of the educated Sangha developed a keen interest in leftist movements
and trade union politics. As shown by Jayewardene (1984, 1977), the leftist movement,
trying to lead the national awakening onto a Leninist path, was still managed by
nationalists who were thinking along ethnic lines as they were looking into the future. The
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) (the Equal Society Party) was an upper middle class
socialist outfit. In 1935, sons of wealthy merchants had undertaken graduate studies at
prominent universities in the UK. They embraced the changes in Europe and tried to
replicate them in their native country. N.M. Perera, who did his PhD research on the
German constitution and the possibility of a greater Europe, was an effective LSSP leader
(Moor 2007; Woodword 1962). Later in 1948, a breakaway group formed the Communist
Party (CP). These two pioneer groups, like their numerous factions in later years,
romanticized the concept of an equal society, but their deeply rooted religious and ethnic
background never permitted them to break away from their Sinhala nationalism. Thus
Ceylon, during the early years of independence, was struggling with two types of
nationalism: an ethnoreligious nationalism with a rural mass following driven by a
nostalgic vision of a mythical past, and a socialist nationalism that was pursuing ideas of a
revolutionary future. On both fronts, the Sangha made their powerful cultural contribution.
H.L. Seneviratne summarizes the developments:
A group of monks who followed Dharmapala to Calcutta (India) and had been exposed to
Indian nationalism there later made Vidyalankara (the Sangha University) the center of
their intellectual and political activities. These monks continued to talk about socialism,
but this has to be distinguished from the international socialism of the Marxists. Theirs
was rather a "Buddhist Socialism". Increasingly it became more "Buddhist" than socialist
did, and by the mid-1950s, it turned into a hegemonic Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism.
(Seneviratne 1999:131)
Itwas during this transition and due to the deep factions amongst the Sangha that the Yen.
Walpola Rahula gained considerable influence on Sangha politics. In 1947, Rahula
authored and published Bhiksuvage Urumaya, the text that cemented his status as a
Buddhist leader. Rahula inspired a large number of powerful Sangha including
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Yakkaduwe Pragngarama, Kotahene Pafifiakitti, Kallalle Anandasagara, and Nattandiye
Pangngankara, who all became extreme ethno-nationalists.
In 1952, just four years into his rule, DSS, the first Prime Minister and the iconic
rallying point of Sinhala politics, died in a horse-riding accident. His United National
Party went into disarray as they searched for a new leader. After many internal struggles
Dudley Senanayake, son of DSS, was asked to lead the party and the island. Dudley was a
reluctant activist. His Buddhist beliefs and behavior were far more innocent than the
politics of the time (Jennings 1954). The falling demand for tea and rubber, the island's
key exports, and the food demands of a rapidly growing population were having an
adverse impact on the rural areas. The rural masses were disappointed and angry that they
had to suffer more hardship under self-rule than under colonial oppression. 1956, an
election year, provided the ideal context for the masses to vent their social frustrations and
the opportunist political parties were more than happy to harvest the results.
2.5.2 1956: Ethnoreligious nationalism institutionalized
SWRD Bandaranaike was the only son of Maha Mudliyar (chief interpreter to the
government) Sir Solomon Dias Bandaranaike, an Anglican by faith of the Horagolle estate
in Aththagalla near Colombo. Young SWRD was educated in the Christian culture and
faith at St Thomas' College, the pre-eminent missionary school. Later at Oxford, he
studied local government and federalism and became the student union president. On his
return Bandaranaike took to politics and became the minister for Local Government in the
first Cabinet headed by DSS. Yet SWRD was, in the words of Manor:
A utopian idealist and ardent opportunist, a progressive and parochialist, an egalitarian and
an imperious snob. He was a rationalist with fascination for the paranormal, an
occasionally radical free thinker who helped to conserve many central elements of the
existing order. He was vain and often shameless in pursuit of power.
(Manor 1989: 1)
In contrast with his earlier idealist suggestions that Ceylon should adopt a Swiss style
federal model combined with a greater political and military affiliation with India, SWRD
pursued an ethno-Sinhala vision of the future of Lanka. He could not wait for the normal
process of party politics to endow him with the leadership he desired. In 1951, he broke
ranks with DSS and formed his own Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). For this he used the
basic network of contacts that he had cultivated among the rural masses and the Sangha
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through his Sinhala Maha Sabha (The great assembly of the Sinhalas), a movement which
he formed in the late 1930s arguing for the supremacy of the Sinhala ruling powers.
Through the effective use of power politics, Bandaranaike introduced two key ideas into
the public consciousness: the ethnic superiority of the Sinhalas and the privileged and
blessed nature of Lanka as the place where Buddha once walked. SWRD was perhaps the
third personification of the Sinhala Buddhist consciousness of modem Ceylon. The first
was the Anagarika, who called for a spiritual recovery; Rahula then provided the
intellectual and theoretical context for the revival, and Bandaranaike capitalized on these
contributions in order to mobilize political power and institutionalize it for the long term.
At the 1952 election, his new party was able to secure nine out of ninety-five seats in the
assembly and became a strong opponent to UNP rule.
The 1956 election could not have escaped these wider realities. It was the 2500th
anniversary of Buddha's birth. Bandaranaike launched his election campaign calling on
the Sinhalas to rediscover and return to their heritage. He urged the Sangha, native
doctors, schoolteachers, farmers and laborers (eeeo,(3'E)~, q?61, (3'roJ5, 2:i)C!)2:S)61) to form the
new five forces (Paficha Maha Bala Vega) to rebuild a nation based on Buddhist values.
He gained leftist support by promising a new national economic and foreign policy. In
rural Ceylon, he argued for the urgent need to re-establish the lost culture of the Sinhalas,
led by their language and Theravada Buddhism, and promised to restore, once in power,
the Mahavamsa prestige of the Sangha. As a result of these promises, in April 1956
SWRD won a landslide victory and became the country's Prime Minister. With a prime
minister who stood for Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, the institutionalization of
ethnoreligious nationalism in Lanka proceeded at great pace. The Sangha and their politics
were to change their trajectories permanently after 1956.
2.5.3 The politics of Venerable Mapitigama Buddharakkhita (VMB)
VMB, the chief Sangha of the historic Kelaniya temple, played a role second to none in
the personal and political life of SWRD. In the early part of 1956, using his extremely
powerful position, VMB formed the Eksath Bhikshu Peramuna (the United Sangha Front),
which campaigned for the official status of the Sinhala language, supporting SWRD's
candidacy. He was also a key member of the commission formed to investigate the status
of Buddhism in Ceylon at the time. In a strategic move prior to the elections, the
commission released its report, Betrayal of Buddhism. It argued for the restoration of the
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Buddhasasana, which had been betrayed by the British and their colonial collaborators,
and demanded a new Buddhist government.
VMB, using his cultural position and influence over the SLFP party and the newly
formed government in 1956, became a kingmaker in every sense. He was as powerful as
an unofficial cabinet minister of the SWRD government. He used his Sangha Front in
order to mobilize rural monks for political rallies and agitations. His association with the
temple of Kelaniya and its wealth allowed him to become an effective power broker, and
he used his position to acquire considerable wealth for himself and others. It was
predictable, therefore, that his support for SWRD would fade. Various events and
developments turned VMB and SWRD into political rivals. VMB's repeated requests for
business contracts on behalf of his powerful friends, SWRD's proposal for paddy land
reform as a result of which the Kelaniya temple would lose a large amount of idle land
(Manor 1989: 277-9), as well as VMBs alleged sexual relationship with Health Minister
Mrs. Wimala Wijewardene, a widow activist with extreme nationalist views, were just
some of the events that triggered a deterioration in the relationship between VMB and
SWRD. Eventually VMB moved to openly oppose his political leader and initiated
country-wide riots on at least two occasions: first, in response to the Tamils' refusal to use
the Sinhala 'Sri' prefix and, second, in response to SWRD's proposal to share power with
the Tamil political leader C. J. Chelvanayakam. These riots turned VMB into the leader of
a movement that unleashed violence against Tamil civilians across the island, discrediting
SWRD (Manor 1989: 302; Vittachi 1958; Wriggins 1960). It is suspected that VMB was
also implicated in a failed coup to poison SWRD in early 1959 as well as in the latter's
assassination by Venerable Talduwe Somarathana, one of VMB's Sangha affiliates, on
September 25, 1959. In Lanka, the radicalization of Theravada Buddhism under the
influence of political Sangha continued during almost every transition period as witnessed
in 1956, 1965, 1971, 1977, 1988, 1994 and 2000 (DeVotta 2007). However, most of these
involvements were indirect and conformist until the Sangha participated in the 1971 and
1988 revolts led by the Janathii Vimukti Peramuna (People's Liberation Front), the
nationalist Maoist party of rural Sinhala youth. These events marked another key threshold
in the unfolding of ethnoreligious nationalism.
2.5.4 1971: The Sangha and the armed rebellion
The first ten years of post-independence rule in Lanka were primarily driven by elites and
failed to reflect the common aspirations of the people. The 1956 government came to
power on an ethno-nationalist promise, but soon faced difficult global conditions for
Lanka's export economy. These difficult conditions combined with a rapidly growing
population, which put pressure on the country's welfare system, meant that by 1970 the
Lankan government had to borrow money at commercial rates from the IMF just in order
to keep its daily operations going.78
In May 1970, a new government headed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the widow of
SWRD, was elected for the second time on a socialist and nationalist platform. Janathii
Vimukti Peramuna JVP (People's Liberation Front) was one of the several leftist groups
within and outside the parliament that supported the new government. It was led by
Rohana Wijevera, a medical faculty dropout from the University of Lumumba in Moscow.
There is a large volume of literature on the socio-political conditions that paved the way
for the birth and growth of the JVP as a radical political mobilization of youth leading to
the insurgency of 1971 (Baharati 1976; Keaney 1977, 1975; Moore 1989, 2007;
Obeyesekere 1974; Samaranayake 1999, 1997; Warnapala 1975).
On 5 April 1971, JVP led a coordinated attack on over 100 police stations and
brought parts of the country under its control (Arasarathnam 1972; Kearney and Jiggins
1975). As a founding and indeed leading member of the Non-aligned Movement, Lanka
appealed to a wide range of countries to provide help in what seemed a desperate situation.
The US, Britain, Russia, India and Pakistan responded to the government's plea and
supplied weapons and material. The Sirimavo government eventually crushed the revolt
and arrested the JVP leaders. Up to that point, the JVP rebellion was the largest example
of civic unrest in the modem history of Lanka. The rebellion is the subject of many studies
(Moore 1989; Samaranayake 2008; Venugopal 2010). These studies offer a wide range of
explanations for the revolt, with one of the more popular theories arguing that the revolt
was driven by educated but unemployed rural youth led by leftist ideologies; another
suggestion is that the revolt was part of a Cold War conspiracy against the Lankan
government. However, it was later established that 94% of the insurgents were Sinhala
Buddhists and another 4% were Sinhala Catholics. The majority of the groups sustaining
78 For a detailed account of the island's financial liabilities, see the Budget Speech [1970-1971] by the Hon.
Dr. N. M. Perera, M.P. Minister of Finance, Colombo on October 25, 1970.
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the revolt came from the Goyigama and Karave castes of the southern region, indicating
that the revolt was also a revolutionary Sinhala-Buddhist movement.
In fact, one of the remarkable features of the 1971 revolt was the extent of direct
Sangha participation in the rebellion, resulting in the largest number of Sangha to face
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violent death in modem Lanka until the second revolt of the JVP in 1989. Economic, caste
and class aspects notwithstanding, the Sangha involvement suggests that the revolt
intended to restore a more radical Sinhala-Buddhist social order and that indeed successive
governments in Lanka had not been radical enough in working towards such an order. The
influence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism within the JVP clearly overshadowed its
socialist ideologies, thus setting a pattern that would continue until the 1989 revolt and
beyond as the JVP opposed any power-sharing with the Tamils.
Sinhala Sangha politics have often rallied around key written texts and manifestos.
In the post-colonial context, two booklets especially ignited the ethnic imagination of the
Sangha and informed their political involvement. The first is Bhiksuvage Urumaya by
Walpola Rahula, published in 1947, and the second is The Revolt in the Temple, published
in 1953 by Don Charles Wijewardene, a member of the powerful Wijewardene family of
historic Kelaniya, to commemorate "2500 years of the land, the race and the faith". While
the former provided justification for the political activism of the Sangha, the latter called
for a rediscovery of Sinhala ethnic supremacy against the competing minorities, especially
the Tamils. Jonathan Walter characterized the 700-page volume as follows: "It constitutes
a blunt statement that the Tamils are a threat to that historic mission and lays out
Wijewardene's blue-print for a post-independence Sinhala Buddhist state which has
gradually become a reality" (Walter 1996:82).
As Amunugama has shown (1991a, 1991b & 1985), the link between the Sinhala
Sangha and their counterparts in Calcutta prior to independence created a socialist ethos.
Politically active Sangha in fact were seen supporting the UNP, the SLFP as well as the
socialist parties in the first decades of independence. Because of their disappointment with
the mainstream UNP and SLFP parties, more rural and young Sangha were attracted to
radical leftist politics by the end of the 1960s. The socialist/Trotskyite parties in Ceylon
denounced the parliamentary system and romanticized an armed revolution. It is in this
context that the book Revolt in the Temple and the political thesis that it projected
intensified ethno-nationalism among the Sangha. Difficult economic conditions
contributed to the desire for a new government and in fact possibly for a new political
system. This attitude was far more common amongst the educated youth. The national
foreign debt, which was 200 million rupees in 1955, had rocketed to 1235 million rupees
by 1970, and around 700,000 people were unemployed, i.e. nearly 25% of the workforce
(Gordon and Rankaduwa 1992; Lim 1968).
The full extent of Sangha involvement in the revolt was revealed only after the
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revolt, when the victorious government arrested and interrogated many of the rebels. It
appears that rural young monks, who were more educated in a secular sense than their
seniors, willingly offered themselves for the armed cause. They borrowed the JVP line of
argument that in order to be a true Buddhist (monk), one had to defend the Buddhist land
of Lanka even at the risk of death. The emotionally appealing Maubima Ndtinam
Maranaya (Motherland or Death) doctrine assigned to the Sangha the responsibility to
shape the politics of this world, so that the dayakas may live in a better world, in which
they could live in accordance with the principles published in the key works. Young
monks used their temples as nodal points in a network of cell groups in order to plan and
propagate the JVP ideology. Though no member of the Sangha was tried as a leader of the
failed revolution, moderate estimates suggest that between 2000-3000 killed and another
300079 monks were either arrested during the period because of their direct involvement.
The JVP revolt of 1971 showed how the yellow robes could be used for violent
politicization, and it demonstrated the Sangha readiness to act in an organized manner and
to take up arms if necessary to protect religion, race, and land. The year 1971 thus became
a turning point in at least three senses: first, it made it obvious to everyone that the Sangha
- who until then had mainly been members of a few loosely arranged 'patriotic'
organizations - were ready to become radical political activists. Second, it highlighted the
state-Sangha relationship as a key problem for any present or future government; and
finally, it permanently altered the relationship between the laity and the Sangha. From now
on, the Theravada Sangha could be both otherworldly guides to nirvana and armed
defenders of their land and ethnic group (Abeysekara 2001; Jeganathan 1997).
2.5.5 1983: The Sangha and the ethnic pogrom
Some commentators have called the 1983 ethnic pogrom against the Tamils in Lanka a
'genocide'. The event clearly marked another turning point in the country's fragile
democracy. The 1977 general elections brought the UNP back to power with an absolute
79 Suchnumbers are very diificult to be accurate. The records show that at least 4000 monks underwent
state sponsored 'rehabiitation'
majority, winning 140 out of 168 seats.80 J.R. Jayewardene (JRJ), a pre-independence
Ceylon National Congress activist and the author of the 1944 proposal to adopt the Sinhala
language, became Prime Minister. JRJ was known for his pro-Sinhala stance and extreme
conservative and pro-western economic policies. With a clear majority, he was able to
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change the election system from a first-past-the-post to a preferential representation vote.
He then proceeded to appoint himself as the first US-style president consolidating extreme
power in the executive (De Silva 1979; Warnapala 1979). The Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF), which had campaigned on a nationalist platform, won 18 seats and became
the official opposition. JRJ tried to gain the TULF's support for his pro-western economic
policies but failed. His frustration grew when the northern Tamil political demands
provoked sporadic outbreaks of violence. The TULF was highly critical of JRJ's UKlIMF-
funded mega projects such as the Mahavali River diversion because they resulted in the
Sinhala colonization of traditional Tamil areas.
During the District Development Council elections in 1981, UNP-Ied security
forces burnt the historic library in Jaffna, which was considered a home for ancient Tamil
literature. In 1982, JRJ extended his government through a referendum, evading an
election; he also intensified the militarization of the Tamil areas. In response, Tamil armed
youth mounted several attacks on the state security forces. In July 1983, one such attack
killed 13 Sinhala soldiers. The news of the killings sparked an emotional and violent riot
against the Tamils living in the south.
The riots consisted almost entirely of attacks on the Tamil minority by the majority
Sinhalese. While the scale of the violence may not warrant the use of the term 'genocide',
the attacks almost certainly exceeded the 1958 and 1977 anti-Tamil riots. The destruction
of Tamil property vastly exceeded anything seen before, with, for example, at least
seventy factories in the Colombo area wrecked and 70 to 90 per cent of Tamil shops and
homes looted and burned in many areas. At least 135,000 Tamils living in Sinhalese areas
fled to refugee camps while tens of thousands more hid elsewhere. The government's
figure of just under 400 deaths is a serious underestimate" This was only possible
because far more of the violence was organized than on previous occasions. In qualitative
terms, the summer's "violence represents one of the nine or ten worst spells of face-to- face
viciousness (without technology to provide distance) to occur anywhere since the Second
80 See Election Dept. http://www.slelections.gov.1k1pdf/General%20Election%20 1977.PDF,
Accessed on 30 March 2009.
81 While to-date there is no official investigation into these riots, it is estimated that 4000 Tamils were
assassinated during the two weeks of violence.
World War". Extreme acts of sadism and mutilation were far from un-common at the
height of the troubles. (Manor 1983:450)
At least three different factors are often considered as the reason for such
unprecedented Sinhala violence. First, it is argued that the violence was a spontaneous
Page 1131
over reaction by a section of the Sinhala population who were particularly affected by the
Tamil attacks. Second, some commentators hold the view that the violence was an
opportunist exploitation of the criminal elements in the south, providing an excuse for the
pogrom. Finally, it has been suggested that the violence was a carefully organized and
state sponsored anti-Tamil campaign in order to tame the nationalist Tamil polity. It seems
obvious that the island-wide pogrom against the unarmed Tamils could not have happened
without the encouragement of the state or sections of it. One key feature during the riots
was the leadership given by the Sangha. Traditionally when Sangha lead a procession of
whatever kind or purpose, no one - not even the security forces - tries to intervene. UNP
leadership with the help of the Sangha cleverly diverted the initial anti-government anger
so that it turned into hostility towards the Tamil civilians. While the direct involvement of
the Sangha was not on the scale of the 1971 JVP revolt, the sizable Sangha group that was
involved still managed to cause damage that the island had not witnessed before. While
the direct participation may have been limited, the silent endorsement of the campaign by
the greater portion of Sangha once again confirmed their sympathy for Sinhala hegemony;
it also showed that they were willing to at least tolerate violence as a means by which such
dominance could be achieved.
Following the experience of the 1971 revolt, the radicalized Sangha had found a
new reason for joining the political forefront: to fight the Tamil separatists. By mid-1982,
a large number of young Sangha had gathered under the JVP banner in order to safeguard
the motherland. Venerable Palipane Chandananda - a well-known critic of the UNP and
its policies headed the Asgiriya branch of Siyam Nikaya, Key individuals like Venerable
Maduluwawe Sobitha of the Kotte Temple and Muriththettuwe Ananda occupied
prominent roles. In mobilizing the Sangha these actors now had two targets rather than just
one: the pro-western government and the armed Tamil separatists. The 1983 anti-Tamil
riots showed the intensity of the Sinhala violence as it was led by both pro-UNP and anti-
UNP Sangha. It was evident that the Sinhalas were willing to take part in actions that
directly contradicted their Buddhist doctrine in order to protect the Sinhala ethnie and
Lanka. They preferred to be 'Bhumi-Putra' instead of Buddha-Putra: sons of the soil, not
sons of Buddha (Amunugama 1991).
2.5.6 1988: Armed Sangha and the second JVP revolt
The ethnic riots of 1983 changed modem politics in Lanka permanently. From among the
many militant groups operating in the country, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Page I 132
(LTTE) emerged as the most violent and most committed to a separate Tamil state. With
the support of the Tamil Nadu and Indian governments, the Tigers became equal to or
more powerful than the Lankan forces in some areas of the country. By 1987, the Tigers
managed to bring 90% of the North and East (roughly 113 of the island) under their
military rule. Yet due to the influx of Tamil refugees to India, the pressure from the Tamil
Nadu state government, the demands of the Lankan Tamil political elites and, finally yet
importantly, India's own regional power interests, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
virtually forced Jayawardene to sign the Indo-Lanka peace accord on July 29, 1987. The
'Accord' aimed to create nine provincial councils to devolve political and administrative
power to the regions with a special focus on the Tamil area. The accord also included a
process for disarming the Tigers, which they refused to sign. The main opposition
including the JVP vehemently opposed the accord. A reluctant JRJ also let his cabinet
members openly oppose the accord, some promoting street violence, which led to an
attack on the visiting Gandhi by a naval guard. The Sangha once again marched on the
streets advocating violence against the state, looting, and burning state properties. In the
process, some Tamil/Indian properties and personas came under attack. The accord failed
to achieve its aims except for the arrival of 80,000 Indian troops in the Tamil area to
disarm the Tigers, leading to a bloody Indian-L TTE clash (Bullion 1994; Cooper and
Berdal 1993; Dixit 1998; Rao 1988).
In December 1988, at the end of JRJ's term, the UNP candidate Ranasinghe
Premadasa (1924-1993) won the presidency by a narrow margin. Premadasa, who was of
humble beginnings with a lower caste background, pursued an ambiguous approach to the
Tigers. A strong opponent of the accord, he tried to negotiate with the Tigers while their
terror politics of suicide missions and city bombings continued. The dual failure of the
government to win the war and to undermine the Indian sympathy for the Tamil demands,
and finally the change of the 'unitary' constitution paving the way for the introduction of
Provincial Councils provided strong rallying points for a new JVP campaign. In late 1988
and early 1989, the JVP mounted its second revolt, one that was even more violent and
bloodier than the 1971 revolt.
In 1988-89, the violent involvement of the Sangha in the second JVP revolt went
even further than in 1971 (Pfaffenberger 1987; Uyangoda 1989, 2000, 2010, 2011;
Venugopal 2010). Long before the second armed struggle, in 1972, the more ethno-
nationalist Sangha had forced the Sirimavo government to declare Buddhism the state
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religion, to establish Sinhala as the supreme language, and to change the official name of
the country from Ceylon to 'Sri' Lanka. The 1972 republican constitution, introduced
without a referendum or a debate, largely followed a Westminster model with an executive
prime minister, but with the judiciary subordinated to the parliament. This provision
would enable the Sinhala parties, who always had the majority, to overpower any minority
opposition (de Silva 1976; De Silva 1979). It further removed articles 29 (I) and (2) of the
Soul bury constitution which guaranteed minority rights (Edrisingha and Selvakumaran
1999, 1990). These developments were justified as a response to the mounting pressure
from the Tamils, who were increasingly resorting to violence as a means of forcing
political negotiations on the issue of shared rule.
In this shifting context - constitutional changes, and a hardening of the JVP stance
against India, against any power sharing with the Tamils, against the LTTE, and against
the UNP government - the Sangha found a new space for political involvement and
recognition as mainstream politics moved towards their brand of ethno-nationalism, More
than any other party in the country, the JVP systematically exploited and fueled violent
Sangha mobilization. The JVP had more members from the rural youth than any other
similar organization and exerted great influence among university students. JVP is pro-
Buddhist, pro-Sinhala, and pro-poor rhetoric attracted young Sangha, who in tum
organized themselves in a cross-nikaya network in association with JVP branches outside
of their temple orders. An important side effect of these activities was the revival of many
old Sangha organizations and the creation of many new ones.82 Among these
82 Examples include the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (Samasta Lanka Bauddha Maha Sammelanaya); the
Buddhist Theosophical Society; the Young Monks' Patriotic Organization (Deshapremi Tharuna Bhikhsu
Peramuna); the Organization of Patriotic Sinhalese Youth (Deshapremi Sinhala Tharuna Peramuna); the
Young People's Patriotic Project (Deshapremi Tharuna Viyaparaya); the Students' Patriotic Organization
(Deshapremi Sishya Peramuna); the Sinhalese Buddhist Organization (Sinhala Bauddha Sanvidhanaya); the
Sinhalese People's Organization (Sinhala Janatha Peramuna); the Sinhalese Progress of Women
Organization (Sinhala Kanthabhivrudhi Sanvidhanaya); the Monks' Organization for Humanity
(Manavahithavadi Bhikhsu Sanvidhanaya); the New Buddhist Revolutionary Group (Nutana Viplawakari
Bauddha Kandayama); the People's Organization to Fight (lanatha Satan Peramuna); the Up-country
Monks' Three Nikaya Organization tKandurata Trinikayika Bhikhsu Sangamaya); the Monk's Three Nikaya
Group (Trinikiiya Bhikhsu Balamandalaya); the People's United Lanka Front (Eksath Lanka Mahajana
Sabha); the Sri Lanka Buddhist Greater Congress (Sri Lanka Bauddha Mahasammelanaya); the Sri Lanka
Sinhalese Buddhist Congress (Sri Lanka Sinhala Bauddha Sammelanaya); the Movement for the Defence of
the Motherland (Mawbima Surekeemy Viyapara)
organizations, the Mawbima Surakeemy Viyapara (MSV) and Deshapremi Janathii
Vyaparaya (DJV), which were largely led by young Sangha, became the most violent
agents of terror. Young Sangha in these movements opposed their senior monks and
accused them of betrayal if they failed to support the mobilization of the people against the
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security forces and the government. Many records published later revealed that young
monks became informants and indeed even collaborators in the assassination of their
senior monks by DJV members (Gunasekara 1999; Manoharan 2008; Tambiah 1992).
It is correct, of course, that the Sangha had rebelled before. However, the 1988/89
revolt was a novelty in the recent history of Lanka because of the level of destruction and
violence committed. While there are no official figures available, it is estimated that some
5000 Sangha were killed during the revolt. Sangha who had previously taken vows of non-
violence and renunciation took up guns and murdered even their own peers. The same
jungle that was once their meditational abode had turned into a violent training camp. The
Sangha, who are to lead their laity towards nirvana, had become an anti-state army. While
JVP may have provided the platform for such a drastic transformation, the 1988/89 revolt
and the Sangha involvement show the Sangha as an active political force engaged in
another historical wave of resistance against what they perceive as dangerous threats to
their ethnie and island.
2.6 Conclusion
From this cursory survey of key moments in Sangha mobilization, we can observe that in
each wave of resistance, the Sangha were able to claim societal, cultural and political
space to promote their agenda, and this agenda acquired sharper contours as their
ethnoreligious nationalist project took shape.
Internal Era Nature External
Factor Factor
Theravada Hegemony Before 1505 Protectionist Buddhism Vadas/
Hinduism
Loss of Political power 1506-1832 Patriotic Buddhism Catholicism/
Calvinism
Theosophical/Olcott 1832-1948 Protestant Buddhism Christian
Missionaries
Minority Demands 1948-1995 Predominant Buddhism Power-sharing
ideas
Political Humiliation 1995-2009 Pugnacious Buddhism LTTE terror
It is intriguing that until the mid-1900s - in spite of the Mahavamsa account of the Tamil-
Sinhala relationship - ethnicity was not the key issue underlying Sangha resistance. In
fact, in the early 19th century during the Vellassa Rebellion, leaders such as Venerable
Wilbawe aimed to mobilize both Sinhalas and Tamils against the colonial rule.
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Furthermore, the Matale Rebellion was led by two Catholics from coastal regions. It could
be argued that modem power relations took an ethnic tum at some point between the
administrative reforms following the Colebrooke Cameron and Donoughmore
Commissions. The McCallum (Jayawardena 1970; Wilson 1988) and Manning
(Rajasingham 2001) reports introduced ethnicity as a fundamental principle of political
representation, thus linking ethnic identity and political power.
The Sangha, as non-state actors, have used resistance politics throughout the
recorded history of the island. The history of this resistance has been analyzed from a
variety of perspectives. The approaches from the classical sociology of religion, inspired
by thinkers such as Weber and Durkheim, have generated a considerable volume of
literature (Malalgoda 1976; Orryu and Wang 1992; Smith (eds.) 1978). However, many of
these studies struggle to free themselves from the colonial heritage. Oriental anthropology
for some time found itself to be a key interpreter of the Sangha-society dialectic. Yet most
of these "outsider" observations seem to fail to appreciate the political dimension of
Sangha activities (Ortner 1995). Critical post-colonial analyses have also tried to decode
the resistance of the Sangha, yet they struggle to understand the continuity underlying the
recurrent waves of resistance. Moreover, how and why do these waves energize a
primordial ideology within a modernist context?
The political resistance of the Sinhala Sangha also shows facets of indigenous
protest by a regional minority against the decomposing effects of a cultural globalization
in which they seem to lose their traditional power bases and cultural hegemony. Still, the
empirical evidence shows that the resistance itself makes use of the modem democratic
social space. Furthermore, the rapid adaptation of, and preference for, a modem life-style
with its new forms of technological and social forms of knowledge and power among the
political Sangha to some extent embraces global trends. This ambiguous complexity is
also reflected in the fact that Sinhala Sangha resistance does not seem to fit into Appleby's
typology of traditional or national religious resistance (Appleby 2000).
We suggest that it is beneficial to look at the social psychology of Sangha
resistance from a political science perspective (Wald and Silverman 2005). Sangha
resistance unfolded within the context of an exclusive claim to power by the Sinhalas
against the democratic demands of power sharing by a minority (Berkwitz 2003; Harris
2001; Sivasundaram 2007). The mytho-history accepted by the majority of Buddhists
legitimates the violent Sinhalization of the land. It further justifies the Buddhicisation of
the island, even by violent means. These key paradigms of Sinhala Buddhist ideology are
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about power politics and concomitant claims to 'ownership' of the island even though
during the period under consideration the issue at stake was the governance of a
multicultural if not multinational island involving a process of democratization and its
failure. However, even with the tools of political science, it remains impossible to find a
singular all-encompassing framework for the analysis of Sangha resistance because, as
discussed, key behavioral determinants are extraneous to the political system.
Decoding Sangha resistance is difficult also because it operates on at least two
different levels within the dominant politics. First, at the conceptual level, the Pali canon
of Sinhala Buddhism intellectualizes their cause. Secondly, at a societal level, the
resistance is articulated in collective protests, often involving violence. At a conceptual
level, the Pali literature of Sinhala Theravadin Buddhism supports both a total pacifism -
as embedded in the notion of - as well as a limited 'just war thesis' leaving room for the
militarization of the Sangha as for example during the time of King Gamini and in modern
Thailand (Bartholomeusz 2002; Jerryson 2009; Mhv. XXII: 13-30). The canons also
support the co-existence of other religious traditions as equals. However, as we have
argued previously, the influential moral rationale for Sangha resistance in Lanka is drawn
from the Vamsa literature. The Mahavamsa and its colonial translations represent the
crucial Vamsa text. As we noted, the Mahavamsa both in its structure and as a narrative,
justifies Sinhala Buddhist supremacy and presents Lanka as a land owned by (or at least
bestowed to) the Buddhists (Mhv. XXI; Rambukkwella 2008; Scheible 2004; Sirimalwatte
2007). The political engagement of the Sangha in Lanka is implied and encouraged by the
texts of the Mahavamsa as the key instrument for the creation of a collective bond of a
'chosen people' (Crosby 1999).
The complexity underlying waves of Sangha resistance refers to vanous
dimensions of social and political struggle and is historically conditioned. Sangha-state
relations can switch quickly from interdependency to mutual exploitation depending on
the various interests at stake. Sangha resistance also refers to a struggle for leadership
between the South and Kandy and entails a dimension of caste struggle. There is an
economic aspect, especially for the laity who supports these Sangha. Resistance has often
come from a semi-urbanite, lower middle-class Sangha section from Siam Nikaya (of the
south) and Amarapura, populated by the Durave and Karave caste. These dimensions are
part of the socio-anthropological background of the political problems we are
investigating.
The Theravada school of Buddhism claims to hold the salvific abhidharma for the
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nirvana of the individual. It differs from the other branches of Mahayana and Vajrayana
philosophies of Buddhism (Gombrich 1995, 1998; Trainor 1997) and is considered the
earliest and most conservative school. The Mahavamsa narrative, framing the identity and
social space of the Sinhalas, stresses this exclusive soteriological position. Throughout
their history, the Sinhala Sangha have positioned themselves as the protectors of the
'chosen people', their faith, and their 'promised land' ideology. Whenever the chosen
people and their claims are challenged, the Sangha offered resistance. In the earliest times,
they resisted different interpretations of the texts within their own school (Bechert 1970),
later they resisted the teachings of different schools (Chandawimala 2007). Mahavamsa is
the record of kings who were either supported or opposed by the Sangha. The Sangha
resisted the invading Hindu kings of India; they resisted the Sinhala kings who failed to
maintain the close association of state and temples. Then the Sangha resisted the colonial
invasions and occupations.
In the post-colonial period, Sangha resisted Western values as well as the life-style
of their indigenous rulers. From 1956 onwards, they resisted attempts to undermine the
supremacy of the Sinhala language and culture. During the 1960s, their resistance targeted
attempts to design and implement mechanisms of power sharing with the country's
minorities. In 1971, the Sangha took up arms against a state perceived to be betraying the
'Sinhalaness' of the land. In the 1980s, their violent acts of resistance were justified
against the background of the separatist terror politics of the LTTE. In the 2000s, they
resisted the efforts of the international community to broker a liberal peace agenda. In the
first decade of this century, their resistance manifested itself in the support they gave to
the 'military solution' to defeat the LTTE, which was comprehensively achieved by mid-
2009. The eschatological nature of the Sangha resistance did not stop with victory. In the
post-L TTE era from 2010 onwards, the Sangha have mounted their resistance against the
UN, INGOs and their local partners who have demanded an investigation of alleged war
crimes.
In recent years, Lanka has witnessed the continuing political mobilization of the
Sangha, who were pursuing two objectives: first, they mobilized society in order to
support the military effort against the separatist rebels and their political demands and,
second, they were looking for new and more effective ways of institutionalizing their
ethnoreligious nationalism. By mid-2010, the fraternity of the Sinhala Sangha seems to
have successfully achieved these ends. In May 2009, the Lankan army pulverized the
entire leadership of the Tamil Tigers, using methods that international observers have
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described as "war crimes." Notwithstanding such accusations, the Sinhala Sangha have
given their unconditional support to the war effort and its post-LTTE triumphal ism. While
to the wider non-Buddhist observing world this may appear as a contradiction, those
familiar with the Sangha outlook understand that for the Sangha, their commitment to their
ethnie, its royalty, and the land will always supersede in importance the commitment to
the canonical Pali texts.
Nationalism and its ethnoreligious interpretation is not an 'imagined' phenomenon
in the Sangha-led society of Lanka. Instead, it is a historical, institutional, and operational
dynamic interwoven with the structures as well as the agencies of the wider society.
Ethnoreligious nationalism has historically rejected not only the Western model of civic
nationalism, but also the centuries old plurinational nature of the island. History in Lanka
is seen only from an ethnoreligious nationalistic perspective. There is no other history than
the one offered (and accepted) by the texts of the Mahavamsa, It is a history written by the
Sinhala Sangha for Sinhala Buddhists, justifying Sangha politics even if they demand
violence. In this construction, the past was glorious, prosperous, and righteous because it
was essentially Sinhala and Buddhist. The present is evil because its identity is impure,
contaminated by non-Sinhala, non-Buddhist elements. Therefore, effort is needed to revert
the present to the past, a specific version of the past in which Sinhala Buddhism was the
unquestionable and exclusive source of meaning. The Sangha have given practical and
ideological leadership to this quest for a 'return' to the purity of the past. The fact that this
quest has provoked a violent response - from the non-Buddhist 'others' has not in any way
shaken Sangha determination. On the contrary, the resistance provoked by the Sangha
only confirmed the seriousness and righteousness of the Sangha cause, which in tum led to
an intensification of the conflict.
The texts of the Mahavamsa are very clear on this point. According to the
Mahavamsa, the conqueror King Dutthagamini considered the '®(S):J~ ~~((' (dumb Indian
Ocean) and 'tl)ltJ ®((@@',:J' (Gruesome Tamils) an ever present threat to his land, race and
faith (Mhv. XXII: 80-90). Dutthagamini's lamentation is not so much an attempt to
acquire land or space; in other words, the problem is not just one of defending a country in
the world of concrete political and military action. Rather, the historic 'Dhammadipa'
refers to the rightful home of the Buddhist faith and the Sinhala race - the principles
evoked refer to eternity rather than the next battle. The vision is one of cosmic proportions
rather than political practicality. Similarly, King Dutthagamini justified the war against the
Tamil king Elara, who was a just ruler, not just as a conquest within the realm of power
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politics but as an attempt to reclaim the land that was once Buddhist (Mhv. XXI: 10-38).
This was the land where Buddha walked. This is the only Dhammadipa of the Sinhalas
and sharing this eternal 'breathing space' was simply not negotiable.
By mid-20 I0, after the military victory, this framework has become part of the
state agenda, directly dismissing the many nuances of liberal democratic rule. Sinhala
Sangha politics in this fonn has challenged many of the predominantly Western
assumptions that modernity would put an end to ethnoreligious nationalism. While
recently Western scholars have come to appreciate the reality of religion in politics,
Sangha ideology itself has remained a historical constant. The cosmic vision of the
Mahavamsa remains the key foundation of Sangha politics. The challenges faced by the
Sangha - in the form of external conquest, internal plurality, relativizing democracy, and
diffusing globalization - have not led them to depart from their way of perceiving history
and the world; on the contrary, the Sangha outlook operates in such a manner that it
expects to be challenged.
The fact that it finds itself 'under siege,' attacked from a range of forces - some
concrete, some abstract - only confirms the necessity of the struggle. If we fail to
understand the peculiar logic of this dynamics, we also fail to understand that
commonsense power-sharing proposals - federalism - will be perceived as a threat and
provoke Sangha resistance regardless of how well meaning these proposals are. The
proposal of peace itself may intensify the conflict. As a 'global minority', the Sinhalas -
with a language that is not used anywhere else, and with a 70 million strong Tamil/Hindu
population just 24 kilometers across the sea who traditionally have sympathies for Lanka
Tamils - have developed a 'triple minority mindset', clinging on to faith, race and land.
Even after the ruthless victory over the equally ruthless - and once thought to be
invincible - forces of the LTTE, the Sangha refuse to 'rest.' The military victory is just
one moment in the ongoing and continuing cosmic struggle. They continue to try to
influence and shape Lanka's polity in accordance with their vision, and for that, they are
ready to face the next challenge.
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Chapter 3
Three Sangha activists and their politics
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3.1 Introduction
The possibility that a system of faith and its agents could influence intra- and inter-state
relations is alien within the realist framework in political science, which privileges a
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narrow definition of power. However, the potential influences of'theopolitics' (Hoffman
et al. 1994: 86-90) should urge us to rearrange our focus. A reconsideration of the role of
faith within political systems is an important and urgent task.
For the Lankan context, much of the literature on Buddhism and its relation to the
ethnic conflict may be classified as either theological essentialism or ethnic reductionism,
both of which have serious limitations. Theological essentialism takes religious doctrine as
its point of departure, whereas ethnic reductionism sees religion as a static aspect of ethnic
identity (Brekke 2009). The previous chapter explored how the Sangha have enjoyed the
hegemony of interpreting the past and shaping the present through their political activism.
Yet the contemporary Sangha community and its influence on the politics of Lanka have
not received the attention they deserve from a political science perspective. Traditionally
most research done on the Sinhala Sangha falls into two key categories: first, there are a
number of ethnographical studies of single village laity-Sangha and their monasteries
(Bunnag 1973; Evers 1967; Stenski 1983; Swearer 1976, 1970). The second category of
works analyses the Sangha in terms of their relation to society and the state (Bond 1992;
Gombrich and Obeyesekere; Mendelson 1975; Malalgoda 1976; Schober 1995;
Seneviratne 1999; Tambiah 1976). Only a few studies on the Sinhala Sangha and their
political role are available (Abeysekara 2008a, 2008b, 2006; 2004; Bechert 1970, 1973;
Carringer 1979; Deegalle 2004; Frydenlund 2005). Even here, the theoretical templates
used are not able to explain the phomenominological process of Lanka.
In order to understand Lankan political dynamics it is essential to study the way in
which the Sangha provide the social, political, and cultural memories and interpretations
and, in return, how the masses make the Sangha a symbol of political authenticity, stability
and continuity. The aim of this chapter is to trace the cross-fertilizing dynamics between
Sinhala Buddhist ethnoreligious nationalism and the worldview of three selected Sangha
activists as they affected the local politics between 1990 and 2010. The chapter will
reconstruct their worldview and perception towards the minority political demands in
Lanka and the 'unitary' ideology they advanced.
3.2 Sinhala Sangha Activists
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returning to the Mahavamsa (and other Vamsa literature) text to re-energize their
ethnoreligious polity is a specifically Sinhala Sangha tradition (Bond 1992; Tambiah
1989). The Sinhala Sangha have constructed and textualized an ethnoreligious nationalist
politics, which, as presented in the pages of the Mahavamsa, gravitates around three key
dynamics: Sinhala Buddhism, Sinhala ethnie, and the unitary status of the island.
The exact number of total Sangha and siimaIJera83 presently living in Lanka is
unknown." The island does not have systematic data on such matters as robing or
disrobing ordination is a private and spiritual affair of each temple and nikaya, but
estimates put the number between sixty and seventy thousand.Y The majority of Sangha
do not engage in secular politics and are for the most part indifferent to, or silent on, the
role of the political Sangha. As we will see later, a section of the largely urbanite southern
Sangha dominate the political mobilization of the monks. Most of these southern Sangha,
unlike their Kandyan counterparts, are deeply dependent on their lay supporters, who in
return patronize the Sangha for their caste affiliation and political motives. The Sangha
society at present is structured as followsr"
Chapter/Region SiyamlKandy Amarl!l!ura/South Riimaiiiia/South
Main Caste Goyigama
Malvatu Branch Karave and Durave mixed region! mixed
Asgiriya Branch but mainly Salagama
caste
Strength 35,000 Sangha 18,000 Sangha 7,000 Sangha
5,000 temples (M) 2,000 temples 1,000 temples
700 temples (A)..
Splits among the Sangha - based on caste and sub-caste affiliations continues (Kemper
1980). Today there are approximately fifty different sub-chapters, with most of them
appointing their own chief Sangha (Hemasiri 1990).87 Tambiah (1992) and Obeysekere
83 sramanera is a novice monk who has not been fully ordained through the Upasampada
ceremony.
84 Author's interview with the Ministry of Buddhasasana
85 Interview with Ministry of Buddhasasana, 10June 2011. Numbers are only approximate.
86 Interview with a number of Sangha in Colombo, Kandy, and Matara
87 Also see C0ZJ):J~t) IDZJ):J"'2S! 8(Jat; ~!5):JdZi]dz, (Details of Nikaya in Lanka), Department of Buddhist
Affairs, Colombo, 1984.
(1974) Kerney and Jiggins (1975) argued that caste, in addition to nationalist ideology,
was an important factor in the Sangha participation in the 1971 and 1988 armed rebellions.
Jeffrey Samuels, after extensive field research conducted as recently as 2007, shows that
caste is a key factor through which the Sinhala Buddhists experience their religiosity
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(2007).88 A noble birth - to a mother who is a paragon of virtue, into a high caste, in a
blessed place - is an integral part of Theravadin teaching on personal worth, as based on
conditions extracted from Buddha's life and teachings.i"
It is noticeable that the Sangha of Siyam and Amarapura nikaya
have taken a more proactive role in politics in comparison to the Ramafifia. Age, seniority,
caste, wealth, family background, political connections, and the ability to mobilize
wealthy members of the lay population are key factors within the sasana structure. Only
very rarely, will a Sangha break all these barriers and become influential purely based on
his spiritual abilities. For example, the revivalist Gangodawila Soma was of the Durave
caste and his popularity remained restricted to the southern region. Sangha Panadure
Ariyadhamma of the 1980s was considered the last monk who was accepted across the
divide. He too was a goyigama and was from the Siyam nikaya,
Within this complex system, in order to be influential and
able to mobilize opinion (whether spiritual or socio-political), one had to be strategic in
appealing to the wider community. The majority of lay Sinhala Buddhists agree that the
primary role of a Sangha is a spiritual one. Nevertheless, they appreciate and follow those
Sangha who advance political ideologies to protect their Rata (country), Jiithiya (ethnie)
and Agama (religion). This is the basic nature of Sinhala Buddhist practice: to put country
and ethnicity before religious ethics. It is historically embedded in the .Sinhala socio-
political psyche that the island belongs to Buddha and thus only to Buddhists. Piijiivaliya,
a 13th century Sinhala classic by Sangha Mayurapada, states "c:t® CO?:i)J<e5~c.:J §~Z5"lc:tcd' ®<:S)J
~~dIDZ5"l r.sJHlil'[):)(S)Jdc.:J2::ifDIZ5"lm" (This Lanka is like the treasure house of Buddha's triple
gem) and again "§~Z5"l ~~ c2::if~5Z5"l" (from Lanka owned by Buddha) (Pujavaliya 1930;
Suraweera et al. 2000: 699&746). Furthermore, the legitimacy of rulers is closely linked
to the ruler's Buddhist identity. Bhikkhu Deegalle Mahinda, citing Don Martino de Zilva
Wickremasinghe says: "Before the Pujavaliya, the tenth century Jetavanarama slab-
88 For further discussion on the impact of caste amongst the Sinhala Sangha see Malalgoda 1976: I06-161;
Roberts 2002; Dissanayake and McConatha 20 II; Rogers 2004: 52-77
89 The Nidana-katha is the lengthy introduction to the Jataka book that narrates 550 previous births of
Buddha. See Jataka vo!.1 pA8 (http://www.sacred-texts.comlbud/jl/index.htm). Accessed on March 10
2010.
inscription (No.2) of [King] Mahinda IV (956-972 C.E.) vividly expressed this idea that
'none but the Bodhisattvas would become kings of prosperous Lanka'." (1999:344)
This chapter will focus on three Sangha who continued the tradition of these
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interpretations in that they opposed power-sharing, advocated military victory and
fundamentally redirected the politics of Lanka during the period of our study. This is not
to argue that there were no Sangha activists who worked for political peace and social
justice." However, those who argued in favour of peace and justice often lacked the
essential connection to the rural masses for two reasons. First, their appeal to follow the
principles of Buddhist ethics was dismissed on the basis of the raging emotional and
nationalist temper and, second, many Sangha who argued for such a position were urbanite
liberals, often educated outside the island, and could not marshal a temple/caste/nikaya
network. These Sangha lacked emotional and traditional militancy and thus their impact
remained negligible.
Within the scope of political science, understanding the processes of accessing and
using power, individually or collectively, requires us to study those who aspire to alter the
course of their society and thus create and use these processes. The social dynamics
activated and sustained in modem Lanka by the politically active Sangha activists cannot
be analyzed without learning about their lives and the primary motivations underlying
their political engagement. How did these politically active Sangha square the circle and
advocate violence on the basis of Buddha's teachings? In order to be able to trace the self-
understanding of the Sangha, this chapter will provide detailed studies of the lives of three
key Sangha who were in many ways responsible for changing the broader political
paradigms and the outcome of the war/peace process during the period from 1995 to 2010.
As the forcesof globalization shook the foundations of traditional social securities
of societies like Lanka (Stoke 1998), these Sangha, following their heritage, found a new
and more energized moral authority to venture beyond the sacred and intervened in the
secular. Within this context, the political order was failing, largely due to the protracted
ethnic war. While the greater portion of the Sangha community watched the development
with passivity or did nothing beyond wishing for an immediate dramatic change, a section
90 In recent times Venerable Baddegama Samitha, who took a liberal view of the peace process, was the first
Sangha to be elected to the parliament on a People's Alliance ticket in 2001, though as an individual
candidate. The Venerable Madampagama Assaji of the Inter-Religious Peace Foundation (IRPF) and Scholar
monk Oeegalle Mahinda of Bath Spa University, UK are two other Sangha who argued for the ethics of
positive peace in Lanka.
of Sangha choose the route of direct political intervention. This mobilization produced a
few key actors who emerged as "yugapurusha" - individuals who could symbolise a
particular moment in time and synthesize the forces that were struggling for articulation.
As the separatist war continued to dominate the affairs of the country, and as the political
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authority failed to find a new direction, these Sangha became the natural focal points for
public life.
The three Sangha to be considered in this chapter and their periods of influence are
as follows:
1. Venerable Walpola Rahula 1995-1997
2. Venerable Gangodawila Soma
3. Venerable Athuraliye Rathana
2000-2003
2004-2010
These three Sangha were selected for a number of reasons, which we will explain as we
introduce them on the following pages. The analysis of their self-understanding in our
selective biographies will help us understand why federalism, instead of providing a
solution, fuelled Sangha hostility and agitation.
3.3 Venerable Walpola Rahula (1907-1997)
Throughout the 2300 years of their history, the Sinhala Sangha performed two
fundamental functions: protecting and promoting Sinhala Buddhism and fighting those
who were a threat to their faith/practice. During the period from 1995 to 2010, as in earlier
periods of history, many members of the Sangha came forward to interpret, influence, and
redirect the politics and ultimately the state of Lanka.
For a number of reasons, I have selected the work of Venerable Walpola Rahula to
explain this political phenomenon. He deeply influenced the politics of Sangha society
prior to the period under study, de-contextualized the Mahavamsa ideology and managed
to use its interpretation for political agitation and mobilization. He also gave leadership to
oppose the peace process. My aim is to uncover the key motives of this learned Sangha
who had renounced this world and yet returned not just to the world but also more
specifically to the world of politics, thus preparing the contemporary path for the political
engagement of the Sangha.
Rahula was always referred to as a monk, and we follow this tradition, but
it is interesting to note that he was a very unusual monk. He did not take the Upasampadii
until very late in his life. He spent almost all his life as an siimanera, with only the lower
ordination. Living as a novice granted him more freedom, allowing him to move around
and live where he pleased. An samanera receives the lower ordination - pabbajjii - so it is
not wrong to say that he was ordained. (Bowden 1893: 159-161)
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3.3.1 Rahula's society
In many states, the last few decades of the 20th century saw the beginning of a rapid but
systematic de-secularization of the public space. The process could be violent - with 9111
as an extreme manifestation - but the phenomenon had deeper trans formative effects
within as well as between states. Some have labelled this a 'new cold war' (Juegensmeyer
1994) or an apolitical 'de-secularization' (Beyer 1999) generated within a particular
religious discourse (Haynes 200 I). However, on closer inspection, dialectical negotiation
between sovereign state power on the one hand and non-state spiritual power centres on
the other is neither new nor restricted to a particular faith or state. Almost all major
religions, whether western or eastern, renouncer or redeemer, monotheist or polytheist,
have sought sovereignty, even before the idea of a state came into existence. The
church/king association as well as the idea of ummah or dharmaraj are well documented
in the annals of political history. Yet, while the politics of religion has received the
attention of a growing number of comparative political scientists, the great majority have
focused on global or regional trends (such as globalization, transnational diasporas,
international religious terrorism, etc.), at the cost of ignoring the micro-dynamics of this
process of de-secularization. The power of religious individuals to shape and direct the
mind-set of a society is largely ignored, or at best marginalized.
By the middle of the 1940s the British Raj, whose contribution to the Allied cause
in Europe had come at a high cost, was forced to rethink its colonial politics. This was
especially the case in Asia, where Russia and China had emerged as new and permanent
power blocks (Duara 2004; Elbaum and Lazonick 1984; Jones 1982). Holding on to 19th-
century colonial politics was bound to bring more harm than benefit. This realization
prompted a change in post-war foreign policy, compelling the British Government to draw
up plans to withdraw from India and Ceylon almost simultaneously. By this time,
Mohandas Karamji Gandhi's tactics had ignited the struggle for freedom in India, and the
confluence of many factors with Gandhi's new non-violent political agitation made India's
political independence inevitable by the late 1940s.
Lanka stood to benefit from this major regional realignment, even in the absence of
any similar charismatic leadership or mass agitation for independence among the Lankan
political elites (Manor 1996, 1989, 1983, 1985, 1979). Instead, the political class, which
had largely benefited from the trade and plantation sector of the British administration,
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sought only a comfortable compromise with the colonists. The exclusive and inter-related
families at the top of the power structure in Lanka preferred to continue most, if not all,
forms of colonial ties, which conferred immediate benefits on them as a ruling class
(Jayawardane 2002; Moore 1989). At the same time, as has often happened in the
country's history, the politically motivated, often urbanized, middle-class sections of the
Sangha saw an opportunity to become involved and to regain their historic influence.
However, Lanka's politics was never determined by laymen alone. It was the Sangha who
first embraced the radical spirit of the Indian freedom movement. Two Sangha academic
centres in the island by then had produced many influential monks who were positioning
themselves as key social authorities. Anthropologist H. L. Seneviratne (1999) has vividly
documented the social transformation of these monks, as they exchanged their lokuttara
(supramundane) spiritual responsibilities for laukika (worldly) secular power politics.
Anne Blackburn (2010) traced the influence of individual Sangha such as Hikkaduve Sri
Sumangala in this transition. They moved from guiding society spiritually to political
agitation for a specific world order. This was a natural extension of the pioneering work of
the lay Buddhist revivalists Anagarika Dharmapala and Henry Olcott. The Dharmapalites
who travelled to India for Buddhist missionary work had witnessed the radical political
transformation sweeping that land. They had also experienced the transforming role of the
religious authorities in shaping the politics of the country towards becoming an
independent state. These mobilized Sinhala Sangha were keen to generate a similar level
of social activism and impact in Lanka. The faculty of Vidyalankara'" was arguing for the
formation of a more radical opposition, aiming to transform the immediate political future
of the island. Among them, Walpola Rahula was a powerful orator and writer.
91 Vidyalankara (in Peliyagoda, north of Colombo) is a key Pirivena-Sangha training-center started by
Venerable Ratrnalane Dhamrnaloka in 1875. The other Bhikhu pirivena is Vidyodaya, started by
Venerable Hikkaduve Sri Sumangala in 1873. These pirivenas were the centers of Sangha reform during the
zo" century revival.
3.3.2 Life and early work
The work of the Venerable Walpola Rahula aligns with the process of Sangha
politicization outlined in Chapter 2. The deep influence he exerted prior to the period
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was due in part to the manner in which he used the Mahavamsa as a sacred history, giving
rise to an activist ideology, which inspired him, and, through him, his fellow Sangha
fraternity.
Rahula was born in the Walpola area of the Matara district, in the deep south of
Lanka, on 9 May 1907. For many historical reasons, southern Lankan Buddhism had
always been the radical stronghold of an agitating Protestant Buddhism (Kemper 1980;
Malalgoda 1976).92Rahula's social background reflected this, as it was steeped in the long
and proud history of radical reformist Buddhist political engagement. Rahula entered a
temple school as a boy and was ordained as a novice by the age of fifteen. A promising
student, he continued with Buddhist studies alongside his secular curriculum, including
mathematics and English literature. The fact that Rahula entered a secular university -
what was then Ceylon University - may have caused suspicion among his contemporaries.
The opportunity to read and study secular literature caused Rahula to challenge some of
the basic popular notions and practices of the Sangha of his time, and the young monk
soon became popular for his critical engagement with the traditional establishment of the
temple and it's social (in)activity. Rahula took to reformist preaching - calling on the
institutionalized Sangha to rediscover their lost heritage.
Rahula disseminated his calls for reform through a series of pamphlets published in
1933-4 under the title e.:l25fG'~:f~~ a25f82Sl:> Satyodaya Patrikii ("Truth-revealing papers").
Learning from the success of Christian missionaries, who used printed material to support
their evangelical efforts, Rahula found the free distribution of his printed views on
Buddhism, Sangha, and Sinhala society to be a far more effective method of social
engagement than the limited alternative of preaching at temples to those who were willing
to gather there. In hindsight, Rahula was keen to use whatever medium available to
advance his argument in favour of redefining the role of the Sangha in society towards a
more active political involvement.
92 Anagarika Dharmapala, Hikkaduve Sri Sumangala and Mohottivatte Gunananda are three examples of
southern Buddhist reformists who advocated radical political changes in modem Sinhala Buddhism.
In the early 1940s, Rahula became an active participant in protests fighting for fair
wages and improved working conditions organized by workers from major plantations and
trading companies - whose owners were often British investors. As a young, articulate
monk, he was a natural leader in protest activities. Rahula's radicalism and his support for
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the Marxist-Leninist parties threatened to undermine the established order. In late 1946,
Rahula was imprisoned for a while with key leftists like N. M. Perera and Phillip
Gunawardana for his active role in organizing labour strikes. As often happens when a
radical leader is imprisoned, the experience only made him a more determined social
reformer (Cuthberston 2004; Rodriguez 2006). After his release, Rahula issued a more
serious reformist appeal, first to the Sangha Samaja and then to the broader Sinhala
society, including lay Buddhists and their political leaders. He gained popular support for
his criticism of established, property-owning senior Sangha, for their abject failure to lead
Sinhala society to its full potential. At this stage Rahula's social agitation was based on the
universal compassion inherent in Theravada theology, which seeks first spiritual liberation
and happiness for all.
Rahula by now fully comprehended the potential of the written word, and in late
1946, he published a manifesto for the future in the form of a small yet well-articulated
book. 'tf3tdS[)@a!c,dl8",' Bhiksuvage Urumaya" (The Heritage of the Bhikkhu) was in
many ways an answer to the traditionalist critics. The book eventually became the manual
for contemporary Sangha politics in Lanka. Published two years before the British left
Lanka, Rahula's comparatively short yet strategic and well-formulated intervention laid
the foundation for a redefinition of the role of the Sangha in an independent Buddhist state
after 438 years of European colonial occupation. All modem Sangha activists, irrespective
of their affiliation or ideology, have used this book and its core argument as their
justification for secular political activism. As of 20 10, the work is in its fourteenth edition
and thousands of copies were distributed to almost every functioning temple library in the
island. Urumaya in many ways permanently altered the traditional understanding of the
dialectical relationship between the Sinhala Sangha and the society in which they live.
93 Bhikshuvage Urumaya was first published in 1946 in Colombo and its 14thedition was published in 2010,
by S Godage Publishers, Colombo. Its English translation by Venerable Walpola Rahula was published in
1974.
3.3.3 Bhiksuvage Urumaya
Bhiksuvage Urumaya, a work that "has influenced the monkhood more than any other in
the recent history of Lankan Theravada Buddhism" (Seneviratne 1999: 135), retains
historical importance for at least two reasons when analyzing modern Sangha politics in
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Lanka. First, the Urumaya represented the collective articulation of a pre-independence
discourse of the activist Sangha. Second, it laid the ideological foundation for the post-
independence Sangha politics. Largely middle-class and urbanised, with above average
education and exposure to European or regional societies, these elite monks were eager to
construct a social order where the once glorified positions of power held by the Sangha
would be re-established in independent Lanka. The Vidyalankara faculty, which envisaged
a modern Lanka defined only by her Buddhist past, led the discourse and acted as the
bridge-builders between a past - as envisioned in the Mahavamsa - and an imagined
future, in which the Sangha would take centre stage in the social and political order of
Sinhala society.
Urumaya was not an isolated work. At least two previous texts paved the way for
Rahula's publication. One, the "Declaration of Vidyiilankiira ", was published on 13
February 1946, when the entire faculty of Vidyalankara unanimously put forward a text
that called for a radical re-establishment of the powers of the Sangha in the political
system. In concluding their Declaration, the faculty claimed:
... The divorce of religion from the nation was an idea introduced into the minds of the
Sinhalese by invaders from the West, who belonged to an alien faith. It was a convenient
instrument of astute policy to enable them to keep the people in subjugation in order to
rule the country as they pleased...
(Rahula 1974: 133)
Vesna Wallace has recently shown (2010) that, in arguing for a new social order, the
Sangha at Vidyalankara borrowed from the past and re-introduced the principle of
"integrated governance" of Buddhism and Sinhala ethnicity. From this perspective, a truly
indigenous polity would have the Sangha at the centre of authority even though they are
not elected in any democratic sense and are only representing the Sinhala Buddhists. This
perspective was significant, springing from a Sinhala Buddhist ideology where violence, if
needed, was justified within the context of a 'just war' thesis (Bartholomeousz 2002,
200 I). The second text that informed an important part of the Urumaya context was the
Kelaniya Declaration of Political Independence. On the strategically important and
culturally charged full moon day of 6 January 1947, at an elaborate ceremony led by the
chief monk of the temple, which, according to Mahavamsa was built on the land where
Buddha himself had preached." a group of monks gave what in modem terms may be
termed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). They declared Lanka a sovereign,
independent state with full rights to self-determination without foreign domination, and
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denounced all foreign occupations as illegal and immoral. After tracing the historical glory
of the land, a brief statement declared:
We therefore, the Sangha of Lanka, the Guardians of Life and Liberty and Sponsors of the
Wellbeing and Happiness of the people of this island, assembled on this hallowed spot
sanctified by the touch of the feet of the Master, do hereby declare and publish on behalf
of the people, that Lanka claims its right to be a Free and Independent Sovereign State.
(Rahula 1974:136)
The declaration did not come in isolation, as discussions surrounding the transfer of power
were already underway. However, by making a declaration that pre-empted the public
recognition of independence, the Sangha captured the strategic political position they
desired and presented themselves as champions of the struggle for political freedom. This
was another example of how the monks succeeded in contextualizing the Mahavamsa
ideological stance, which presents the Sangha as the political liberators of the Sinhalas.
The Sangha efforts rested on the fact that they had established a genealogy of socio-
political authority that led from Buddha to them. This is a clear process of framing an
ethnicized Sinhala Buddhism to be the legitimate political force in independent Lanka,
superimposing Sinhala ethnoreligious nationalism on the core values of Theravadin
Buddhist ethics and hegemonizing Sinhala rule over the entire multi-ethnic island. The
narrative style, the words chosen, and the dating of the declaration all showed the
determination of the Sangha to return to their heritage after some four and a half centuries
of colonial rule.
This declaration inspired the political elites and other nationalist forces in the
country. The historical religious forces embodied by the Sangha gave them the impetus to
reformulate their contemporary socio-political order. Rahula included both these texts in
his Urumaya, which instantly became a reference for political activism amongst the
Sangha, who by now were determined to win what they considered as their rightful
position of power.
Urumaya is rooted in the vision of Anagarika and Olcott, who saw the Sangha and
94 The Mahavamsa records that in his third and final visit to Lanka, Buddha, on the invitation of king
Maniakkhika, preached the dhamma at Kelaniya. (Mhv. Chapter I: 34-37)
its supporters at the centre of Sinhala society and politics rather than at the neglected
periphery. The organic enthusiasm it generated among the Sangha across the island
worried some members of the political elite, including DSS, the agriculture minister in the
last pro-colonist government. DSS was a champion of the Buddhist cause, and he was
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expected to be the first Prime Minister of an independent Lanka. Yet he feared the power
of Sangha nationalism, which the Urumaya had successfully mobilized. He tried to win
over key members of the Vidyalankara, but instead the monks of this new social force
organized themselves under the civil banner of the Lanka Eksath Bhikshu Mandalaya
(LEBM), or the United Bhikshu Organization of Lanka. This was the first such
organisation in modern Lanka: a para-political social phenomenon that would have a deep
impact in the decades to come (DeVotta 2007; Frydenlund 2004; Gamage 2009; Harris
200 I; Kent 20 10; Wickramsinghe 2006). While an early attempt at forming a civil
organisation among the Sangha was made in 1938 as the Lanka Bhikshu Sammelanaya
(Bhikshu Conference of Lanka), it could not mobilize the same forces as the LEBM.
It was in this context of the early years of the independence movement in Lanka
that the Urumaya became a textbook for Sangha politics. In this booklet, Rahula provided
the theological and theoretical justification for a new brand of 'Deshapalana Bhikshuwa'
(political Sangha) or 'Bhikkshu Deshapalanaya' (Sangha politics), as he would name them
(Rahula xiii). To date, there has been no systematic academic analysis of the text and the
social impact of the Urumaya from a comparative political science perspective. However,
the continued popularity of the text and the authority and legitimacy its use confer shows
how widely accepted the text continues to be. Rahula predicted the success of his own
polemic. In the introduction to the second edition, he declared that the text provided a new
justification for the political activism of the Sangha. It is evident that Rahula foresaw that
the Sangha fraternity of Lanka would eventually embrace and obtain the political role he
envisioned for them, and he provided the ideological justifications that would shape the
future governance of the state.
3.3.4 Structure and narrative of the Urumaya
Urumaya can be divided into five basic sections as follows:
i) The historical development of Buddhism and the Sangha in Lanka (chapters 1-
5),
ii) the role of the Sangha in developing a unique Sinhala culture (chapters 6-10),
iii) the three European invasions and the role of the Sangha In the fight for
independence (chapters 11-14),
iv) British/Christian strategies for destroying Buddhism and the Sangha in Lanka
(chapters 15-19),
v) the essential need for a new revival (chapter 20).
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Out of the vast body of canonical texts, Rahula selectively focuses on comparatively
minor themes of Theravada Buddhism in order to advance his political discourse. He
employs at the outset a very liberal and extremely selective interpretation of the
Theravadin scriptures, wilfully ignoring in his highly focused hermeneutics the holistic
approach that underlies the teachings of the Tripitaka/? He wrote
On careful reading of the Vinaya Pitakaya, one may clearly see that the Rules of
Discipline were introduced, changed or modified in accordance with the changing
economic and social conditions to suit times and places.
(Rahula 1946: II)
By this Rahula assigned the interpretative authority of the most important codes to "time
and place." His statement, which was part of his call for 'political' engagement,
anticipates what later came to be conceptualized as 'socially engaged' Buddhism (King
2009; Queen 2000). For centuries, historians, anthropologists, theologians, and social
scientists have analyzed the radical renouncer nature of Buddhist teaching in a large body
of literature. In Lanka, Theravada Buddhism championed a stricter form of social
withdrawal in every ideological and conceptual sense. Rahula himself, later, during his
time at the Sorbonne, would defend the Theravada school against its Mahayana
competitors through his work What the Buddha Taught (1959) and Zen and the Taming
the Bull (1978). However, in Urumaya, his mission seems to be openly political and
narrowly nationalist as he focuses on the strong link between the Sinhala Sangha and
society, using Buddhist canonical texts to justify his advocacy.
In the opening chapter of the book, Rahula uses the ambiguous conceptual
discourse of Theravada and 'social service', opening his text with the statement
"Buddhism is based on service to others". This phrasing is no accident. His aim is to build
a broad-based audience around a widely accepted and respected common currency. There
can be no opposition to the call for service to society, which Rahula supports with the
95 Tripitaka (Three Baskets) is the collective body of the three sections of Buddhist teaching: Sutta Pitaka
(discourse), The Vinaya Pitaka (discipline) and Abhidharma Pitaka (philosophy). (00B:309)
story of hermit Sumehda96 during an earlier life of the Buddha, who gives up the
opportunity to enter nirvana for the service of others. "He [Sumedha] renounced nirvana
as suffering in samsdra and took upon himself suffering in samsara for others as nirvana.
A true Buddhist should have the strength to sacrifice his own nirvana for the sake of
others" (Rahula 1974:3).
He continues to construct a chronological history of the Sangha, situating the
Mahavamsic ideal of the hegemonic relationship of the Sinhala Sangha vis-a-vis the state
in a modem context, while beginning with the birth of the Buddha, thus locating the origin
and authority of the Sangha in the founder of the faith himself. After briefly presenting
selected highlights of key events in the history of the establishment of the Sangha
fraternity in India and Lanka, Rahula gives an account of an ancient Lanka, in which the
Sangha were a religious, social, and political force. His narration is primarily based on the
Mahavamsa, but also interwoven with strategic references to incidents, events, and context
that support his ideological claims. Seneviratne, an unreserved critic of Rahula,
maintains that the latter's use of the phrase 'service to others' was nothing but a pretext:
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The Vidyalankara idea that the monk's vocation is social service was revolutionary, in that
it has provided monks with an unprecedented excuse to seek profit and other secular goals.
It has opened the floodgates and given rise to a new monkhood that many thoughtful
members of the culture view with alarm.
(Seneviratne 1999: 195)
Elsewhere he writes,
The main reason why these new monks, who claimed their work is community service,
have failed to live up to the standards of service envisaged for them by Dhammapada [and
other key Buddhist texts] is that they have never intended any such [community service] in
the first place. What they meant by community service was a licence for themselves to
have greater involvement with secular society, beginning with politics.
(ibid: 338)
Seneviratne also argues that the actual impact of Rahula's intervention was contrary to the
true nature of the Theravada monkhood and that it misled the Sangha and their collective
morality.
The true and clear commitment of the monk is to the otherworldly goal, and when that is
taken away, the monkhood is freed of its basis and monks can engage in any activity. [... ]
However, when the floodgates are opened, as when knowledge is elevated over practice,
96 For the full story see- http://arahan.tripod.com/story_sumedha.html, accessed on 10 March 2012, See also
ODB pp. 282
there is no inner way to control the activities of monks, whereas such control is the




In the Urumaya and in the History [of Buddhism in Ceylon] it suits Rahula to be an
advocate of a Buddhism that glorifies social intercourse with lay society. [... ] the receipt
of salaries and other forms of material remuneration; ethnic exclusivism and Sinhala
Buddhist hegemony; militancy in politics; and violence, war and the spilling of blood in
the name of "preserving the religion."
(ibid: 186)
Seneviratne was prescient: many of his theses have been corroborated by the manner in
which Sangha political influence unfolded. Yet if we look at the Urumaya from a more
detached perspective, we need to acknowledge that Rahula very cleverly built on what was
already there, and his writing influenced both the Sinhala Sangha social psyche and the
wider society. It may not be close to the Pali canonical writings and their intended
message, but one cannot deny the fact that Sinhala Buddhism, over the course of 2000
years, has evolved a different set of norms and values and mutated Sinhala Buddhism into
a 'protestant' form. As summarized by Tilakarathne:
Throughout the history of Buddhism, there seem to have been two categories of monks, or
rather, monks with two different slants. The best example of this division is the two great
elders of the time of the Buddha, namely, Maha Kassapa and Ananda. The former was the
epitome of relentless ascetic practice and austerity characterised by living in the forest,
dislike for women, etc., clearly even more austere than the Buddha himself was. Ananda
was the exact opposite: city-dwelling, active, busy, a perfect private secretary, co-
ordinator and champion of the liberation of women, visiting and meeting people. The texts
say that Ananada could not attain arahanthood, the perfection of the path, until the Buddha
attained parinibbana. Categories such as gantha-dhura and vipassana-dhura, dhamma-
kathita and pansukulika, and gama-vasi and aranna-vasi that became important in the
subsequent history of Buddhism may be traced back to the two elders.
(Tilakarathne 2003:177)
In the case of Lanka, the delicate balance between this world and the other may have tilted
towards historical and socio-political engagement and away from doctrinal practices
oriented towards the other world. However, the paradoxical tensions between the two
paths are real and create opportunities, which Rahula was able to exploit at a critical time.
3.3.5 Urumaya as an ideology
Rahula borrowed from the argument developed by Anagarika Dharmapala, Yet the
"service to others" Rahula had in mind is far from the kind of service the average rural
Buddhist was familiar with. Rahula's project was to exploit the existing tradition of
community service for a mass mobilization in order to recapture the politically influential
positions that the Sangha had historically enjoyed. This vision, based on the Mahavamsa,
targeted the future independent state of Lanka and its governing structure. Urumaya
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appeared in conditions that were ideal for channelling the existing social moods and forces
towards a new political vision. As a monk with enough secular education and exposure to
regional (especially Indian), political development, Rahula aimed his text at the waiting
generation of younger monks who had benefitted from a liberal education under the
colonial administration. The new community of Sangha who were able to travel, meet
more freely than their teachers, and read and understand secular sciences, were energized
by Rahula's arguments and the intellectual debate he provoked. To many younger Sangha,
who desired a liberated monastic order, Rahula had provided a blueprint for action. They
had been waiting to receive a calling from a respectable voice. Rahula's writing inspired
them to develop Sinhala Buddhism and the role of the Sangha into a new direction that
would alter both their own destiny and the political fate of the island.
With the self-appointed authority stemming from the success and the acceptance of
Urumaya, Rahula took to task the relaxed, rural Sangha leadership, challenging the
ritualistic lifestyle of the average senior monk in Lanka. He even sarcastically stigmatized
the fundamental rituals of the Sangha, which were mainly limited to the preaching of
bana, officiating at Buddhist funerals and conducting the annual festivals of the temples.
Rahula's calculated attack on the rural Sangha attracted urban monks who were searching
for new ways of criticizing the detachment of the monkhood from the life of the average
Buddhist. Rahula provided a moral justification for the many urban monks who were more
keen to associate themselves with the political powers of the cities than to serve in the
difficult and challenging rural temples. It was also a perfect springboard for those monks
who had become fascinated by the socialist political ideologies flourishing in the political
landscape. It was this section of Sangha that the pioneering socialist movements of Lanka
targeted in the hope of recruiting them as collaborators. As Kumari Jayawardena noted
These strikes were led by petty-bourgeoisie, which included Buddhist revivalists, the
unorthodox fringe of the Ceylonese bourgeoisie and Theosophists, social reformers,
temperance workers, and the more politically conscious nationalists who first gave the
urban workers an element of trade union and class-consciousness.
(1973:6)
There were a number of circumstances that helped the Urumaya to mobilize politically
motivated Sangha. Rahula's historical contribution planted an ideological seed that was
later to grow into one of the most significant political forces in Lanka. The role of the
contemporary Sangha in justifying the war against the Tamil Tigers is now well recorded.
Among the circumstances facilitating Urumaya's impact are the following:
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(i) the idea and possibly the expectation that a Sinhala Sangha should provide
political leadership,
(ii) frustration caused by the diminished influence of the Sangha over centuries of
foreign rule,
(iii) widespread disappointment with the traditional Sangha leadership,
(iv) a period of political uncertainty and transition, and
(v) the personal values and beliefs of key leaders
3.3.6 Opposition to Power-sharing
Rahula remained committed to his ideology of the societal role of the monkhood until his
death. In the mid-1990s, towards the end of his life, he again came to the political
forefront. In 1995 and 1997, he led the opposition to the peace process and the
constitutional changes proposed by President Chandrika Kumaratunge (CBK) to
accommodate the demands of the Tamil ethnic minority. In 1995, CBK proposed a
constitutional amendment, based on the federal model, aimed to address the root causes of
Tamil political grievances. These were well received by most moderates, intellectuals, and
most academics, who were keen to support a historical process that promised a democratic
solution to the political crisis and a negotiated solution to end the war. Yet the attempts of
the CBK government failed due to the formidable forces of the Sangha who. opposed the
process for various reasons, but largely on grounds of Sinhala Buddhist hegemony. At that
particular time, the monks were able to point to the brutality of the Tamil Tigers' terrorism
as a valid reason for their opposition. Rahula vigorously campaigned against the proposal.
His presence on the political front mobilized a large section of younger monks and
nationalists against the peace process resulting in the defeat of the proposal. Rahula not
only urged others to rediscover the role of Sangha but also, through his own example,
empirically redefined it. Weeks before his death Rahula was firm in his ideology.
(Being the season of Vesak, I asked the Yen. Rahula whether one should not think of
maitri and peace and could not a dialogue be held with the LTTE. His voice was strong
and loud. The Yen. Rahula was agitated as he said,) "you are talking of peace and maitrI.
What maitri and peace is there when the terrorists in the North and East are trying to
divide our country asking for Eelam." The Yen. Rahula thundered, "our country is so
small that four times our country could be accommodated in just one Indian State." I recall
how he said, "get this straight and quote me, Sri Lanka is a Buddhist country. Let no one Page 1159
make a mistake. 70% of the country consists of Buddhist and Sinhala people. And make it
clear that Sri Lanka is the only Sinhala Buddhist country in the world".
(Rahula 1997:12)97
In light of Rahula's influence, we need to ask why it is that the Sinhala society was - and
continues to be - more influenced by political Sangha than by the eremitic and ascetic
monks who propagate a canonical Theravada Buddhism. How is it possible for a
politically motivated monk to radically reshape the ideology of the state? It is a historical
fact that socio-politics, rather than Buddhist canons, had become the key reference point
for Sinhala Sangha. In the public square, the Sangha initiated and cultivated a tradition in
which they were more bhumiputras, or sons of the soil, than Buddhaputras, or sons of the
Buddha. For these Sangha, Buddha himself was the example of dialectical socio-politics.
He advised kings on war and peace and encouraged the Sangha to remain close to the
royal courts. Finally, in the Cakkavatti Siihanada Sutta, which teaches the fundamentals of
a just social and political order, he predicted a just king ruling in the shadow of the future
Buddha (De Silva-Wijerathna 2007; Malalgoda 1970). The Sinhala Sangha justified their
political involvement in terms of these and similar scriptures.
Rahula, through his well-timed intervention in the form of the Urumaya, may have
achieved two distinct but convergent aims. He legitimized the secularization of the modern
Sangha and its interpretation of Buddhism as exclusively Sinhala, and he de-legitimised
the "other", opposing voices not in support of this thesis. At a time when the political
future of the island was more uncertain than ever, Rahula's arguments became a rallying
point for Sinhala nationalism, the ancient force that had once lost its direction but was now
re-conceptualized by the articulate scholarship of the Sangha. The ethnic politics of later
years were the natural extension of this inclusive and exclusive process. Here, as Derrida
has pointed out, the "other" becomes the historical rogue against whom society needs to be
reconfigured and secured (2005). In Lanka, in the Sinhala Buddhist narrative, there has
always been an "other" who is often a "rogue" in every political and social sense. This is
how society, the state and even the future are defined: it is not an exceptional state but
97 Roshan Peiris 'Yen Rahula: learned and forthright', Sunday Times, 21 September 1997, page 12,
http://sundaytimes.lkl970921/news2.html,Accessed on Aug 20, 2011.
rather the norm. Once the "otherness" is constructed and established, it justifies the
punitive political order, which is often a centralized mechanism of exclusion and
inclusion. At the dawn of independence in the late 1940s, when Rahula presented his
Urumaya thesis, it was the colonial administration and everything associated with it that
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was perceived and presented as the "rogue." As we have seen, it did not take long for the
ethnoreligious nationalism of Sinhala Buddhism to designate the non-Buddhists, who
shared the island, to be the new "rogues" in the post-independence era.
The identification of "rogues" within a system demands action whereby every
citizen is mobilized to cleanse the societal space and order of the "rogues." The necessity
of action legitimises a punitive system of exclusion, which silences voices looking for
alternatives. The excluded, in return, will react in a manner that further justifies their
political status of 'otherness,' as 'rogues.' The Tamil Tigers, during their three-decade
campaign of political terrorism, did just that. The LTTE's terror campaign reinforced the
dreadful imaginations within the majority Sinhala mind, reproducing a whole social
psychology that justified a war within a Sinhala Buddhist discourse. Athuraliye Rathana,
the current leader of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in Lanka's parliament, echoed the
essence of this discourse:
There are two central concepts of Buddhism: compassion and wisdom. If compassion were
a necessary and sufficient condition, then the Buddha would not have elaborated on
wisdom or prajna. Hitler could not have been overcome by maitriya alone. Today there is
a discourse about peace in Lanka. It is an extremely artificial exercise and one that is
clearly being orchestrated under the threat of terrorist attack. Our responsibility is to
ensure that the jathika sammuti is given voice and the lie of the conflict sammuti is
exposed.
(Rathana: 2003)98
This process is the result of a deep ontological insecurity by which a violent anxiety is
generated internally. Modem observers of Lanka's polity have testified that it has
repeatedly reproduced this social dynamic, which follows a sensitive political trajectory,
often led by the cultural elite: the Sangha. In 1915, 1930, 1947, 1956, 1978, 1983, 1988,
and during the war from 1983-2009, the Sangha were among the instigators of upheavals.
Walpola Rahula was only one of those who, at a critical point in the modem history of
Lanka, permanently reshaped the polity of the island.
98From the paper presented by Venerable Athuraliye Rathana at the Bath Conference on Buddhism and
Violence in Sri Lanka, 2003, as cited in (Degalle 2006:20).
Rahula single-handedly answered those critics and scholars who lamented that brands of
Buddhism were contradicting, or at least diverging from, the traditional teachings of the
Theravada canon and tradition (Gombrich 1998; Ling 1983; Obeysekere 1995; Smith
1972). Rahula's vision had a decisive impact on modern Lanka. Fractured along caste,
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regional and party lines, the Sangha community had often operated as the most decisive
non-state political force at the disposal of the ruling Sinhala elites. Walpola Rahula
through his ideology, work, and especially through his writing, re-focused the historical
role of a Sinhala Sangha by re-contextualizing and intellectualizing the Rata, Jiithiya and
Agama - the unitary ownership of the island, the supremacy of the Sinhala ethnicity, and
the institutionalizing of Sinhala Buddhism, in that order of priority. Thus, between 1950
and 2010, if the Sinhala Sangha agreed on any single issue, it was the determined and
violent opposition to the proposal of political power sharing with non-Sinhala minorities,
which they interpreted as the death of the two fundamental features defining Lanka:
Sinhala ethnicity and Sinhala Buddhism.
In reviewing Rahula's impact, we conclude that it may be misleading to think of
the relationship between the Sinhala nation and Sinhala Buddhism as an enduring
phenomenon; instead, we must pay attention to the specific and contingent ways in which
such notions as "Buddhist" and "nation" are defined. By examining particular native
debates over what can and cannot count as "Buddhist", we may have to recast Buddhist
nationalism "as a shifting configuration of discourse wherein competing interests struggle
for rhetorical and political advantage" (Abeysekara 2002:30).
3.4 Venerable Gangodawila Soma (1948-2003)
3.4.1 Global and national context
The 1994 general election promised to deliver change after 17 years of rule by the right-
wing United National Party. The open economy, the demand that Lanka adjust to a pro-
western culture, a protracted war and the abysmal human rights violations of the UNP
regime had generated angry political reactions calling for a total transformation. Leading
the opposition, Chandrika Kumaratunga, the widow of popular actor and activist Vijaya
Kumaratunga, came forward as the symbol for change. Her readily marketable political
family name generated formidable support in a country where elite names matter so much
in politics. Her father was SWRD, assassinated by a Sangha in 1958 while serving as
Prime Minister, and her mother was the world's first female Prime Minister in 1960. Left-
of-centre liberal policies and her belief in a comprehensive political solution to the ethnic
war earned her a comfortable victory. The hope of democratic recovery was so high that
analysts claimed her victory as a new social transformation (Bartholomeusz 1999; De
Silva 1995; Saez 2001; Schaffer 1995; Whall 1999; Zompetti 1997).
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However, the island's deep-rooted political crisis was not easy to manage or
resolve in a manner that would bring a sustainable and acceptable solution within any
short period. Instead, Chandrika, like many of her predecessors, was caught between the
nationalist south, led by vociferous opportunist political oppositions, and the terror
campaign of the LTTE in the north. The Tigers walked away from the peace talks, which
had been initiated with much hope, and had begun to mount dramatic military attacks not
just in the war zone but also in the commercial-civil heart of the capital city and its
environs. A failing economy due largely to the inexperience and mismanagement by the
newcomers in the Chandrika camp added to the frustration. A president who had never
held a political post at any level was confronted by multiple and varied challenges, both
internally and externally, diminishing the popularity that her charisma had secured
(Schaffer 1995; Zompetti 1997). Following an assassination attempt by the Tamil Tigers
in 1999, Chandrika lost vision in her right eye. While her administration was able to
respond to many of these new pressures with limited success, her ultimate failure was
caused by the traditional Sangha resistance to her commitment to constitutional change.
Chandrika either ignored the Sangha or dismissed them as irrelevant, yet this political
ignorance and her disregard for the Sangha turned out to be a political disaster she could
not survive.
By the year 2000, every socio-economic index of the island was trending
downward. The Sinhala south was desperate for social-political, or spiritual alternatives.
The subsequent entry (and the dramatic departure) of a charismatic, photogenic preacher,
who knew the power of the mass media, could not have come at a better time for the
advancement of Sangha politics in the recent history of Lanka.
3.4.2 Early Life
Gangodawila, who is often given the honorary title Soma hamuduruvo eed® ts):>§~6{eE)::f in
Sinhala, was born in 1948 in Gangodawila - a semi-urban area near the capital city of
Colombo (Perera 2001). His parents were struggling to make ends meet with four children.
Soma, being the eldest of the family, offered to go to work and contribute to the family
income at an early age. He managed the family-run grocery store. Gangodawila is near
Maharagama, where the influential Vajirarama Temple and the Bhikshu Training Centre
were situated. Young Soma became a frequent visitor and a close associate of the Temple
and its activities. The temple was headed by the respected Sangha Madhe Pagfifiasfha, who
later became the chief Sangha of Amarapura nikaya,
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His strong association and involvement with the temple gave Soma a new social
identity and purpose, granting him far more respect than his previous grocery-keeper
identity. After years of trying, Soma eventually convinced his parents to permit him to
enter the order of Sangha as a member of the Amarapura nikaya, which he did in July
1975. For obvious reasons his choice was to join the Vajirarama Temple and have Madhe
as his teacher and instructor. With Madhe as his teacher, the young Soma managed within
a short period to bring many modem elements to a temple, which was otherwise trapped,
in tradition and ritual. One of these new elements was an initiative to develop a youth
organization that would engage in Buddhist evangelism. This initiative became a major
turning point for him and the temple. Soma analyzed the reasons why the temple was
unpopular with the youth, drawing on years of experience as a lay associate of the temple.
His realization that there remained a gap between the expectation of the youth and what
the temple could offer soon drove him into action. He started a dialogue centre intending
to answer the contemporary questions faced by the youth within a popular Buddhist
discourse. Deploying an unconventional, dialogical preaching style, Soma attracted many
followers. He adopted innovative and non-traditional methods of addressing the laity.
Traditionally a Sinhala Sangha refers to the laity as "8~D2:il&", Pinwathuni, (those who
are collecting merit), yet Soma would address lay people as "file,:) ~ltsl0'2Sl:f", oya aththo,
which is a term usually used by a Sangha when addressing another Sangha, or by a wife
respectfully addressing her husband. The young followers who enjoyed his teaching
encouraged Soma to make his teaching available to a wider audience outside the temple
walls. Thus, Soma felt encouraged to take this new form of preaching to the street, a
practice unseen in Lanka for many years. Soma would gather office and factory workers at
a crowded bus stop on a weekday evening and start a dialogue on life and society in light
of Buddhist concepts. The semi-urban low-income workers, who were burdened with
existential questions, would eagerly listen and participate in this form of "street Buddhist
dialogue," often until late evening. Soma used what at the time were modem instruments
of communication such as a megaphone, tape recorders and even music tapes to enrich his
presentations, a practice not known within the tradition of Buddhist preaching in
Theravada societies (Mahinda 2007, 1997, 1995).
These were the early signs of a Sangha who was determined to both critically
engage with modem society and benefit from the same modernity. The "critical customer"
approach that we find in the life and work of Soma, especially in his use of electronic
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media in later years, symbolizes a new brand of Sangha who, although more modem than
their predecessors, were at the same time vociferously critical of almost all features of
modem society. This paradox was a fundamental force supporting Soma and the political
psychology he helped to create (Clifford et al. 2003; Mensing 20 I0).
He would frequently ask a series of questions, always beginning with "Why is
there suffering in Lankan society?" followed by "Who is a true Buddhist?" The first was
an open inquiry in a society where war, political uncertainty and the failing economy had
created social anxieties without the prospect of any clear solution, while the second
allowed him to present his own analysis. Through these two dialectical and critical
discursive questions, Soma provided an alternative perspective, especially for people at the
fringe of a society, which had turned inwards without hope or direction. Soma in many
ways embodied the ideal of the homeless street preacher, offering simple solutions to
intrinsically complex questions. This was an image that the traditional Buddhist society
could relate to: a wandering preacher explaining the meaning of life in both individual and
collective terms. By adopting these practices, Soma captured the attention of the semi-
urban population who were hoping to find answers to modem social struggles through the
(re)interpretation of popular Buddhist concepts. Nikki Keddie (1988) has shown that
modem religious nationalism is essentially a semi-urban phenomenon (Gooptu 1997;
Simpson 2006).
Soma's popularity grew. As we shall see later, these two simple and popular
questions - why Lankans suffer and how Sinhalas Buddhism could provide answers to the
suffering - became the future social and political conceptual framework within which
Soma would campaign to reorganize the contemporary Lankan society and its polity.
After a period of ten years, Soma had established himself as the field marshal of
the new form of preaching and temple management. This was not without costs, as
popularity and relentless demand for change made him many enemies among those who
preferred that traditions continue unchanged. At this stage, Soma began to address a
strategic section of the temple supporters who were in many ways a microcosm of the
wider Lankan society: the middle-aged employed and homemaking women. Throughout
his subsequent career, Soma appealed to Lankan women, referring directly to their
experiences as he cited single motherhood, abuse and neglect at home, suffering caused by
husbands struggling with alcoholism, the increasing costs of living, and the fear of war as
evidence of growing social problems. Soma's appeal to reorganize Lankan society
according to the moral principles of popular Buddhism99 (Kitiarsa 2005; Phya 1986) had
Page 1165
earned him a loyal audience amongst the middle aged and elderly female population of the
country (52% of the population). Women, who traditionally suffer more than any other
section of society during social crisis, had withstood the worst of the painful reality of the
war in Lanka for decades (Argenti-Pillen 2002; De Mel 2003; De Alwis 2002;
Somasundaram and Sivayokan 1994). Most families in southern Lanka had lost at least
one member, often the breadwinner, to the war: mostly men from poor families who had
joined the army or others who had died from LTTE attacks. Thus, the traditional role of
women in family and society had changed, forcing them to face new social and
psychological anxieties. Many were witnessing the moral decay of their husbands and sons
now addicted to gambling and to a new culture of pubs, bars, and karaoke centres, which
flourished in the new liberalized economic system.l'" These women needed solace, and
Soma answered these needs with his preaching, emphasizing the historical culture of
Lanka and popular Buddhism. Seventy four per cent of the population accepts that
Buddhism provides the ultimate answers to questions regarding the very meaning of life.
In such a context, Soma's teaching found resonance.
In response to criticisms about the appropriateness of a Sangha advocating the
cause of women, Soma authored a book on Yasodhara, the wife of Buddha and mother of
Rahula, Yasodhara is the paradigmatic female role model in Buddhist hagiographical
texts. Yasodhara bore the eternal anguish of personal and social loss when Buddha left her
with the infant Rahula, and when some nine years later Rahula followed the steps of his
father into monkhood. By entitling the book coG'(5.l:!~6J6J~C ®Jl51J - Yasodharii: Riihula
Mala (Yasodhara: mother of Rahula) - Soma targeted both the young wives who had lost
their husbands and the mothers who had lost their sons. By presenting an image of the
ideal woman in stark contrast to the morally decaying male, who was dominating society
and fighting a cruel war, Soma touched the feminine psychology in at least two ways: as a
monk who was willing to understand the suffering of millions of Buddhist women and,
99 I distinguish three types of Buddhism: I.Pali Buddhism (canonical writings in the Pali language), 2.
Popular Buddhism (what is sought after as Buddhism in Asian and Western societies), and 3. Political
Buddhism (the use of Buddhism for political purposes)
100 An unregulated karaoke culture emerged in Lanka during this time. Often these centres were known for
their links with the sex and drugs trade.
even more subtly, as a kind of masculine role model, whom these women never had in
their lives. Soma's empathy, identification and defence of suffering woman made him a
venerated household hero.
Through his empathy with women, Soma challenged the traditional temple culture
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including his guru and guide, Madhe Pagfifiasfha, in an innovative and creative manner.
This is because in Sinhala Buddhism the Sangha have a very reserved attitude towards
women, even refusing to accept female Buddhist ordination (Bartholomeusz 1994; Keyes
1984). As a direct influence of Riihula Miita, many young women of key families closely
connected to the temple followed Yashodhara's example and took the ultimate decision to
overcome present and future suffering by seeking to be ordained as female monks or
Bhikkhuni - a tradition that the majority Theravada societies had barred for two millennia.
The exclusivity of the ordination of men and the rejection of the ordination of
women, in contradiction of Buddha's teaching, is a core ideological position of modem
Theravada Buddhism (Bartholomeusz 1994; Bhikkhu Bodhi 2009; DeVido 2007; Tomalin
2009; Jason and Mort 2005; Jonathan 1994; Salgado 2004). Accordingly, by calling
women to the higher life of Buddhism, Soma angered some of the most influential
members of the Sangha fraternity. As he noticed how his interpretations and activities
troubled the traditional hierarchy, and following Sangha traditions, Soma decided to go
into exile. He left the griima vihiira vdsi ('living by the village') life and became an
iiranya vdsi ('living in the jungle'). Despite this gesture, Soma was not a traditionalist. All
his life he had rebelled against tradition by borrowing modem concepts while criticizing
modernity and its impact. He recorded his thinking on tape, addressing wider issues that
led to the crisis in the temple and explaining that the fundamental issues of the temple
were connected to the core character of contemporary Sinhala Buddhist society and its
hopeless polity. He pleaded with the dayakas and the Sangha to unite in order to address
and remedy these conditions. One core tactic in the preacher's arsenal was to create a
discourse of "modem-ness" in order to analyze his surrounding "modernity." He pursued
two interrelated and converging projects: first, the renewal of the spirituality and culture of
contemporary Sinhala Buddhists and, second, the initiation of a new type of Sangha power
politics. The core of both projects was the encounter and emerging relationship between
the Sinhala polity and its Buddhism on the one hand and modernity on the other. As
Grossberg (2006, 2005) argued, it is possible to have multiple modernities; however, the
political and structural ontology of Sinhala Buddhism is stubbornly non-modem.
Soma's voluntary departure from a comfortable urban temple to an extremely
remote, rural village reinstated his status as true Sangha, reaffirming the respect he
enjoyed at the temple and within the Sangha community at large. He took residence in
Degamadulle near the Mahaoya River. His choice again was strategic. His new residence
at the edge of the jungle was in the area of Mahiyangana, which, according to Mahavamsa,
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was the first place Buddha visited in Lanka and where he used his supernatural powers to
tame the unbelieving native Yaksas (Mhv. 1: 1_46).101 Soma, in his attempts to present
himself as a prototypical Buddhist mendicant, decided to cover long distances by foot,
pindapiita (begging for his meals), and spending the night at the area's temples, meditating
under trees or even by the side of the road. During these long walks, according to his
biographer, Soma covered 'over 1000 miles or one third of the Sinhala Buddhist area of
the country' (Perera 2001: 106). During these long marches, Soma critically engaged with
the popular practices among Buddhists, such as patronizing Devala-shrines dedicated to
Hindu deities, attending healing meetings conducted by Pentecostal Christians, and
following other Indian gurus such as Sai Baba, He created controversies as he even
condemned the worship of a Buddha statue or the worship of the Bo tree, which both had
become integrated and demonstrative parts of modem Theravada Buddhism. He
represented a 'puritan' version of Buddhism and presented himself as a reformer who
aimed to revert the Sinhalas to the Buddhist texts. Such calls for reforms are often mere
rhetoric devices serving political ends because Sinhala Buddhism had always intermingled
with Hindu and other indigenous religious beliefs and practices (Gombrich and
Obeyesekere 1999).
During this period of withdrawal and renunciation, Soma kept his connections with
his supporters and followers. He made sure that the news about his "protest and reformist
walk" was known to his critics and to the masses. Through his commitment to revive the
forgotten conventions of the Theravada texts, Soma became more popular especially
amongst the urban middle-class Buddhists and particularly with the transnational diaspora,
who preserved a nostalgia for their culture and traditions. Soma soon became a politically
charged, spiritual attraction to the visiting members of the Sinhala diaspora.
Modem scholarship nationalism has argued that in a globalized context of trans-
nationalist social dynamics of contemporary diaspora communities are eager to adhere to
and reproduce their homeland a nationalism that is founded on a religious interpretation of
101 In Buddhist literature, Yaksas are flesh-eating spirits with dark powers (ODB p. 338). How the
Mahavamsa constructs the pre-Buddhist natives of Lanka as Yaksas is a question worthy of further study.
According to the Mahavamsa, Kuveni, the first wife of Vijay a, the founder of the Sinhala race, was a
Yaksani (Mah.7:5-40).
their identity (Adamson 2008; Biswas 2010; Collier 2008; Sageman 2004; Shain and
Barth 2003). Consequently, unlike the previous waves of nationalism that grew on
territorial, linguistic, or ethnic identities, within multicultural and modernistic discourse,
religion has replaced many other forces of identity construction and social bonding. As a
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way of managing the new realities surrounding them in their adopted homelands,
diasporas often embraced anti-secular and absolutist orientations. These often hybridized
versions of homeland cultural practices are constructed around non-Western religious
beliefs (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Brinkerhoff2008).
Identities are more taken than given in a postmodern context; they are taken by
individuals and communities to suit a particular socio-political or even economic reality
(Faist 2000; Martiniello and Lafleur 2008). This process of embracing "identities of
convenience" produces a counter-dynamic when an outsider/other attempts to impose an
identity that is different from that which is desired (Biswas 2004; Kapur 2010; Lyons
2007). This process of embracing and imposing identity and its political discourse has
followed different trajectories among the diaspora of many states. In Lanka, the Sinhalas
historically and politically wanted to adopt the identity of the "owners" of the land and
accordingly tried to impose the identity of "visitors," "latecomers," "tenants," and
"invaders", on other non-Sinhala communities despite historical evidence to the contrary.
In this context, the Tamil diaspora tried to establish itself as a hardworking but oppressed
minority nation with the legal and political right to self-determination. In opposition to this
narrative, the Sinhala diaspora have projected themselves as an ethnic minority in the
regional and global sense that has suffered centuries of colonization from India and the
West. As Debyesh Anand argued:
A discursive approach does not deny any act of communal political activism. It only
reveals it as contingent, as strategic rather than something unambiguously natural.
Identification should be seen, not as an artefact or an outcome, but as a construction, a
process never completed. Identities are increasingly fragmented and fractured; never
singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic,
discourses, practices and positions.
(2000:273)
At a time when the diasporic ethnic nationalism of the Lankan Tamils was at its peak, and
when the armed resistance of the Tamil Tigers was considered a modem, effective,
textbook guerrilla struggle, the Sinhala diaspora suffered humiliation in the liberal West
for the illiberal governments of their motherland. The average Sinhala living in the
diaspora was caught between the asymmetrical forces of centrifugal Sinhala nationalism
and centripetal Tamil nationalism (Lyons 2006; Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008; Orjuela
2008). A section of the Sinhala diaspora was more than willing to embrace Soma and his
Theravada religious repositioning project as a force offering a new identity that could
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construct legitimacy and provide answers to their socio-political anxieties. Within a short
time, Soma was preaching on a worldwide stage, travelling to the parts of the world where
the Sinhalas were a struggling diaspora. His international "missions" gained influence in
Europe, North America, and key centres of East Asia. The culmination of such overseas
"dharma cdrikiis" - missionary trips - was the invitation to establish a new Theravada
temple in Melbourne, Australia. Soma moved to Australia, spending his time building an
international network.
There is presently no detailed study available of Soma's work and impact in
Australia. All we know is that he was successful in establishing two new Buddhist
temples, which became the central symbol of the new religious nationalism among the
Sinhalas in Australia. The important issue for this discussion is not so much the new
nationalist impetus Soma created among the Sinhalas in Australia, and the administrative
controversies surrounding them (Perera 2001 :158), but his return to Lanka after ten years
of absence, now with well-developed networks in Australia and the rest of the world. He
returned at the end of Chandrika's first term, at a time when Lankan society had lost its
hope of a return to peace and prosperity - a time when the Sinhalas were looking for a
political and cultural redeemer.
3.4.3 lfE(j'dz! ~~",e - Anduren Eliytua : From Darkness to Light
In the I990s, academic debates on the growth of Sinhala nationalism had a profound
impact on Lankan politics. Anticipating attempts in the political realm to find an
acceptable and sustainable solution to the ethnic war, academics tried to define or defend
the various political perspectives on offer. R. A. L H. Gunawardena and K. N. O.
Dharmadasa, both from Peradeniya University, led the two camps. For Gunawardena, the
ethnic nationalism of the Sinhalas was a recent colonial construct (1971; 1979; 1995;
1990), whereas for KNO, Sinhala ethnic nationalism was an indigenous identity-based
project that had begun much earlier with the introduction of the Sinhala script and
language in the fifth century CEo It is noteworthy that KNO's argument, in structure and
content, was based on the Vamsa literature. Like many debates about the origins of
nationhood, this debate too eventually entered a deadlock.
However, new scholarship suggests that it might be possible to move beyond the
question of the timing of the origin of Sinhala nationalism, and to understand how and
why such an ideology became a dominant force in reshaping the history and modem
politics of Lanka (Abeysekara 2002; Bartholomeusz 2002; Chalk 2007; Oeegalle 2006; De
Silva 2006; De Silva and Bartholomeusz 2001; DeVotta 2007, 2005, 2004; Indrapala
2005; Obeysekere 2006; Premasiri 2006)
This scholarship finds common ground in the assertion that the conceptual
understanding and the implementation of Sinhala nationalism are fundamentally
contextual. At different times and in different conditions, different factors have generated
or sustained nationalist forces that allowed the jathiya and the agama of Sinhala Buddhism
to construct the same power structures. Often the literature draws on two different sets of
explanations in order to account for the rise of a religiously inspired nationalism. First,
there are the explanations informed by Marxism, according to which religion is to be
understood as the "opiate of the masses," as an instrument of power. Because of the status
of religion in society, governments who appeal to religious belief are often granted a
higher authority and legitimacy, even by secular groups within these societies (Williams
1994). Evoking the power of God as a foundation of secular power often justifies the use
of violence (Fox 2006; Little 1996).
A second explanation of the prominent role of religion in politics refers to the
failure of modem secular governments to answer the ontological anxieties that plague
societies today (Appleby 2004, 2003 and 2000; Barder 2007; Barghava 2007; Esposito
2007; Gutmann 2003; Habermas 2006; Haynes 2010, 2007, 2008,. 2004, 2001;
Juergensmeyer 2008, 2005, 2006, 2004a, 2004b, 2002a, 2002b; Kukadas 2003; Kymlicka
2005; Levey 2008a, 2008b, 2006; Manshipouri 2001; Marty and Appleby 2004; Modood
2007; Senn 2005; Shah 2000; Tibi 2002; Turner 2001; Veer 2001). The secular principles
and projects of modem governments have failed and often brought misery to the masses,
justifying the regeneration of religious forces in politics to either edify or criticize the
current social order. Thus, where governments fail to provide social, economic and
cultural justice for the greater sections of the population, where modem secularism is seen
as standing in the same tradition as colonialism, and where Western influence is seen as a
continuation of colonial oppression, religion can become a voice of protest and resistance.
These factors were certainly present at the time of Soma's return.
Almost immediately after his return, Soma resumed his previously successful style
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of dialogical preaching, but instead of gathering people in the urban city centres, as he had
done previously, Soma utilized electronic mass media for his latest mission. Anduren
Eliyata ('from darkness to light') was the title of his weekly televised preaching, which
became an instant success and a "must have" item in the competitive profit-seeking media
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market. Soma soon became one of the most watched individuals on all the main channels.
Many new FM radio stations had him speak regularly on a variety of topics. Through these
efforts, Soma in many ways created a new "social space" for the debate on Sinhala
Buddhism, and this new social space also reflected a new emphasis within this debate.
Whereas he had previously promoted Pali Buddhism, Soma now aimed to articulate a
political vision through the lens of Sinhala Buddhist ethnic ideology. Dhamma, which was
traditionally preached in temples and at funerals thereby found new modern and "secular"
means and spaces to "Buddhisize" the socio-political consciousness. Soma ensured that
his new methods of repositioning popular Sinhala Buddhism would address and provide
answers to some of the urgent, contemporary, political uncertainties of the Sinhala social
psyche. As ryes Lambert (1999) has argued, Soma succeeded in making an "Axial age"
connection between the current political crisis and the secular pluralism that treated
Buddhists and non-Buddhists as equal citizens. For him, however, this pluralism was
simply not acceptable within the Dhammadipa, the island that belongs to Buddha and his
followers. Soma, like his predecessors, argued that modernity and most of its products,
including colonialism (Perera 200 I: 17-24), Christianity (ibid 71-80), a multi-party
parliament (ibid 32-43), multi-cultural democratic Lanka (ibid 44-70, 107-135), an open
economy, a secular university education (ibid 141-155), and a judiciary system based on
English law were all institutionalized Western/foreign influences and therefore enemies of
z53b®C §g ~w® "nirmala budhu dahama" or "pure Buddhism" (Soma 2001:128).
While his presentations were often factually and conceptually full of errors,
Soma's rhetoric, available to Lankans in the comfort of their home or place of work,
resonated with the majority. His appeal to the Sinhalas to be "e:ll@l G'@'!lC:w~25f" saba
bauddhayan - true Buddhists - through "G'@'!lC:w e:lJowb®" "bauddha saradharma" -
Buddhist morality - in order to shun immorality and to reconstruct the true "G'@'!lC:w
G'C:~~2Sf" buddha deshayak - the Buddhist state, captured the imagination of the largely
urban and semi-urban middle class Sinhalas (Jayakody 2002). Adopting the methods of
conventional advertising campaigns, Soma developed a tagline for his mission: "e:l~JE)JO~
eSJl5)~2:5) G'e:l'!lWJcs::f~ C~J 2:5)08" "sadacaraya - jatiyaka saubhagya udakarai" -
Righteousness Enhances the Prosperity of a Nation. With this phrase, Soma reassured
large sections of urbanized Sinhalas that by embracing Buddhist righteousness they were
not undermining their economic welfare; on the contrary, Buddhism was the answer to the
fragile economic situation of the country.
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The commonplace question, often asked in Western circles, of what Buddhism in
Lanka means often provokes answers informed by anthropological studies and based on
binary oppositions such as "worldly vs. spiritual," "rural vs. urban," "modern vs. pre-
modern," or "orthodoxy vs. new age". The work of leading scholars such as Obeysekere,
Seneviratne and Tambiah follows similar lines. Soma's activities demonstrate, however,
that these dichotomies are misleading. His success was due precisely to the fact that his
message seemed to overcome these binary oppositions. More recent scholarship on the
anthropology of Sinhala Buddhism has shown that the actual dynamics of Sinhala
Buddhism transcends the binary oppositions referred to above (De Silva 2006, 2002; Scott
2002). Moreover, as Parakrama de Silva maintains, those who continue to assume that
such dichotomies are meaningful are unable to appreciate the real impact of Buddhism on
Sinhala society (de Silva 2006: 169). Soma, in contrast to his pre-Australian life as a
mendicant, embraced modern means of reaching the population. He also now lived a
modern life in an urban environment, and yet he propagated the thesis that modern-ness
and modernity were both enemies of Sinhala Buddhism. Soma utilized his international
network, especially the US-based Buddhist publisher Dayawansa Jayakody, to publish his
speeches and preaching. He formed the 'Jana Vijaya' - the People's Victory foundation -
in order to promote his work throughout the Sinhala-speaking world. By this time, his
discourse had moved very openly from a spiritual debate to social and political issues. As
he continued to preach, Soma constructed a particular version and interpretation of
Buddhism that was adaptable to, but not consumed by, the "immoral" forces of modernity
and globalization. By this, as Abeyasekara argues, he constructed "specific debates that
rendered possible and centrally visible differing demarcations between what can and
cannot count as Sinhala Buddhism" (2002:31). He portrayed "saubhagya" or prosperity,
towards which middle class Sinhala society was tirelessly working, as the long-term goal
for a Buddhist Sinhala state. It may be possible to argue that Soma was thereby
constructing a Buddhist charismatic movement with an in-built "prosperity theology".
Soma may have learned here from the success of Pentecostal Christianity, which recruited
many converts in rural Sinhala villages. These movements presented material prosperity as
one of God's blessings bestowed on the righteous, and they created their own communities
and welfare structures - 'mini-states' within the state.
It is now clear that, although he spearheaded the anti-conversion bill In Lanka
(DeVotta 2002; Frydenlind 2005),102 Soma borrowed many theoretical and practical
applications from these evangelical groups in order to contextualize Buddhism and to
Page I 173
provide a challenge to the growth of Christianity amongst the rural Sinhala villages
(Fernando 2011; Hresko 2006:123). In this sense, Soma's efforts paralleled Anagarika's,
who constructed a "Protestant" Buddhism (Bertelsen 1997; Ebaugh 2001; Gombrich and
Obeysekera 1991; Mellor 1991) against the influence of the "Protestant" missionaries. The
most active and growing sections of Christianity in Lanka today are the health-and wealth-
oriented, faith-based, charismatic movements. These movements, which have by now
become a global trend, tend to provide a new negotiating power to the individuals and
communities who have suffered the aggressive effects of globalization, which has
undermined their local identities and subsistence (Beama and Chu 2006; Coleman 2002,
2000; Hunt 2006; Lioy 2006). These church movements often have their own welfare
systems providing basic needs such as health care, education, and micro-finance. By
competing with them, Soma may have contributed to the construction of a "neo-
Pentecostal Prosperity Sinhala Buddhism" in Lanka: a phenomenon, which could be an
indigenous Sinhala Buddhist response to a changing world order under the weight of
globalization. The Buddhist social and political order he envisioned clearly also had an
economic dimension. This is further clarified by his desire to enter power politics as a
means to reconstruct a Buddhist socio-political and economic order. Soma's phrase
"Sadiicharaya Saubhiigya genadeyi" - morality will bring prosperity - justified Buddhism
in economic terms. If the people were willing to become e.:l~@( e@'!)~w",Z5f - true Buddhists
- he would lead them towards the desired prosperity.
In his discursive strategy, Soma projected a bi-polar structure onto Sinhala society.
Buddhist righteousness was opposed to the immorality of modernity, and he was the one
who would lead the fight of the former against the latter. On the one side, he positioned
Buddhism, the Sinhalas, their culture, family values and superior history. On the other side
he found the open economy, consumerism, multi-party democracy, election systems,
political corruption, Christianity, the LTTE, Muslim traders, Hindu sects (such as Sai
102 On 22 Aug 2004, the Lankan parliament, proposed by the JHU, debated a bill to any ban
conversions to Christianity. See Bruce Matthews, Christian Evangelical Conversions and the Politics
of Sri Lanka, Pacific Affairs, 2007, Vol. 80, No.3, pp. 455-472 for a background discussion on
this.
Baba) and the lINGO debate on human and minority rights. Soma called on the Sinhalas to
arm themselves with Buddhist ethics in order to fight against the immoral elements of
contemporary society. The struggle of the Sinhala people was the righteous struggle
against the eternal Western and foreign conspiracy. The Sinhalas had to live up to their
assigned role as the custodians of the faith.
As an immediate step towards the recovery of the "C~®C.:l" (heritage) of the
Sinhalas, Soma asked citizens not to vote for the then government of Chandrika claiming
that 'its leadership had failed' (Soma 2002:33). He often confronted the urban Buddhists
with the contradictions in their lives - how they compromised their Buddhism by
participating in an unjust political, social, and economic order - and thereby appealed to
the 'shame culture' that prevailed on the island (Lu 2008; Ma and Hung 2010). As an
alternative to the existing system, Soma advocated the urgent need to restructure the
Lankan polity according to Buddhist values under the leadership of the Sangha, suggesting
that he could be a superior leader to govern the country. The Sangha were superior leaders,
he argued; because the true Sangha had no children, no family, and no attachments,
allowing them to selflessly serve the country and its people (Soma 2002: 42).
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3.4.4 A Universal Sinhala Buddhism (?)
Soma's agenda mirrored a broader global trend within religion and politics. Modem
scholarship on culture, religion and politics has argued that there are two main types of
reactions to the tension between the demands of theo-politics and the demands for a
secular order. One type of reaction rejects the globalizing forces and asks the faithful to
return to their religious roots; the other type of response wants to see globalization read
into the relevant religion through new interpretations of the canonical texts (Appadurai
1996; Giddens 1990; Kinwall 2006, 2004; Levitt and Avillae 2004; Whitehouse 2002).
The Sinhalas were faced with internal challenges, such as the raging war, and external
challenges, such as immigration and the free flow of capital and information, with both
kinds of challenges forcing radical transformations and uprooting the traditional security
they had felt for centuries. As Kinwall has summarized:
My argument is that nationalism and religion supply particularly powerful stories and
beliefs (discourses) through their ability to convey a picture of security, of a "home" safe
from intruders. They do this by being portrayed as resting on solid ground, as being true,
thus creating a sense that the world really is what it appears to be.
(2004:776)
Soma, through his preaching and debates, capitalized on this power of religion with a call
to action focused on two key political issues. First, he vocally raised suspicions about the
Norway-led peace process that had started without the involvement of the Sangha
fraternity and, second, he criticized proposals for political power-sharing arrangements
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with the LTTE-led Tamil nationalists. Many Sinhala nationalists, even those who
disagreed with Soma on his interpretation of Buddhist texts, now found a new platform on
which to criticize the peace talks, calling the Sinhalas to (re)discover a Sinhala Buddhist
ruling system led by the Maha Sangha. Soma openly expressed his intentions to form a
political party for monks and asked his followers for support. There was speculation, never
denied, that he was willing to contest the presidential election.
Soma changed his contemporary Sinhala society in at least three ways. Firstly, he
built a critical consciousness amongst the Sinhalas towards modernity and the relentless
forces of globalization. While his criticisms were often based on sentiment and rhetoric
rather than political analysis, he managed to capture the Sinhala imagination. Secondly, he
mobilized grass root agitation against the Norway-lead peace process, which he
understood as a symbol of inappropriate influence of Western and foreign powers on
Lankan affairs. Thirdly, as a remedy for these social disorders, he proposed a new form of
political, Sangha-led governance.
Venerable Gangodawila Soma, at the heights of his popularity, died suddenly on
12 December 2003 in a hospital in Moscow, while visiting to receive an honorary
doctorate. His unexpected death fuelled suspicions that he had become the victim of the
very international conspiracy he had warned against. While local and international
forensic experts declared that Soma died of a heart attack, for which he had undergone
treatment earlier, his followers, admirers and funders would not let the matter rest. His
funeral procession was a state affair and the cremation was accordingly performed on the
national independence square. After his death, Soma was declared qG-o 2.:i"lJCG-cl§~
IDJ~~6"{G-€)1-theBuddha of our time - by his followers. Soma - his life, his work, even his
death - influenced politics in Lanka for years to come. Some commentators would
consider his thinking as a reaction to the effects of globalization, which undermine the
indigenous space and identity (Friedland 1999:314). According to Stephen Berkwitz:
As such, his work crucially recognizes that religious nationalisms today are developed as
refuges of autonomous spaces, in opposition to a vast global system that is stripping
nations of the ability to control their own religious, economic, political, and cultural
spheres.
(2008:76)
For us Soma's work is not primarily reactionary; on the contrary, it stands in a line of
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ethnoreligious Sinhala ideology. Globalization, largely a Western model of economic
development, may have created a special role for Soma, and it may have influenced the
design of his campaign - but globalization did not create Soma. As we noted previously,
Sinhala Buddhist ethnoreligious nationalism was strong well before the modern world
order came into being. Soma's discourse was another attempt to preserve the hegemonic
position of Sinhala Buddhism over the state of Lanka. His intervention was timely in light
of actual (the LTTE) and perceived (globalization, the Norwegians, Federalist proposals,
and the INGOs) threats. The key difference between Soma and other Sangha activists was
that instead of seeking state or political party sponsorship he created his own network of
support. Instead of becoming "part of the ruling", Soma desired to become "ruler" himself.
Unlike many previous Sangha activists, Soma did not have a team of people working with
him but preferred to work alone, and presented himself as a self-proclaimed pedagogue,
making his very person the agenda and agency of change. Venerable Gangodawila Soma
symbolized the continuing contestation between worlds that is rapidly changing according
to the logic of the market-based liberal democracy and between the inherently hegemonic
ethnoreligious nationalism of the Sinhalas.
3.5 Venerable Athuraliye Rathana (1966- )
3.5.1 Early life and activism
The 1983 ethnic pogrom against Tamils living in southern Lanka, believed to have been
state-sponsored, produced at least two mutually reinforcing results. First, the Tamils came
to believe that the state of Lanka was not only unwilling to protect their lives and property
but would also use any opportunity to unleash terror against them. With this belief came
the conviction that the only route to safety was to support the separatist LTTE and its
armed struggle. Second, the majority of Sinhalas, especially in the South, and especially
those with influence on state policies, came to believe that Tamil political demands had
become a serious threat to be defeated at any cost, including heavy military action. The
Muslims and the Tamils of Indian origin were caught in the middle of the dispute, often
forced to take sides without much free will. While there was a minority of moderates on
both sides of the divide, they either had too little influence or remained silent. In 1983,
Venerable Athuraliye Rathana was a student monk whose university entrance exam had
been delayed due to the unrest in the country.
Rathana was born to a working class family in which his mother was the
breadwinner (Abesekara 2010). His upbringing meant that he was aware of social
inequality from childhood onward. Athuraliya is one of the poorest villages in the southern
Matara district, an area saturated with both the nationalist Maoism of the JVP and the
traditional leftist politics led by the Communist Party (CP) of Lanka. One reason for this
extra influence could be the fact that the founder and leader of the CP, medical doctor S.
A. Wickramasinghe, was born in Athuraliya. It appears that poverty, the desire to collect
merit and the caste basis of the Amarapura sect, were key factors in Rathana's decision to
enter the Sangha. His keen interest in philosophy and reading won him a place at the
Peradenya, the most respected university in Lanka.
Unlike Rahula and Soma, who were drawn into politics by their social contexts,
Rathana established himself as a political activist early in his university career. By 1985,
the effects of the government's liberal restructuring of the economy provoked protests,
with Lanka's universities and higher education centres serving as bases of protest
(DeVotta 1998; Oberst 1985; Shastri 2009; Warnapala 1979). The student body, especially
in Peradeniya, was divided into two key factions: one that was more internationalist in
nature and that supported or was sympathetic to the separatist Tamil nationalism, and
another composed of Sinhala nationalists controlled by the JVP. Due to his upbringing in
Athuraliya and his own experiences at university, Rathana was initially closer to the
former. During this time, he became friendly with a number of Tamil graduates who while
not LTTE supporters argued for a Tamil socialism in the north and Sinhala socialism in
the south. Rathana had adopted a middle ground on these political issues, leaving him in
the position of being a trusted member of many groups who were otherwise opposed to
each other. Yet the increasing level of LTTE violence by the end of the eighties and the
equally bloody second JVP uprising in 1988-89 forced Rathana and his contemporaries to
pursue alternatives. During this time, Champika Ranawaka, an engineering graduate from
the University of Moratuwa, 'had become a close friend and political associate to
Rathana.' Ranawaka ultimately emerged as an extreme Sinhala ethno-nationalist and had a
deep influence on Rathana's political life (Abesekara 2010:33).
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3.5.2 o~m.5):J@~@cS:I- Janatha Mithuro: Friends of the People
By the end of the 80s, after a decade of harsh experiments with massive social and
structural adjustments, it became clear that the policy of liberal market-based development
had failed in Lanka (DeVotta 2002; Moore 1990; Stokke 1997). The traditional argument Page I 178
that liberal economic policies with authoritarian rule will bring social and economic
prosperity in a short span of time and a stable democracy was proven wrong in Lanka.
Extended development projects such as the Mahavali Irrigation followed a liberal
economic model, largely based on Thatcherism, and did not benefit Lanka. The militaristic
approach to the challenge posed by the LTTE in the north, the forced Indo-Lanka Accord,
and the subsequent arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force all alienated the Sinhala
masses, creating a complex political situation that could not find any immediate resolution
within the available political discourses. Observers agree that this was a crucial era for
Lanka's modern polity (Dunham and Jayasuriya 2001; Goodhand, Korf, and Spencer
2010; Goodhand and Gunasinghe 2004; Hulme 2000). The uncertainty created a vacuum
within Sinhala society, providing an opportunity for Sinhala Buddhist ethnoreligious
nationalism to offer itself as an answer.
Rathana and Ranawaka invented a program that capitalized on the volatility of the
socio-political situation. They gained some grassroots experience by working with local
and international human rights groups such as the Mauvarunge Peramuna: Mothers
Front103 and Amnesty International. Realizing the limitations of these attempts and
looking for a method to appeal to a wider audience, they launched "025')Z5)J ®25Je6:f" Janatd
Miturii - JM or Friends of the People - a new political organization for university students
to become activists and messengers amongst the rural citizens and initiate a new
discussion on indigenous democracy. By this time, an intense discussion on the need to
develop an indigenous democracy was on-going among the urban elites thanks to the work
of neo-Sinhala nationalists such as Professor Nalin de Silva and linguistic activist
Gunadasa Amarasekara. Their "eSJl5)2li) e325f2S)25)~" Jiithika Chinthanaya - National
Cognizance Forum - propagated a search for a localized yet modern ethno-nationalist
identity in politics and culture (Bastian 2009; DeVotta 2007; Edrisinha 2005; Hennayaka
2006). Rathana, with the help of Ranawaka, captured the imagination of the Sangha
reformists and developed it in an original way by taking the political discourse to the rural
103 Mothers Front was a project supported by international human rights groups in order to encourage and
empower the mothers of victims of the 1988-89 JVP uprising (De Alwis 2002; Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer
2000).
masses.
Rathana, like his predecessors, exploited the traditional Sangha method of
barefooted mendicancy in order to galvanize his followers and popularize his motives. He
travelled in rural villages addressing crowds including unemployed youth without higher
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education. These rural communities had never experienced this kind of top-down
recognition and appreciation expressed by a learned, graduate Sangha who was visiting
their humble dwellings in order to teach them. This was in total contrast to the experience
of contemporary power politics in most of rural Lanka. Rathana was imitating Buddha's
methods and the Theravadin tradition of reciprocal dependency and benefit but with a
radical difference: Instead of the otherworldly dhamma, Rathana's message was very
much of this world, based on his ethnicity, his Sinhala Buddhism, and of course the need
to protect the land of Buddha. Within a very short period, the JM was challenging the
hegemony held by the JVP in rural politics, especially in the deep south of the Matara
district, Rathana's home base. The growth of this movement was such that it managed to
publish a monthly tabloid, Asipatha -The sword blade. Rathana projected himself as the
key public figure of JM while Ranawaka was the ideologue and the editor of the
newspaper. JM soon registered as a political party in Lanka, giving clear signals of the
movement's interest in widening the existing power politics. The political landscape in
Lanka until then had witnessed all kinds of divisions based on class, territory, language,
ethnicity and caste, but JM reflected the beginning of a new force: an aggressive and
exclusive form of Sinhala Buddhist ethnoreligious nationalism organised in the shape of a
recognized political party led by a Sangha.
3.5.3 From Janatha Mithuro to Smc c6r.®'-' (Sinhala Urumaya)
JM changed over time, adopting various names such as Sinhala Weeravidhana (SW) -
Heroes Front of Sinhalas, Sinhala Urumaya (SU) - Heritage of the Sinhalas, and finally
the present Jiitika Hela Urumaya (JHU) (Abeysekara 2004; Bastin 2009). The last
transformation towards the current JHU reflected an ideological transition from a
combination of nationalism and socialism to ethno-nationalism. Of course, Sinhala politics
had always been defined and fought in terms of identities and ideologies. However, the JM
gained a strategic advantage by building their political platform on the concept of an
"indigenous democracy." In the absence of any major financial, social and ideological
capital, JM turned towards Sinhala Buddhist doctrine and at least in its public discourse
argued that adopting a Theravadin morality was the only way of improving society.
Chandrika Bandaranaike came to power in 1994 on the promise of liberalism and
peacebuilding and thereby changed the social context within which 1M was operating.
Most of the activists and nationalist elements that had supported 1M as an act of protest
now rallied around a new government that promised a negotiated peace settlement with the
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LTTE. For the general citizenry these years marked a period of hope (Bartholomeusz
1999; Samarasinghe 1994; Schaffer 1995). However, as noted earlier, the peace promise
failed by April 1995, nine months after it was made. The actions of the LTTE created fear
and frustration among rural people who were hoping for a quick peace settlement. With
the committed leadership of Rathana and Ranawaka, the previously scattered elements of
1M launched their politics under a new party banner: Swe c6~®c.o Sihala Urumaya (SU),
Heritage of Sinhalas, in order to attract those who were disappointed by the failure of the
peace process. SU essentially became a political alternative for the ultra-Sinhalas. Many
opposition groups, fearing that Chandrika would make constitutional changes paving the
way for power-sharing arrangements with the Tamils, began to rally around and support
the SU. With growing strength, the SU organized numerous protest rallies and very
significantly made inroads in the greater Sangha fraternity, mobilizing the support of
respected Sangha for their political agenda. It was in this context that influential Sangha
such as Walpola Rahula, Paravehere Pafifiananda (vice chancellor of Southern Ruhuna
university), and Palipane Chandananda, (the Sangha chief of the powerful Asgiriya
chapter), emerged as leaders who challenged the power-sharing proposal, nicknamed as
'the package'.
The 1999 LTTE attack on the highly fortified strategic Elephant Pass led to the
highest death toll in a single battle; the LTTE also captured some heavy weaponry from
the SLA, creating a dramatic sense of fear and insecurity in the south (Murthy 2000;
Oberst 1992). The LTTE were relentless in their bloody campaign and used a suicide
bomber in an attempt to assassinate CBK during her campaign for a second term. She
survived but lost sight in one eye, and won the election with a reduced majority. Her
weakened position enabled the SU to promote their agenda, demanding a full military
solution to the war. Rahula and Soma, in contrast, did not - at least not in public - propose
the total annihilation of the LTTE as a final solution to the crisis, but Rathana used his
protest marches to openly demand a "military solution." In one such protest, he managed
to organize a 'fast unto death' by Venerable Hadigalle Vimalasara under the famous Bo
tree in the centre of the commercial area of Pettah. Vimalasara was a respected senior
monk, and the public fast soon turned into a very emotional campaign against Chandrika's
rule.
With these demonstrations, Rathana clearly moved beyond his mendicant life and
internationalist ideologies. Instead, he became the new symbol of a militant form of
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ethnoreligious nationalism. The emotional and extremely nationalist opposition mounted
by the SU eroded the image of the already weakened Chandrika government.
Nevertheless, in the parliamentary election of 2000, SU only won a single seat, based on
less than 2% of the national vote. The continued mismanagement of the economy, the
micro-management style of the president, and the military successes of the LTTE, at huge
material and human cost to the Lanka Army, continued to weaken the government from
within. At the height of the internal political disagreements regarding the question of how
the LTTE should be approached, the Lanka Muslim Congress, which for a considerable
time had been demanding that their political issues be addressed, broke off from the ruling
alliance, forcing the president to dissolve parliament and call a new election less than eight
months after the previous one. As expected, the ruling UPFA then lost to the UNP
opposition. In a complex outcome, SU did not win a single seat, gaining less than 55,000
votes. The election was marred by violent incidents. The victory of the UNP was
attributed to the promise that it would negotiate a peace settlement with the LTTE and
thereby establish the preconditions for an economic recovery. The UNP's programme was
a 'Business for Peace' model similar to projects operating in South Africa and Northern
Ireland. Many minority parties, including the Muslim Congress, backed the UNP. The
rather poor performance by SU was largely due to the island-wide "camping for peace"
campaign launched by a group of civic organizations, of which many received funding by
international non-governmental organizations (Hoglund and Piyarathne 2009; EU
200io4). This campaign destabilized the popular support the SU had enjoyed for some
time.
The UNP immediately launched an aggressive privatization program, which was
perceived as favouring a small Colombo-based business community who traditionally
supported the UNP (Bastian 2011; Venugopal 2008), provoking hostile reactions in the
rural areas of the country. Moreover, the promised "peace dividend" did not materialise.
Instead, with the help of the Norwegians, the government hurriedly signed a Ceasefire
Agreement (CFA), which was widely perceived to be in favour of the LTTE.
104 See the full report by the EU Election Monitoring Team: http://www.eueomsrilanka.orgIFR2001.pdf.
Accessed on 15 March 2010.
These developments disturbed the Sinhalas, particularly the armed forces and the Sangha
community. Soon the UNP became unpopular amidst a sense that Christian white
foreigners led by the Norwegians controlled politics in Lanka and that the international
involvement somehow gave legitimacy to the separatist LTTE. This was exactly the
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situation Soma had warned against. The ruling UNP could not justify its soft attitude
towards the LTTE, which was openly violating the CFA. The continued fear that the
LTTE was using the CFA to collect more arms and the hope that she could gain more
support in a new election led Chandrika to dismiss the parliament in 2004. The 2004
election gave Rathana and his SU a new opportunity to promote their cause. Rathana and
Ranawaka campaigned under a different name - e5J2S3zm ew@: C6{®C6 OHU) - and were
determined to become the kingmakers of the island and to alter the existing power
structures. Unlike many other Sangha activists, who let the context shape their agendas,
Rathana became an agenda setter. In this sense, Rathana may symbolize the ultimate
product of the kind of "Sangha heritage" defended by Rahula. He became the embodiment
of the political Sangha that Rahula and Soma had envisioned.
3.5.4 Rathana and o:)~2m "'we edt@)'" - Jathlka Hela Urumaya (JHU)
The 2004 election was a historic event: for the first time in history, an all-Buddhist-monk
party nominated 200 monks for 225 seats. The subsequent election of nine Sangha as full-
time politicians was of great symbolic significance for the entire Theravada Buddhist
culture in South and Southeast Asian states. The election was fought over the failed peace
process, over proposals for changing the constitution towards a more federal arrangement,
and most dramatically, over the possibility of establishing a dharmariijya (a righteous
state) through a "Buddhist Democracy." Rathana was one of the key JHU members, and
articulated the JHU vision better than anyone else in the Sangha fraternity.
Of course, this was not the first time that a Sangha stood for an election in Lanka.
Venerable Migettuvatte Jinananda, a contemporary of Rahula, was a candidate for the
Colombo Municipal Council in 1943, five years before independence, but was not elected.
In 1957, Welletota Pafifiadassi contested for a village council position in the Matara
District and became Lanka's first elected Sangha in any governing political body.
However, these elections were mostly symbolic and ultimately did not empower the
Sangha community; they were primarily local events. After the 1971 JVP uprising and
subsequent power struggles, the Sangha became more ambitious in setting themselves
political goals. In 1977 Venerable Pinikahane Saddhatissa was the first Sangha to contest
for a seat in parliament for Karandeniya but he too was unsuccessful.
In 1992, Venerable Baddegama Samitha, who like Saddhatissa was from the Galle
district and an active member of the LSSP (socialists), contested for the Baddegama
village council and won easily. He was one of the very rare Sangha to argue continuously
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argue for a more humane, compassionate approach to the ethnic conflict in the country; he
also supported the idea of power sharing. In 2001, he successfully won a seat in parliament
and became the first Sangha Member of Parliament. He was part of Chandrika's coalition
government and supported the peace process with conviction and compassion. However,
the continued terror attacks by the LTTE diminished the credibility of advocates of
moderate policies. Furthermore, the JVP/JHU anti-peace campaign in the south of Lanka
was effective in leading voters towards a more ethno-centric position. Accordingly, in
2004, Samitha was defeated.
A few months prior to the April 2004 election, the Sinhala Urumaya went through
a series of internal conflicts. The key issue in these debates was the extent to which the
Sangha should be participating directly in politics. Rathana and Ranawaka were
uncompromising in that they wanted the Sangha involved in every political campaign;
they wanted the Sangha to stand for election, to be elected, and then to use the political
process to advance their cause. In light of such internal disagreements, the party eventually
had to be dissolved, leading to the creation of the new "d~;§2:))@WG COl@","JHU party. The
JHU was based on a radical, even more ethnicized version of Rahula's Urumaya ideology,
advancing Rahula's ideas to their radical conclusions and thus adopting an openly anti-
peace and racist rhetoric. Rathana and Ranawaka's campaign exploited every known
Buddhist cultural practice, from using Buddhist vocabulary to organizing temple pujds.
They claimed their effort was a "e!lJO@Z5) @e!lOW~O" (a demonstration of Buddhist virtues),
"q~~~J25') ge5JD" (an offering of determined efforts), "&:hb@25) @e!lbWO" (a demonstration
of righteousness) and finally all this was to achieve a "wb@~C) OJd~~ "(a righteous state).
Compared to some of the newer Sangha like Omaple Sobitha, Ellawala Medhalankara and
the charismatic Uduve Dhammaloka, Rathana did not take on a prominent role in public
rallies. He was the national strategist who designed the campaign. Until the 2004
elections, it was common for political parties in the south to use the Sangha for purposes
of propaganda and mobilization, but for the first time in 2004 the Sangha themselves were
mobilizing every aspect of popular Buddhism to enhance their popularity through the
promise of creating a righteous land. They started every public meeting with a long period
of "pirith" chanting. On the nomination and registration day at the national election
commission office, they performed a Bodhi Piijii. During their propaganda rallies, they
arranged for the elderly, especially the Upasikas, to chant "Sadhu, Sadhu, and Sadhu" as
Buddhists would do in a temple.
Through these public demonstrations of popular Buddhist practices, Rathana
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initiated a process of "Buddhicizing the election atmosphere." Given that this process was
initiated by the Sangha, it conquered political life with unquestionable authority. Under
the JHU banner, the Sangha were using their ceremonial knowledge to mobilize the voters
- a practice that was not used by the SUo The SU was primarily reacting to the LTTE
separatist threat, whereas the JHU's agitation was more comprehensively directed towards
gaining power. Among its targets were also both the established and the new Christian
churches. Their anti-Christian position was coupled with a strong anti-Western rhetoric.
Unsurprisingly, these anti-Christian agitations reached their climax after the sudden death
of Soma, which the SU and pre-JHU elements presented as the result of an international
Christian conspiracy.
Moreover, the SU and the JHU can also be distinguished in terms of the caste
backgrounds of both the supporting laity and the key Sangha. While key leaders of the SU
were from a high caste, Rathana belonged to the Vananthanne (jewellery-making) caste,
considered to be one of the lowest. Rathana's activities showed that he had no inhibition
against using Buddhist ceremonial rituals for mobilizing voters and using the status of the
Sangha to impose his political agenda on the ruling elites. The JHU won seven seats in the
2004 election and obtained two additional seats due to the fact that they received 552,724
votes (5.97% of the national vote). The votes represented a tenfold increase over the SU's
200 I election result. The JHU acted as an independent opposition party in the parliament
for a while, contributing to some intense verbal and at times even physical clashes with the
others parties represented in parliament. Eventually the JHU joined the ruling party for the
2005 presidential election in order to support the hardliner Mahinda Rajapakse, who
campaigned on an ultra-nationalist platform promising to defeat the LTTE militarily.
Analysts are divided on the role and influence of Rathana's JHU. For example,
Oeegalle Mahinda commented:
I began writing this paper with reservations about the JHU's political ambitions and real
intentions of entering into the Sri Lankan Parliament. Once I read their literature and
reflected upon the current political crisis in Sri Lanka, I can see their importance and value
in democratic politics at a crucial juncture of Sri Lankan history. On the one hand, as a
minority party, the JHU can raise issues dealing with religion in Parliament to safeguard
Buddhist and Sinhala interests; on the other, their activities in the legislature with vested
interest on the Sinhala and Buddhist communities can be perceived by others in future as
an inhibiting force for peace in Sri Lanka. Although the members of the JHU are portrayed
in overseas media as nationalists and extremists, their current standing as a nationalist
voice has also to be interpreted in the current volatile ethno-politics in Sri Lanka.
(2004:99)
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However, these assessments, according to which the JHU had the potential to become a
force for peace and a voice of the Sinhala nation turned out to be self-delusions. The JHU
unreservedly supported the military campaign against the LTTE even when the huge
civilian costs became obvious. Rathana, as the leader of JHU, became the most hardened
supporter in parliament for the military campaign. He explained his position as follows:
"Day by day we are weakening them [the LTTE] with our military force. Talk can come
later."(The Economist 9.06.2007:26) The ideology of the JHU and its support for the
military campaign concretized the Mahavamsa thinking that killing Tamils was an
acceptable price for the protection of the Dhammadipa. Rathana became the symbol of a
neo-nationalist 'Buddhatvd' similar to the Hinduttvii of the Indian Sadhus, i.e. an
ethnoreligious nationalism that seeks to become the conceptual framework for redefining
the state and its subjects (Sarkar 1996). Rathana continues to contribute to the construction
of this Sinhalattva and defends it as the core of the Lankan identity.
3.5.5 Democracy vs. Moral authority
In 2004, after ten years of ChandrikaJUPF A leadership, the island had seen more LTTE
violence than at any other time in history, provoking the Sinhala south to look for new
political options. Already the SU was keen to exploit this political context, but it was the
remarkable transformation of the SU into the JHU - an all Buddhist monks' party - that
was decisive not only for the development of Sinhala nationalist politics but also for the
wider context. According to Deegalle Mahinda
the most recent radical development that occurred in Lankan Theravada monasticism in
the year 2004 [was the] the historic event of nine Buddhist monks becoming professional
politicians in the Lankan Parliament. By any standard, 2004 is the watershed in the entire
history of the Theravada Buddhist monastic world in South and Southeast Asia. For the
first time, a newly formed Buddhist monk political party identified as the JHU (National
Sinhala Heritage Party) fielded over 200 Buddhist monk candidates for the parliamentary
election held on 2 April 2004 to elect 225 Members of Parliament.
(2004:83)
Among the key factors that inspired the imagination of the largely semi-urban Sinhalas
and helped them embrace the idea of a Sangha-led political order was the strength of
Rathana's "morality" argument, which he underlined by incorporating Buddhist rituals
into the political campaign. Sinhala history from the days of the Mahavamsa onwards
showed how the Sangha exercised leadership by using Theravadin norms, rituals, and
traditions in order to legitimize or de-legitimize the state rulers. Under the leadership of
Sorbonne-educated Chandrika and her outwardly secular "liberality", the state had
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deliberately failed to continue the tradition of recognizing the Sangha and giving them a
kind of political legitimacy. In what we may call the Lankan "cultural consciousness,"
Chandrika was not the official and demonstrative "patron" of the Sangha, thus provoking
Rathana and his team to deploy a strategy of 'ritual displacement.' As defined by
Anagnost, the 'politics of ritual displacement involve the contestation of ritual space with
the aim of controlling this space and of undermining the moral credibility of the opponent'
(1994:221). Rathana challenged the state authority with the ultimate goal of transferring
power back to the central religious authority in the country - the Sangha.
The 2004 elections were fought over a number of issues, such as peace, liberal
democracy, economic recovery, and the future of the Sinhalas. Yet all these debates were
secondary to the 'culture gap' articulated and manifested by the JHU, who gained the
political advantage by promoting a traditional yet extreme interpretation of Buddhist
ethno-nationalism. Despite the state controlled media, the highly organized JVP (then a
partner of the ruling party) failed to win the sub-urban nationalist mind to the extent that
the JHU did. Nothing quite compared to the images, broadcast on an almost daily basis, of
a group of 300-400 Sangha walking silently in the heavy rain and burning sun towards
their meeting places.
How could Rathana inspire a country that had seen the decay of the Sangha, the
defeat of the military and the repeated failures of political elites? In general, in the analysis
of Western political science, democratic authority is always a contested notion. The ability
to acquire and maintain power through democratic support and access to resources
becomes the "art of government," but contemporary Western political science is limited in
explaining the role of religion in this process. In Lanka, governance is historically
legitimized by moral and socio-religious forces often defined by the hegemony of the
majoritarian mind-set. Scholars such as Rodney Hall (1999) and Muthiah Alagappa (1995)
have demonstrated that this was the case also in feudal Europe, where the legitimacy of
the secular rule was defined in a framework revolving around the notion of 'faith.'
As we have already argued, by introducing a cosmological order superior to the
secular social and political order, the Buddha created a system in which these parallel
processes were to be recognized and harmonized. There is a cosmic order that ultimately
governs human society and its politics, and in Theravadin tradition, this cosmological
order must be concretized by human action. Thus, these two orders can be harmonized
only when the "this-worldly" order is arranged and organized in accordance with the
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"other-worldly" order. The epicentre of a Theravadin theory of governance is Buddha (or
his relic), with the king/ruler, as the protector, next in line, followed by the rest of the
powers, including minor gods, their deities and the devotees in hierarchical order. Roshan
Wijeratne has explained in detail this "galactic" Theravadin cosmology, which provides an
infrastructure for power politics in Lanka (20 I0; 2005; 2003; 2002; 2000; and 1998). In
light of this analysis, it is not surprising that even within the last kingdom of the Sinhalas
in Kandy, its kings, regional rulers, and other officials were arranged in this order around
the Tooth Relic of Buddha.
In Theravada Buddhism the Bodhisattva, who is the one on the journey towards becoming
the next Buddha, could be incarnated as a king or ruler. It is for this reason that in
Theravada states religion, rule, and ritual establish a relationship between rulers and the
Sangha, and it is this nexus that had broken in recent years in Lanka for at least two
reasons. First, Chandrika, as mentioned, failed to recognize the role and authority of the
Sangha; and second, the ever-present separatist threat to the Sinhala state as well as
Chandrika's failure to defeat it. The government seemed to have broken the traditional
bond between rulers and Sangha, thus allowing Rathana to denounce the government as
decadent and illegitimate. In her ideological stubbornness, Chandrika ignored the fact that
while political authority in Lanka comes directly from the citizenry, the survival and
legitimacy of authority are directly dependent on the endorsement granted by the Sangha.
Rathana did not fail to remind his society of the ancient code of conduct followed even by
non-Buddhist kings (including the Christian British rulers), which exhorted those in power
to look after the "religion of Buddha, Sangha and its people". Until Chandrika, every
political leader of Lanka had, though at times unwillingly, played this role of the protector
of the "religion of Buddha, Sangha and its people" in order to have his/her authority
legitimized.
3.5.6 Rathana and the war against the LTTE
There was nothing ambiguous about Rathana's political aims and ambitions. He
explained: "the Sangha have entered the arena of politics in order to ensure the protection
of the Buddhist heritage and values, which have been undermined for centuries."I05 Prior
to the elections, he campaigned unceasingly for four objectives:
1. Chandrika's proposal to share power with the LTTE-Ied Tamil polity was
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clearly one of his primary targets. For Rathana, the land of the Sinhalas
belongs to the Sinhalas, who had been treated unfairly for the last seven
centuries. He argued that giving equal rights to the non-Sinhalas, who
constituted less than twenty-four per cent of the population, was in fact an
injustice to the Sinhala majority.
2. He promoted the idea of the total defeat and destruction of the LTTE by
military means. In his worldview, the LTTE epitomized the ancient rivalry
of Hindu Brahmanism against Buddhism, now made even more intense
because the Buddhist enemies were influenced by the Western ruthlessness
towards Buddhist people and their culture. Therefore, there simply could
not be any negotiations while the LTTE existed.
3. Rathana, building on Soma's legacy, also wanted to reverse the growth of
the evangelical churches in Lanka. He argued that evangelizing rural
Buddhist villages would be a step towards the destruction of the Sinhala
Buddhist culture. The norms and habits of the Christian West were a direct
threat to the existence of Buddhism and its culture. In response to this
threat, he mobilized - often very violently - the rural Sangha in whose
areas new churches were being built.
4. To a lesser degree and priority, Rathana demanded that the national
economy be restructured in order to comply with the requirements of an
indigenous, nationalist economic policy: a Lanka model of Bhiimi Putra106
- giving priority to the local capital of Sinhala Buddhist investors.
With the 2004 victory, Rathana became a firm part of the contemporary politics of
Lanka. Once in Parliament he proceeded to implement his goals. He was most persistent in
developing a political justification for the total war against the LTTE. In May 2009, less
105 Daily Mirror, 19 February 2004; and Spotlight on Lanka, 8(25), 20 February 2004, at
http://xLpair.comlisweb3/spot/c0825.html. Accessed on March 23, 2011
106 Article 153 of the Malaysian constitution guarantees special privileges to the ethnic Malays in providing
quotas, special discounts and higher marks at exams - an affirmative action favoring the ethnic Malays, who
are referred to as Bhumiputra or Sons of the Soil.
than five years after the JHU had entered parliament, Lanka totally defeated the LTTE,
killing all its top ranking officers, including its elusive leader Prabhakaran, who for the
past 30 years had humiliated the Sinhalas. This victory was imagined, campaigned for,
supported, and achieved by the JHU, a fact that elevated Rathana into the rank of a
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contemporary Sinhala Sangha who had lived, preached, and used his Buddhist identity and
position to defend, at all costs, Sinhala Theravadian ethno-nationalist politics. He
reaffirmed that in Lanka, peace and order could only come from the historical process
whereby the Sangha and the Lankan polity legitimize each other. Furthermore, Rathana
and his generation of JHU Sangha once again disproved the Western-colonial construct of
Buddhism and war as mutually exclusive phenomena.
Rathana was often referred as the "war monk of Lanka" in the Western media, a
title that accurately retlected his advocacy of a total military solution to the contlict with
the Tamils. He was included in a list of the "world's worst religious leaders" compiled by
the journal Foreign Policy.l07 Undoubtedly intluential in cultivating the military mind-set
in the present Sinhala society, he has no regrets that his 'victory' may have come at too
107 See http://www.foreignpolicy.com!articles/200S/04/06/the _list_the _worlds _worst_religious_leaders.
great a cost. He wanted to achieve the "total destruction of the LTTE", and given the
priority of the goal, "civilian causalities should be considered unavoidable collateral
damage and a necessary cost". 108
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The Sangha-led political protest in Lanka grows from a long-standing tradition with pre-
modern roots. As we have seen in Chapter 2, changing contexts and themes have
generated successive waves of Sangha resistance. Contemporary Sangha activists have
exclusively come from southern Lanka, from different caste backgrounds, patronized by
different political parties and caste conscious nationalist laity. What started as a protest
against the Kandy, Goyigama-caste Sangha hegemony, eventually turned against the non-
Buddhists and non-Sinhalas.
All these waves have been driven by two primary ideological notions. The first is
that the Sinhalas are the custodians of pure Buddhism and that the island of Lanka belongs
to the Buddhists and cannot be shared. The second derives from the first in that it
considers all interventions - from the inside or from the outside - that appear to threaten
the above foundations of the Sangha self-understanding as hostile enemy actions that call
into question the eternal future of pure Buddhism and the Sinhala race in this world.
Every intervention - regardless of how minor or well meaning - is thus bound to
be perceived as an existential threat. The Sangha self-understanding responds to the
outside world by raising the stakes as high as possible. Every outside influence becomes a
matter of life and death - and not just the life and death of individuals, or of a people, but
of a cosmology, of life itself. This uncompromising attitude will inevitably tum into a self-
fulfilling prophecy in which the very opposition it encounters confirms the essentially
hostile approach it takes to 'otherness.' This is the reason why for the Sangha mind-set,
the federal proposal was not at all a mere 'political' proposal. It was a direct attack on
their way of life. Well-meaning Westerners eager to bring 'peace' to the country have
failed to understand why their proposals were not only ineffective but also fuelled the
conflict. To offer 'federalism' to the Sangha as a 'solution' was like pouring oil on fire.
The dynamics of the Sangha self-understanding, worldview, and the historical dynamics of
the wave, in which it manifested itself throughout millennia, are the reasons for the failure
of federalism in Lanka. Thus, Lanka is an important case to consider as scholars and
108 Interview with the author, 23 June 2011, at his Sadaham Sevana Vihara, in Colombo 8.
practitioners of contemporary politics continue to suggest federalism as a solution to
problems of fragmentation and conflict in societies throughout the world (Iff 2012;
Mehretu 2012; Seymour and Gagnon 2012).
Walpola Rahula, Gangodawila Soma and Athuraliye Rathana are only three
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contemporary Sangha who interpreted, lived and disseminated Sinhala Buddhist themes in
their own context based on their individual experience and worldview. Both Rahula and
Soma constructed and left behind a legacy of their own, while Rathana's lasting influence
is yet to be seen. The three Sangha considered in this chapter in many ways continued the
tradition of the elders (Theravada) in Sinhala Buddhism and the ideological genealogy of
their Sangha fraternity. From the point of view of secularization theories, the Sangha
influence appears as an outdated outlier, as a phenomenon not to be taken seriously, an
unfortunate remnant of the past. However, in a society such as Lanka, the Sangha
influence and power is real. As we have seen, ignoring this reality - even if with good
intentions - will lead to more violence, more hatred, and more bloodshed. It would be
extremely important to explore to what extent the frequently reported 'revival' of religion
in other parts of the globe may be informed by a similarly deep-rooted dynamics.
The comparative political science frameworks are limited because they are marked
by a large conceptual 'blind spot' regarding the peculiar dynamics of the ideology of the
Sangha and its concrete historical and contemporary manifestations. One of the main
reasons for this oversight is that the underlying assumptions of Western political science
are implicitly and sometimes explicitly normative. The focus is on the recognition of
minority rights, liberal democratization, and multi-cultural universalism. From this
perspective, the Sangha are simply overlooked and yet the Lankan polity co-evolves with
them. The Sangha did not disappear with the advent of modernity, they have embraced
some features of modernity and used them as tools for their agitation - e.g. mass
communication media, globalized diaspora - but they were used in order to fight the very
principles of modernity. The need to understand forces as if the Sangha is not just an
academic exercise, but is also and most importantly a political need. The Western/outside
world will not be able to meaningfully interact with these societies unless they understand
and in some sense recognise the existence of these forces.
Popular Western scholarship tends to observe societies in terms of dichotomies and
binary oppositions such as e.g. religious/secular, traditional/modem, and
authoritarian/democratic etc. However, the Sangha are a good example of a political force
that does not fit into these categories. They bridge the past and the present; they are
religious but operate in the secular, and their role is not questioned by the majority of the
populace. Because the political tools that Westerners use are modelled on such flawed
dichotomies, they remain not only ineffective but also indeed counterproductive. It will
thus be instructive to look at one of these concepts and tools - federalism - in order to see
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how exactly it failed to respond to the political reality in Lanka and how, if at all, it can be
adjusted and possibly re-defined in order to become more sensitive to the religious, social
and political reality of Lanka.
Chapter4
Federalism and Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism
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4.1 Introduction
The previous chapters reconstructed the Sinhala Sangha mind-set in order to understand
the Sangha as key actors within the Lankan polity. We noted how they not only rejected
federalism as a solution to the separatist war in Lanka but also interpreted it as a threat Page 1194
undermining Lanka's unique position as the designated home of Buddhism, just as the war
itself threatened the territorial integrity of island. The Sangha fought against federalism
with the same motives that made them engage in and support military action against the
Tamil Tigers. This dynamic remained largely unnoticed by well-meaning Western
observers and activists. In this chapter, we will explore the Sangha opposition to
federalism in detail, but instead of approaching the subject from the point of view of the
Sangha, we will begin by reviewing the contents of the federal proposition and the
trajectory of the federal debate in Lanka. As we noted in the introduction to this thesis,
there were many good reasons why many voices within and outside Lanka would have
considered federalism to be an appropriate and promising solution to the ethnic violence in
the country. While the extreme position of the Sangha eventually proved decisive, it is
instructive to trace the fate of federalism in Lanka because it enables us to shed further
light on the Sangha and on federalism as a conflict resolution tool. As the federalism
project failed in Lanka, what can we learn from this failure for the future implementation
of federalism in other divided and war-tom countries?
4.2 Defining federalism
Academics, political activists, and leaders agree that federal arrangements are the best
available democratic solution for societies that experience fragmentation, division and
conflict (Anderson 2009, 2011; Burgess and Gagnon 2010; Burgess and Pinder 2007;
Kincaid and Stenburg 2011; Kincaid 2009,2011; Barnes 2001; He, Galligan, and Inoguchi
2009; Hicks 2011; Horowitz 1993; Lijphart 2004, 1992; McGarry and O'Leary 1993;
Roeder, Rothchild, and Donald (eds.) 2005; Simeon 2009; Tillin 2007; Diamond 2008,
2002; Kymlicka 2009, 2007, 2005, 2000; Taylor et al 2011). Federalism is evoked in the
context of a wide range of conflicts including ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural
conflicts. It is suggested as a solution during various stages of these conflicts, including
pre-and post-conflict management, resolution and transformation.
There is a vast literature on federalism and the way it is defined.109 Valerie Earle
commented that federalism is marked by "infinite variety in theory and practice" (1969).
William H. Stewart listed 326 varieties of federalism. Daniel J. Elazar, the chief editor of
Publius, argued in thejoumal's first issue:
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Federalism, as we understand the concept in its political form, is related to the whole
problem of the concentration, diffusion and, most particularly, the sharing of power in
political and social systems. Federal principles grow out of the idea that free men can
freely enter into lasting yet limited political arrangements to achieve common ends and
protect certain rights while preserving their respective integrities. As the very ambiguity of
the term "federal" reveals, federalism is concerned simultaneously with the diffusion of
political power in the name of freedom and its concentration on behalf of energetic
government. Institutionally, federalism is a form of political organization, which unites
separate polities within an overarching political system so that all maintain their
fundamental political integrity. It does so by distributing power among general and
constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of all
while enabling all to share in the system's decision-making and executing processes. In its
most practical manifestations, the workings of federalism are reflected in the processes of
intergovernmental relations and negotiated coordination among the general and constituent
governments and the interests they represent.
(Elazar 1971:3)
In his much-quoted Why Federations Fail (1968), Thomas Franck noted:
What this definitional problem suggests is not that a single, highly structured definition of
federalism is needed. Rather it is that there be greater understanding of the nearly infinite
number of variations that can be played on the federal theme and that the difficulties of
engineering a union of nations only begins when the leaders agree to federate and their
subalterns sit down to work out what is too often called 'the details.'
(Franck 1968: 169)
According to Burgess, "the study of federalism construed in its broadest sense is fraught
with difficulties that are reflected in both theory and practice", and he goes on to
elaborate:
Part of the problem with studying federalism is that it is a microcosm of the problem with
studying political science itself. Federalism deals simultaneously with fundamental moral
questions as well as with amoral matter-of-fact issues. The former, like social diversity,
individual, and collective identities, are highly charged emotional questions for many
people while the latter involve the routine pursuit of economic profit and security and
reflect for the most part calculated and dispassionate self-interest. The moral basis of
federalism derives from certain inherent virtues such as respect, tolerance, dignity and
109 For a list of recent literature, see http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=suggestions&doc=biblio/biblio-eng.htm and
http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/pub/archivelbibliographies/pubBiblio/fedbio.pdf Accessed on Mar 10, 2010.
mutual recognition, which lead to a particular form of human association, namely, the
federal state or federation. The amoral foundation suggests that no such qualities inhere in
federalism at all and that it is nothing more than a particular constitutional and/or political
technique for achieving certain overarching goals such as territorial expansion or
economic benefits and security.
(Burgess 2006:1)
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One of the key questions, which surfaced already in our research and is highlighted by
Burgess in the above quote, is the question of the normative core of federalism. Especially
when it is introduced as a constitutional arrangement that is meant to manage diversity and
to address possible conflicts, the indigenous political culture may consider the federal
proposal as an alien imposition - the case of Lanka demonstrates this possibility. The fact
is that whenever federalism is proposed, concrete people in concrete situations that are
loaded with meaning propose it. Whether or not it constitutes in itself a "neutral"
technique of power sharing, as soon as it is "applied" to a concrete situation, it assumes a
normative quality, which is reflected in the overall goals and ambitions of the political
actors who become its advocates (or opponents). It is perhaps mostly in places where it is
resisted, as in Lanka, that the normative dimension of federalism becomes obvious, raising
the question of whether federalism itself originated from and reflects a particular set of
ethical values contextualized in a political culture, which in tum may not be compatible
with other political cultures. Elazar understands political culture as "the particular pattern
of orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded" (1966:79).
The expectation and delivery of politics, the nature and character of people who come
forward to do politics and the policy outcomes are largely affected by this political culture,
and federalism too is an expression of a particular political culture. Federalism, therefore,
is not just a technical institutional arrangement; rather, it reflects the political aspirations -
political virtues such as peace and justice-of a people.
It is well known, of course, that the historical origins of federalism are culturally
specific. Wayne Baker emphasized the centrality of the notion of the "covenant" in
federalism:
The early federal idea and reality, as it developed from 1291 up to the sixteenth century,
held the promise of the theological, political federalism that Heinrich Bullinger first
formulated in Zurich in the 1520s and 1530s. [... ] Combining his experience of living in a
federal society with his perception of the biblical idea of the covenant, he developed a
concept of the covenant that not only had theological meaning but also important social
and political implications. In tum, this theological idea of federalism, as it developed more
fully in the course of the sixteenth century, fed into and helped to create the modern
political concept of federalism, especially in the thought of Althusius.
(1993:20)
The covenantal basis of federalism extended to the Constitution of the United States:
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America's covenantal heritage inspired the public philosophy of federal liberty and the
federal principle used to establish governments and political associations in colonial New
England. The Puritans, as Tocqueville explained, created the bonds and the liberties of
citizenship by their assent to eternal, transcendent principles, as well as by their consent to
government. The principles of covenant ultimately provided the institutional and
conceptual foundation of constitutional government, making America's federal democracy
less vulnerable to possessive individualism and democratic despotism.
(Barbara 1998: 1)
The very history of the term, and the mutations it underwent because of its history,
therefore suggest it is not a neutral technical label, but a political term with normative
implications. Ronald Watt agrees:
"Federalism" is basically not a descriptive but a normative term and refers to the advocacy
of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule. It is
based on the presumed value and validity of combining unity and diversity and
accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities with a large political union.
The essence of federalism as a normative principal is the perpetuation of both union and
non-centralization at the same time.
(2008:6)
Norman and Karmis expressed the same idea from the point of view of citizenship:
In its most general sense, federalism is an arrangement in which two or more self-
governing communities share the same political space. Citizens of federal states (or super-
states, as in the case of the European Union) are members of both their subunit (sometimes
called a province, canton, land or confusingly a state) and the larger federation as a whole.
(Norman and Karmis 2005:1)
Our discussion of federalism in this chapter will take Watt's and Norman's definition as a
guide, but we must stress that what exactly 'federalism' meant - and to whom -in Lanka
is an empirical question, not a theoretical stipulation.
4.3 Federalism without indigenous owners
As we have argued on several occasions throughout this thesis, federalism not only failed
in Lanka; the federal proposal itself fuelled the conflict because it became a focal point for
ethnic, religious and national agitation. Federalism came to symbolise, for the Sangha-led Page I 198
Sinhalas, everything that was wrong with ideas and practices that were not their own -
practices, which they considered as threats, because the mere presence of difference
reflected a departure from the unity and uniformity that their outlook and self-
understanding demanded. In this section, we will briefly review some of the key reasons
identified so far, as to why federalism came to play this role.
i. Political Culture
The political culture reflected in the federal idea emphasizes bargaining and negotiation
processes. There is nothing in the process itself; however, that guarantees a convergence
of positions. For example, in the Norwegian-led negotiations, both parties for some time
pretended to aim for a federal solution to the war. The LTTE demanded a Quebec-type
federal devolution of powers as a minimum, while the Lankan government was not ready
to agree even to a Pakistani-type federal arrangement as a maximum.i'" While both
seemed to promote a federal solution, the range of options left enough room for a
stalemate, and so they succeeded in deceiving the international community and the
mediators. On paper, Chandrika's proposal for a union of five autonomous regions
outlined a possible federal arrangement, but in practice no one believed that the proposal
had any real chance of leading to a consensus among the conflicting parties especially the
amongst the nationalist Sinhalas. Even the government's constitutional .expert, Professor
G. L. Peiris, who was the Minister of Constitutional Affairs and chief negotiator from
1994 to 2001, together with other architects of the proposals believed that it was 'an
excessive accommodation', which undermined the sovereignty of Lanka. In fact, while
publicly displaying a liberal appreciation for power sharing, privately he expressed strong
reservations. If there had been any chance that the proposals could have led somewhere,
they would not have been made. As a discourse, therefore, federalism provided both
parties with a playing field where they could hide their true positions and ambitions, while
the well-meaning international community was eager to sustain the discourse in the
110 For an introduction to the different types of federal govern aces see Ronald L. Watts, Federalism, Federal
political Systems, and Federations, Annual Review of Political Science, 1998, Vol. 1, pp. 117-137.
mistaken hope that it had real substance. The situation seems to suggest that for the
political culture of federalism to unfold, it must already exist. There are limits to the
degree and nature of 'political difference' that federalism can accommodate. Federalism
only works where there is a willingness to share and thus to compromise. Where such
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willingness does not exist, or cannot be enforced, the discourse of federalism becomes a
tool, which allows its users to hide their true intentions and manoeuvres. Even worse,
where there is no will to compromise, external pressure may lead to a hardening of the
underlying positions. The fact is that the federalist proposal in Lanka did not have any
indigenous' owners' .
ii. Indigenous Owners
The lack of indigenous ownership went hand in hand with the over-internationalization of
the conflict. The Sinhalas perceived the international community and facilitators as
pursuing their own interests, which were not necessarily in congruence with the interests
of Sinhala Buddhism. During the period of 1994 to 2005, advocating federalism was very
much the symbol of being 'liberal' in Lanka - leading to various proposals such as the
1995 CBK proposal, the 2000 UPFA proposal, the 2003 ISGA proposal, and the 2004
PTOM proposals - but the Sangha and the majority of the Sinhalas came to consider the
kind of liberal political culture that federalism seemed to manifest as a threat to their
native culture. Moreover, the federal discourse was primarily concerned with question of
peace and the ending of the war and thus partially ignored more substantial questions of
justice. Whose peace should it be? The commitment of the international actors involved
was looked at with suspicion. It is intriguing to observe that the many prominent
supporters of the liberal peace projects and the many VNGOs that not long ago wanted to
be directly involved in the peace building process are no longer present in Lanka. Since
the military conclusion of the conflict, neither Erick Solhaim, Norway's Minister for
International Development, the iconic figure representing the peace process, nor Yasushi
Akashi, former UN Under-Secretary General and Japan's special peace envoy, have
visited the island. The once-vibrant NGOs dedicated to promoting the peace process have
disappeared as their foreign funding stopped. As a result, the Lankan government
currently faces no external pressures to deal with the war victims, internally displaced
persons, needs-based development, or to address wider issues such as the de-securitization
of the North East or the downsizing of the swollen military, not to mention democratic and
constitutional reforms that would include the respect for minority rights. Similarly, in spite
of the 2012 March UN resolution, Lanka does not find it difficult to dismiss accusations of
human rights violations and mass killings as part of an international conspiracy sustained
by the Tamil diaspora. India's on-going involvement and its support for power-sharing
arrangements reflect a tactical move aimed at satisfying Tamil Nadu sentiments. Similarly,
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the numerous visits of higher Indian officials to Lanka reflect India's concern with the
growing Chinese influence in Lanka rather than with the situation of the Tamils. In the
meantime, the Lankan government maintains a strong military presence in the Tamil areas.
It seems that since the government's military victory, the agents of liberal peace have lost
their sense of purpose in Lanka, which might suggest that with their well-meaning and
flawed involvement in the 'peace efforts' they responded to their own needs rather than
the needs of the Lankan polity. These circumstances ensured that the religious, ethnic and
nationalist forces could unite in their opposition to the federal proposal.
iii. A pre-fab Solution
The international debate on federalism in Lanka envisioned federalism as a normative
extension of liberal governance. Initially, however, federalism was meant to end the war,
to bring peace, which means it was a technical tool in the service of conflict mediation and
resolution. Without indigenous ownership, the federal model implied in the peace process
was a 'mechanical' model, which if implemented would have amounted to an imposition
of a template believed by its proponents to be of universal validity. In other words, the
federal proposal in Lanka, embodying a distinct political culture, was always likely to be a
purely 'formal' proposal, which aimed at circumventing the intricacies of the Lankan
situation precisely in order to achieve peace. Yet reduced to its 'instrumentality' as a
potential peacemaker, the federal idea failed to connect to the inner dynamics of the
Lankan polity and to the self-understanding of any of its major actors. On the contrary, the
emptiness of the proposed 'formal', 'mechanical' federalism made it an easy target for
ethnoreligious nationalist agitation, thereby uniting the forces least interested in a
resolution of the conflict based on the acceptance of 'difference' in the name of peace. In
other words, the federal discourse unleashed and elevated to the centre of political action
precisely those forces it wanted and needed to contain.
iv. Ignoring History
Throughout this thesis, we have emphasized the unique role that Lanka plays in the self-
understanding of the Sinhalas and especially the Sangha as the home and 'refuge' of pure
Buddhism in the modem world as intended by Buddha himself. The political culture
informed by this belief in Lanka as the manifestation of Buddhism in the world created
both an informal and a formal structure whereby the kings and rulers on the one hand, and
the Sangha on the other, mutually legitimized each other. It is this symbiotic relationship
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between power and Sangha - a defining feature of the Lankan polity - which the
'mechanical' federalism of the peace process unintentionally (for the international
community) or deliberately (for the liberals in the Lankan political spectrum)
underestimated if not simply ignored. This, however, is not just a matter of ignoring or
excluding important political actors from the political process, but is also a matter of
failing to understand that the Lankan society, in the understanding of the Sangha, is a
'cosmion,' an analogue to the eternal cosmic order articulated in the teachings of Sinhala
Buddhism.
The term 'cosmion' was created by the Austrian philosopher Adolf Stohr (1921)
and then later developed by Eric Voegelin (Voegelin 1945). The purpose of a cosmion is
to act as a shelter against the forces of disintegration, and it accomplishes its purpose by
"simulating the wholeness of the cosmos by analogy" (Moulakis 1997: 18). A cosmion is
always the product of the human imagination, but it manifests itself in history as a
concrete political society with real political and social institutions.
Out of the shapeless vastness of conflicting human desires rises a little world of order, a
cosmic analogy, and a cosmion, leading a precarious life under the pressure of destructive
forces from within and without. [... ] The function proper of order is the creation of a
shelter in which man gives his life a semblance of meaning [... ] thereby relieving his life
from [the disordering aspects]of existence that always spring up when the possibility of
the utter senselessness of a life ending in annihilation is envisaged.
(Voegelin 1940:226)
We need to stress the crucial importance of this fact. The Lankan polity is not just a
historically grown community of people, who live together as a matter of fact, and
convenience, and who over millennia have created their own culture, their own way of
doing things. Rather, the political order in Lanka is an analogue to the cosmic order.
Accordingly, the history of the country, too, has cosmic significance, in which adherence
to cosmic principles is rewarded with well-being and prosperity and in which any
departure from these principles is punished with chastisement and suffering. For the
Sangha, the order of the land is not just 'symbolic' of the order of the cosmos; rather, the
relationship between the two 'orders' is analogous and real. Within this context, clearly,
the federal proposal too assumes cosmic significance and, to the extent that it is perceived
as a threat, requires an existential and total response even at the expense of one's life. The
stakes could not be higher: for the Sangha, federalism is not just a matter of war and
peace. It is not only a form of neo-colonialism; far more seriously, it is an attempt by
enemies of Sinhala Buddhists to hijack and hence divert the course of cosmic history.
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v. Devaluing Buddha
As we noted, the Mahavamsa is that record of the 'cosmic history' of Lanka. We saw how
the Mahavamsa glorifies the Anuradhapura era, the longest of all in ancient Lanka
(chapters 6 to 20), and two kings in particular: Dutthagamini (chapters 12 to 18), and
Parakramabahu I (chapters 29 to 37). Their kingdoms were highly centralized and
militarized; especially after the massive wars, they fought to "unite" the land under one
strong Buddhist king (Cunningham 1996; Evers 1969, 1967). Chapters of the Mahavamsa
vividly narrate the wars fought by pious Buddhist kings against the Hindu Tamil rulers.
These wars were fought in order to protect the dhamma, the sasana, and the land - not
merely to preserve political power. The Mahavamsa thus indicates what kind of rule the
Buddhist cosmion should adopt. Buddha's life, too, may be read as providing 'models' of
appropriate types of kingship. He lived at a time when there were several quasi-kingdoms
that were often at war to restore and preserve territorial and ethnic/clan identities. Buddha
himself came from the warring caste of Ksatriyas. He met with, advised, and accepted
invitations from kings. Richard Gombrich noted that Buddha, in many of his discourses,
emphasized the importance of hierarchical order in political and administrative affairs.
While his views were rather apolitical, Buddha did not radically dismiss the king's rule or
his standing armies. In fact, Buddha agrees to the advice of king Bimblsara to avoid
calling the soldiers into the order of Sangha (1988:83-85). The significance of hierarchy is
further underlined in the Dipavamsa and the Mahavamsa, because the hierarchy represents
the fact that the dhamma is given the "foremost" place in a "united" land. The unity and
uniformity of the land - the absence of difference - reflects the people's undiluted, pure,
and undivided devotion to the faith. Moreover, in order to establish and sustain the purity
of the dhamma, according to Mahavamsaeven Buddha used indirect force to either
coercively expel or 'integrate those outside the faith' (Clifford 1978:40), suggesting to
some that force and violence can be justified as long as they help sustain the hierarchy of
the Buddhist dhamma. The realization of the federal proposal in Lanka would have
undermined the Buddha's status and position within the Lankan cosmion.
vi. Subverting the eternal order
The Sangha are the guardians of the Buddhist cosrruon. They mediate between the
political and cosmic order, and thus are the protectors of the analogy that must rule
between the two orders. In some sense, these notions make the Sangha more powerful than
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the actual rulers of the polity, but we already noted that in practice their relationship tends
to be one of mutual legitimization. The crucial link between worldly power and Sangha
mediation is confirmed in many Theravada texts, especially the Mahavamsa (Collins
1997; 1992; Seneviratne 1978, 1976; Tambiah 1976, 1986; Wijeratne 2007). Modem
Theravadins accept the rule of the Emperor Asoka as the ideal model of governance.
Asoka became a (Theravada) Buddhist. He sponsored large amount of monasteries while
building new temples and stupas. However, what makes Asoka a great example in the
minds of modem Buddhist is his commitment to expand the Buddhist ideology.
The Ashokan period was then for Buddhism an axial moment, since not only was it
changing from a regional Indian tradition to a pan-Indian one; but as a result of its
encounter with Hellenism, which will be shown in this study, it thereby started to break
away from its geographical-cultural Indian cocoon. In short, Buddhism started to reveal its
cross-cultural and universalistic religious potential.
(Scott 1985:133)
Asoka personified Buddhist political rule as no other ruler did. He tolerated non-Buddhist
citizens, but only as long, they found and accepted their place in the highly centralized,
hierarchical structure of the kingdom. He ensured that the dhamma reached all eight
sections of his kingdom and gave his son and daughter to the sasana, with missionary
effort and sacrifice providing the ultimate legitimization of his rule. Asoka understood
himself, and was understood by those he ruled, not just as Buddha's agent but also as his
placeholder, as his 'replacement', carrying the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the
harmony between political and cosmic order. Wijeyeratne commented:
The cosmic order of Sinhalese Buddhism is multi-layered and subdivided, but its
fissiparous nature is "counteracted by the holistic framework within which it is
understood, by the attributes of the Buddha, and by the principles and mechanisrriswhich
provide the pantheon with a unity of structure" (Roberts 1994: 62-63). Within this
cosmological order, the Buddha is at the apex and the gods are in the middle, while the
demonic forces of disintegration are at the base. This cosmic order is in a continuous state
of flux as it moves between its hierarchical unifying aspects (associated with the Buddha),
fragmentation, and reordering, with the ordering power of the Buddha ultimately
encompassing the fragmenting logic of the demonic.
(Wijeyeratne 2007: 162)
Natha is the highest of the gods and in Sinhalese Buddhist tradition the next Buddha-to-be.
He is "characterised as continually contemplating the teachings of the Buddha and as
being so unattached to the matters of existence, that he is expected by the Sinhalese to be
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the next (Maitri) Buddha. [... ] Vishnu is conceived of as the protector of Buddhism on the
island; Kataragama is closely linked with the ancient Sinhalese Buddhist resurgence
against Hindu Tamil domination; and Saman is the god of Adam's Peak, the site of
Buddha's footprint and the Buddha's first visit to Sri Lanka" (Kapferer 1991: 159). Both
Vishnu and Kataragama are concerned with affairs of the human world and combine both
ordering and disordering powers "in their being" (ibid: 160). The order of the land and the
order of the cosmos are therefore not just "analogous," they are also closely linked via the
actions of gods and humans, with the Sangha playing a crucial in-between role. The
picture of the Sinhala order that emerges from these notions is thus one marked by unity,
hierarchy and purity. The canonical narratives make it evident that the Buddha occupies
the ultimate spiritual centre, with everything and everyone else, including devas and
arahaths, being subjected to the centre in a hierarchical fashion which allows some to be
closer to the centre than others (Gombrich 1998, 1971; Tambiah 1984, 1973). The journey
towards the centre is an ascent, reflected in the Samsara journey towards nirvana, which
includes the six familiar steps: sriivaka (listener), Diiyaka (supporter), Sangha
(renouncer), Siitapanna (the one who had entered the stream of awakening), Sakrdiigiimin
(the one who will return only once more), Aniigdmin (the one who will not return), Arahat
(the one who has attained). The same hierarchical order is also expressed in the notion of
simdmdlii, which recognizes the authority that radiates from the key temples. Even within
the Sangha community we find a hierarchical order emphasizing age, experience, and
gender. The equal power sharing that is at the core of federalism seemed to directly negate
this ideology of hierarchy as a principle of cosmic order.
vii. Ignoring cosmology
Throughout this thesis, we have referred to the forces opposmg federalism as
representatives of "nationalism," or we have more appropriately referred to
"ethnoreligious nationalism" as their underlying motivation. However, our previous
discussion has also shown that in the case of Lanka, the forces of ethnicity, religion, and
nationalism are the same. Applying the term "nationalism" to Lanka is, in some sense, an
anachronism. The Lankan cosmion existed before nations and nationalism emerged, and
accordingly it may be misleading to analyze it in terms of "nationalism". As Marshall
Sahlins argued some time ago, the cosmion of Sinhala Buddhism is a "too dominant site of
symbolic production, which supplies the major idiom of other relations and activities"
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(1976: 211). The language and ideology of a supreme ethnic race, Buddha's dhammadipa,
the warrior heroes, and their guardian Bhikkhus define the Sinhala polity. The
centralisation of all political power under Sinhala rule is not just a political "nationalist"
notion but also the manifestation of a cosmology, which emphasizes unity, purity, and
hierarchy - notions which to the Sinhalas seemed diametrically opposed to the notions of
differentiation, plurality and equality highlighted by the federal proposals.
In light of these distinct features of the Lankan cosmion, we should not be
surprised that federalism not only failed but that in fact its very proposal provoked the
sensitivities of the Sangha and the Sinhalas, leading to a response that was both aggressive
and defensive. This conclusion does not justify or sanction the Sinhala outlook, but it
helps us raise the question of how one can politically engage with the Sinhalas.
4.4 Conclusions
In Sinhala society, the king, the Sangha and the people form a triangle, and it is primarily
through their triangular relations that Sinhala society is to be modelled as an analogue to
the cosmic order. The king is the ultimate centre of power, leader of the Sangha and the
laity. He is to be a shadow of Buddha, while the laity who is to practice and embody the
teachings becomes the symbol of dhamma. The Sangha, as we noted previously, occupy a
crucial in-between position - between the king and the people, and also between the social
order and the cosmic order. Any disturbance to the balance of these forces represents a
challenge to an order that is not of man's making; it represents an affront to the divine
order of the cosmos with consequences potentially much more serious than the human
violence that the defenders of Buddhism may inflict on those they perceive as threats. The
centralisation of power corresponds to the central role played by Buddha. In Dighanikaya,
numerous verses are devoted to a justification of the "Maha-Sammata", or the great
chosen one and his centralized rule. The figure of the "Maha-Sammatha" emerges from an
election process and yet, once elected, it is his authority and power that moulds the realm
into a cosmion. Thambiah (1977) and Roberts (1994) showed how most South/Southeast
Asian states whose culture is dominated by Theravadian doctrine have come to adopt
centralised political systems that reflect the above outlook.
Political centralisation corresponds to the spiritual centrality of Buddhahood and
Nirvana. Every individual in their entire cosmic journey through the cycle of births moves
closer to that centre. The social and political order is subordinated to the overarching
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spiritual dynamics that underlies the overall direction of human lives. Ideally, the king is
the caretaker or steward of the process of Chakkavatti - he is the turner of the wheel of
dhamma. The king's palace becomes the capital not just for purposes of political
administration but also as a place of spiritual significance, symbolised by the presence of
the Dhiitu-relics. Political society revolves around the centre, being drawn into its
centripetal power field. This power field is a spiritual reality as much as it is a political
reality. It reflects the vision of an approved (Sammatha) and righteous king who holds
everything under him in balance so as to assist the peripheries in completing their journeys
towards Nirvana. Politically, this vision may translate into rigid structures of control and
even oppression. However, the spiritual legitimacy of the political order is conditional
upon the king's righteousness, i.e. his ability to be Buddha's shadow. If he ignores his
responsibility for maintaining the Theravada cosmion, he cannot expect that his authority
continue to be respected. It is especially with regard to this question - evaluating the
righteousness of kingship - that the in-between position of the Sangha allows them to play
a crucial role. Emperor Asoka - the most idealized Buddhist king - was able to embody
this idea of kingship. He came to power through ruthlessness and yet he was assured that
his karma was nothing as he constituted and maintained the Buddhist cosmion.
As we noted throughout this thesis, these fundamental principles of the Buddhist
cosmion are reflected in the Mahavamsa, The central hero of the Mahavamsa, king
Dutthagamini, acquires power by fighting wars against the Damilas - the Tamils - and by
killing many who failed to support him in his crusade. As he doubted the purpose of his
campaign in light of the suffering that it caused, the enlightened Buddhist Sangha (the
Arahaths) reassures him:
Only one and a half human beings have been slain here by thee, 0 lord of men. The one
had come unto the (three) refuges, the other had taken unto himself the five precepts.
Unbelievers and men of evil life were the rest, not more to be esteemed than beasts. But as
for thee, thou wilt bring glory to the doctrine of the Buddha in manifold ways; therefore
cast away care from the heart, 0 ruler of men.
(Mhv.25:108-112)
Considering the stakes, no costs are too high to protect the cosmion. Charles Hallisay
argued that Theravadin societies use Buddhist narratives in order to justify what he calls
"ethical particularism" (1996:3).
The Buddhist cosmion in Lanka has survived into the present and continues to
determine post-independence electoral politics. Leaders who position themselves outside
this framework will ultimately fail to gamer the support needed to implement their
policies. They will provoke a response from the Sangha, who are the judges of Buddhist
righteousness. This dynamics prevented CBK from implementing her proposal for Lanka,
and it catapulted Rajapakse to power. In spite of the illiberal nature of their policies, he
and his brothers were repeatedly elected because they were able to convey the image of
the defenders of the cosmion. Rajapakse succeeded in defeating the LTTE, a fact that will
cement his status within the Sinhala and Buddhist history of Lanka. It appears that his
unwillingness to negotiate with the Tamil Tigers was corroborated in the latter's military
defeat, turning Rajapakse into a modem Dutthagamini-style leader. Opposition leaders
such as Ranil Wickramasinghe, who campaigns for a market-based, western-style liberal
order, ensure their political marginalisation by ignoring the reality of the Lankan cosmion.
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4.4.1 A Federal Peace
It was within the context of this deep-rooted and historically unfolding cosmion that an
army of Western, liberal secularists injected federalist power-sharing as a one-size-fits-all
solution to the violence of the war in Lanka. The power-sharing discourse came to a
climax during the years from 1995 to 2005, which as a highlight saw the Ranil
Wickramasinghe government agree to explore federalism as part of the solution proposed
in the Oslo Communique. In light of the analysis provided in this thesis, it is not at all
surprising that these proposals were unacceptable for the Sinhalas. From their point of
view, they were held .at gunpoint by the LTTE and put under pressure by the Western
liberal peacemakers to change the very principles according to which they understood
their society and polity. As they were looking to formulate a response, they turned again to
their spiritual guides who mediate between cosmion and cosmos, the Maha Sangha,
restoring and rejuvenating the traditional position they held in Lankan society. In a
historical process involving ceasefires, peace talks, the resumption of war, and the final
military victory, we can see how the liberal peace agenda with federalism as its central
proposal was ultimately self-defeating because it strengthened and revived the very forces
it needed to contain.
The approach to conflict resolution and peace building that the international
community brought to Lanka was exclusively defined in terms of Western scholarship and
activism, emphasizing Western notions of minority rights, conflict resolution, democracy
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and federalist power sharing. After the 1983 pogrom and the emergence of the LTTE, it
seemed the peace building in Lanka required outside help. At first, India led the
international efforts from 1984 to 1990.
During the Chandrika Kumaratunga presidency - primarily in response to demands
from the Tamil diaspora and the LTTE - Western actors were invited to facilitate the
peace talks. The fact that a large number of Tamils ended up in European states may have
played a role in getting the Europeans involved in the negotiations. Moreover, when
India's traditional ally, the USSR, collapsed, India's influence as a regional power was
reduced. The globalisation of market based economies and the concomitant desire for the
creation of new markets and the expansion of existing markets led to what Roland Paris
(2004) called "Wilsonian peacebuilding". This "liberal peacebuilding" (Duffield 200 I;
Richmond 2006) gained further momentum as a dimension of counter-terrorism measures
as well as in the context of the "R2P" agenda - the "responsibility to protect" III (Bellamy
2009, 2010; Cohen 2009). It is a distinctive feature of these efforts to involve non-state
actors and indeed to involve them as partners who are as independent, autonomous and
equal as sovereign states. In Lanka's cosmion, however, undermining state power IS
contrary to the order of things and thus is always likely to provoke resistance.
Furthermore, the peace process itself remained an elite-driven enterprise. Except
for the president's office and the ministry of foreign affairs, hardly any other ministry or
government agency was asked to take part in the process. The 2002 Ceasefire Agreement
was largely an unknown document even to high-ranking officers in the Lankan army.
Often senior public sector bureaucrats and administrators were asked to observe or take
part in workshops conducted by a new breed of young, urbanised activists who preached
the entire curriculum of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding from "early
warning" to "post conflict-TRC mechanisms" and "distributive justice". An entirely new
peace industry promoted Western concepts and methods of analysis, but to the extent that
these notions were imposed from outside, they were also not just patronising but in fact
III R2P is a policy to intervene and protect the vulnerable section of a country when the state fails to do so.
This was discussed by world leaders at the 2005 UN summit, See
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%200utcome%20doc%202005( I).pdf.
dismissed the traditional order and its representatives.
The peacemakers approached their task with a rigid mind-set. They were
determined to make permanent and far-reaching changes to the Lankan polity so as to
accommodate their ideas. New actors were to be included, traditional actors were to be
excluded, and federalism was to replace the traditional Sinhala hegemony. The
peacemakers assumed that they had fully understood the internal conflict in Lanka. For
them, the conflict was an example of the problems they had studied elsewhere, an
"instance" of the theories they brought with them. Within their theories, they had ready-
made "optimal" solutions, which they assumed would be appreciated by "rational" actors
- implying that failure to accept their models would amount to irrationality. Accordingly,
the peace process included individuals and organisations who sympathized with its overall
framework and ambitions. These individuals and organisations were considered
"supporters" and they were portrayed as international, enlightened, liberal and modem,
while those who questioned, challenged, or even opposed the process were considered
regressive, outdated "spoilers" (Newman and Richmond 2006). The process thereby
managed to alienate precisely the very core of the Sinhala-Buddhist society - including the
Sangha - and provoked a predictably hostile response. In the conditions of modernity,
external observers have little choice but to approach the defenders of the Lankan cosmion
as "nationalists" and yet this label reflects an anachronism. Nationalism is itself a modem
category, while the mind-set that defines the cosmion in Lanka is, as we have shown,
much older. The modem, liberal peacemakers were thus prevented from identifying the
Lankan polity for what it is, adding another layer of misunderstandings to the situation. In
response, Sangha led nationalist groups including the JVP, JHU, NMAT, and a plethora of
other Sangha fronts united to condemn and agitate against the peace process, labelling the
process a "sell out" to the LTTE and the foreign agents. The politicians and NGOs who
promoted the peace p.rocess were demonised as traitors, who betrayed not just the politics
of the country but the very fundamentals of Theravada Sinhala Buddhism.
This binary opposition between inclusion and exclusion, supporters and spoilers,
defenders of the faith and traitors, etc. structured the 2005 presidential election, ending
with the defeat of Ranil Wickramasinghe of the UNF, who had supported a federal
solution. Mahinda Rajapakse, who had presented himself as the protector of the land by
distancing himself from the peace process, won the elections. It is ironic that the LTTE,
which had eagerly worked with international actors in order to gain international
recognition and publicity, entered into secret talks with Rajapakse as they too turned
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against Wickaramasinghe for his overtly pro-Western stance. In fact, although they fought
against each other with extreme brutality and cruelty, the two warring parties in Lanka
were still united in their opposition to foreign influence. Although they were driven by
very different ambitions and objectives, they secretly agreed that federalism was against
their desired goals.
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4.4.2 The Sangha reinstalled and legitimized
One of the unintended and yet crucial results of the process was the restoration of the
Sangha as a key formative influence on the Lankan polity. Not only did they survive in a
concrete, "physical" sense in the post-LTTE social context while, in contrast, the
Norwegians, the EU, the wide range of NOOs and INOOs engaged in peacemaking, as
well as the Western scholars have disappeared from the country. Further, the Sangha have
emerged from the process as the legitimate protectors of the Lankan cosmion. They
emerge from this process with their traditional role and reputation intact, and they are
probably the only actor in the process who can claim to have achieved this remarkable
feat. Their in-between status allowed them to support Buddhist soldiers, as they had to
reconcile their faith with the violence they endured and inflicted on others. On the one
hand, they were able to commit to the Panca Sllall2 - the five precepts of which the first is
not to kill any form of life: Piindtidptii veramani sikkhdpadam samiiadiyiimi - while on the
other hand they could endorse the killing of thousands (Daniel 2008). What is for outsiders
a plain contradiction is a traditional paradox within the Lankan cosmion. Its particularized
ethics applies within it; its ethics assumes the existence of the cosmion. If the cosmion
itself is under threat, its normal ethical rules and precepts are suspended and it becomes
not only possible but also indeed necessary to take whatever actions are required to restore
and secure the cosmion.
We must stress at this point that it is not our intention to dismiss the achievements
of the Western notions of peacebuilding and democratisation altogether, but it is important
to identify the limits of the Western approach. There is no question that in many other
contexts, federalism has worked effectively and that liberal peacebuilding has achieved its
intended purpose. However, this was not the case in Lanka, and this was because the very
understanding of politics in the country differs from the modem understanding of national
112 Panca Sila are the five basic precepts of Buddhism: Do not kill (any living being), do not take what is not
given, avoid misconduct in sensuality, abstain from false speech and do not consume intoxicants.
politics that prevails in many other countries. We also do not wish to romanticise or
legitimize the Sinhala understanding of politics as the preservation of the cosmion. We do
not doubt that under the disguise of spiritual politics, a considerable degree of "realpolitik"
is taking place and self-interests are pursued even where the Sangha symbolise that the
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true protectors of the cosmion must first of all renounce themselves. Rather, what we wish
to stress is that the "blind spot" of modem peacebuilding prevented the peacemakers from
understanding and hence from effectively engaging with the Lankan polity. This, we
argued, was because there were two different notions of "politics" involved. It is this
insight that makes the Lankan case so significant for both political science scholarship and
political practice.
We must also stress that not all Sangha were opposed to the peace process. Many
Sangha, who lived in remote villages with a mixed ethnic demography such as Ampara,
Degamadulle, Galle, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya, were supportive of the idea of power-
sharing and of a negotiated settlement with the Tamils. Some of them risked their
reputation and lives as they attempted to engage in dialogues with the LTTE and with
Sinhala society. Siyambalanduwe Mahinda, Madapagama Assaji, Baddegama Samita are
three prominent Sangha amongst others less widely known who made their conviction
public that peace must come from negotiation, compromise and power-sharing. However,
these were the voices of individual Sangha without much state or nationalist elite support.
And yet if only the international actors involved in Lanka had taken the Sangha more
seriously as political actors, they could have engaged with the Sangha hierarchy in Kandy
and elsewhere by working with these pro-peace Sangha. As a result of this "blind spot",
the exclusive, particularistic ethics of the Sangha seems more unitary than ever.
4.4.3 A way forward
Peacebuilding in conflict zones, particularly where new constitutional mechanisms such as
federalism are introduced, is never a single-actor endeavour. A protracted conflict along
ethnic and religious lines as in Lanka deepens the divisions between the communities,
suggesting that solutions can only come from outside facilitation. There is no doubt that in
many situations, external mediation and facilitation can be effective and beneficial.
However, the case we explored in this thesis suggests that the effects of such interventions
cannot only be ineffective but counter-productive; fuelling the very conflict, they were
meant to resolve. The "blind spot" underlying the peace efforts in Lanka was not just, due
to the fact that key actors were overlooked; rather, the issue is that the very nature of
"politics" in the Lankan cosmion is different from the modem notions of politics on which
those peace efforts were based. Arguably, there is no such separate realm of "politics" in
Lanka as the modem discourse of "politics" implies. In Lanka, the political is a dimension
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of the spiritual. Accordingly, problems do not have technical, "political" solutions that can
be separated from other dimensions of being. While it may be tempting for the modem
mind to treat this mode of thinking as an outdated relic of the past, the case of Lanka
shows that precisely this approach will confirm and reinforce this mode of thinking as a
distinct and very real feature of the present.
It is important to understand the scope of our findings. Our main point is not that
the techniques and methods of peace building need refinement - although this, too, is true.
Rather, the entire project of Western style peace building and federalizing needs a
thorough review in light of its unintended and yet very real effects on countries such as
Lanka. The "blind spot" we have identified here appears to us as a general characteristic of
the current Western approach to the world, with potentially tragic and unfortunate
consequences - although there is not enough space here in this thesis to pursue this theme
in greater detail.
The various forces in Lanka were able to use the war and the commotion
surrounding it in order to assert them and (re)confirm their traditional roles. If it was the
ambition of the peace builders to soften the positions of the traditional forces in the
country, then it is fair to say that the very opposite was achieved. Instead of getting
traditional actors to engage in a process of introspection, the situation in Lanka allowed
them to fall back on their traditional roles. As we have seen, "reform" in Lanka will
remain unlikely as long as the historical dynamic of the past continues. Crucially, the end
of the war is not a new beginning, but precisely a continuation of the dynamic of the past.
If the source of this dynamics is the Sinhala understanding of their polity as a cosmion,
then it is there where 'reform' needs to begin. For example, the present Sinhala
understanding of the Mahavamsa and related texts needs to be re-examined. This re-
examination could be guided by the actual Pali Theravadin teachings, in the light of which
mythical-historical narratives acquire meaning. This process of re-reading, re-examining
and re-interpreting is of a very different kind than the technical application of conflict
resolution tools and universal peace building templates. The point of this re-reading is not
to create a Western-style "consensus" but to use the reflective potential of Theravada
Buddhism itself in order to empower the Sinhalas to re-visit the by now taken-for-granted
features of their self-understanding of them and other. Within the context of such a
process, Western concepts and methods of analysis and interpretation may well be useful,
but in their application, we will need to surrender to the process itself in order to let new
meaning unfold.
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Appendix A Constitutions of Sri Lanka
(all accessed on 10 January 2012)
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Pre- Independence
1. The Colebrooke-Cameron Report of 1829-1831
2 The Donoughmore Report of 1927-1930
3. The Soulbury Report of 1944
Post-Independence
1. 1948 Independence Constitution
http://www.nationalarchives.gov .uk/documentsonline/download.asp?T=312
1082&S=II12/02988517M&E=raghavansuren%40gmail%2Ecom
2. 1972 Republican Constitution
http://tamilnation.co/srilankalaws172constitution.htm
3. 1978 Executive Constitution
http://www.priu.gov.lklCons/ 1978ConstitutioniCONTENTS .html
Proposed Constitutions
1. 1995 Chandrika Proposals
http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/cbkproposals/95proposa
ls.htm
2. 2000 Chandrika Proposals
http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/ 1978Constitution/ 1978Constitution WithoutA
mendments.pdf
Appendix B PeaceAgreements and Related documents (Post-
Independence), all accessed on 10 January 2012
1. 1956 Banda - Chelva Agreement
http://www.tchr.netlrsdetrbandachelapact.htm Page I 215
2. 1965 Dudley- Chelva Agreement
http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/65dudleychelvaa
greement.htm
3. 1987 The Indo-Lanka Agreement
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papersl
indo srilanks agreement.htm
4. 1987 Provincial Councils Act (as a result of the Indo-Lanka Agreement)
http://www.priu.gov.lklProvCounci Is/Provicial Counci 1s.html
5. 2002 The Ceasefire Agreement
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/south asiall836198.stm
6. 2003 The Oslo Communique on the possibility of a Federal solution
http://tam ilnation.col con flictreso 1utionltam ileelam/norway/02120 50
slodeclaration.htm
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